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ABSTRACT
“Imperially-Minded Britons:
A Study of the Public Discourse on British Imperial Presence in the Cape-to-Cairo
Corridor, Military Reform, and the Issue of National and Provincial Identity, 1870-1900”

Timothy Ramer Lay, B.A., M.A.

Marquette University, 2013

The Victorian era was marked by the incremental expansion of the British Empire. Such
developments were not only of enormous importance for government officials and the
contributors of that expansion, but for the broader general public as well, as evidenced by
the coverage and discussion of such developments in the Cape to Cairo corridor in the
national and provincial presses between 1870 and 1900. Transcending the discussions
surrounding the politics of interventionism, the public’s interest in imperial activities—
such as the annexation of the Transvaal, the First Anglo-Boer War, the Zulu War,
Gordon’s mission into the Sudan, the Jameson raid and the Second Anglo-Boer War—
also led to debates about the status of military institutions and the necessity for military
reform. Lastly, although these debates reflected on public understandings of British
national identity, they also demonstrated specific provincial sympathies, suggesting that
national identity was constituted differently in England and Scotland.
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1
INTRODUCTION

Beginning on the evening of 19 May 1900 and lasting over a period of several
days, the streets and squares of British cities, towns, and villages were awash with
merriment as the British public responded to the news that the town of Mafeking in South
Africa which had been besieged by Boer forces for 217 days had finally been relieved by
the British army. In London, the “unparalleled demonstrations” included spontaneous
parades of men, women and children marching throughout the city.1 In the city of
Bristol, thousands turned out for a formal parade led by the Lord Mayor of the city, and
in Kirkaldy, the event was marked by parading, setting out decorations, the ringing of
town and church bells, and the setting off of fireworks.2 Elsewhere, in East Peckham, a
village of 2,000 people in Kent, the residents likewise took part in celebrations such as
spontaneous parading, setting out decorations, ringing the town and church bells, setting
off fireworks, and cancelling school.3
Assessing the events surrounding Mafeking Night, numerous scholars have
contended that those activities were an isolated event and that the British public was
detached from and relatively disinterested in the empire. For instance, in examining
Britain’s small wars of the Victorian era, Byron Farwell asserted that the “long peace”
associated with the Pax Britannica left the British public largely unaware that from
Waterloo to the end of the nineteenth century the nation was almost constantly at war

1

Times (London), 21 May 1900, 12.
Bristol Mercury, 21 May 1900, 5; Fife Free Press (Kirkaldy), 26 May 1900, 2.
3
Donald Hodge, interview April 1995, Imperial War Museum (IWM), catalogue #11341; Census of
England and Wales, 1901. County of Kent. Area, Houses and Population, Cd. 1171 (1902), 27.
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some place on the globe.4 Focusing on economic matters, Lance Davis and Robert
Huttenback have argued that the empire comprised only a small part of the British
economy, and that for the most part the British public was not concerned with imperial
markets.5 More recently, Bernard Porter’s inquiry into the Victorian culture and social
awareness has boldly characterized the British public at that time as being largely
“absent-minded” about imperial concerns.6
Even so, while the British Isles were certainly detached from the peripheral
empire due to the delay in communication during the first part of the nineteenth century,
it is untenable to believe that the British public was oblivious to and unconcerned about
the imperial wars, that the mere frequency of those wars did not leave indelible marks or
impressions upon British society, and that the occurrences of Mafeking Night emerged
spontaneously without a pre-existing cultural foundation. Muriel Chamberlain has
suggested that, instead of reflecting Britain’s indifference to the imperial wars, the idea of
a Pax Britannica recognized that those wars posed little threat to the British homeland.7
In that way, the effectuation of a Pax Britannica coincided with interests in extending a
British hegemony, which was often ensured at the point of the sword.8 Other scholarship,
such as that offered by John M. MacKenzie and Andrew Thompson, has done much to

4

Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 339. Farwell’s
interpretation of the meaning of long-peace is to say the least remarkable, given that earlier in the same
work he contended that in the second half of Queen Victoria’s reign the British public was increasingly
aware and concerned about the imperial wars. Farwell accounted for this apparent contradiction by
contending that by the early 1890s the constant imperial wars caused Britain to become numb to such
developments. Ibid., 218, 295.
5
Lance E. Davis and Robert Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of
British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
6
Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford:
University Press, 2004).
7
Muriel Chamberlain, ‘Pax Britannica’? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914 (London: Longman, 1989), 9.
8
Sir Francis Patrick Fletcher, Pax Britannica in South Africa (London: Archibald Constable and Co.,
1905), x-xi; H. Whates, “A Year of Lord Lansdowne,” Fortnightly Review 70 (1901): 593; Bill Nasson,
Britannia’s Empire: Making a British World (Stroud, UK: Tempus Publishing Ltd., 2004), 135-36.

3
show that, to varying degrees, the British public was engaged in imperial concerns and
that the empire did exert some influence upon British culture.9 Additionally, Paul Ward
has specifically contended that public support for imperialism formed a key element of
British identity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, questions
concerning the degree to which the British populace was positively disposed to the
military and to the use of military force to advance Britain’s imperial position and status
in the international community remain underexplored.10 Building upon the
historiography, this dissertation contends that while the pageantry of Mafeking Night was
certainly unique, it was far from being an isolated expression of British enthusiasm and
support of the empire and the military. Rather, the phenomenon of Mafeking Night
should be seen as a culmination of decades-long support, interest, and engagement by the
public in the empire and the military.
The present study into the British public’s attachment to the empire and the
British military began as an offshoot of my master’s thesis which addressed the 1916
conscription debate in Great Britain. At the time I was interested in understanding how
Britain, by all accounts a non-militaristic state, came to implement a policy that was seen
as the embodiment of militarism. Historians and intellectuals alike have predominantly
characterized modern Britain as non-militaristic essentially because it lacked the
institutionalized forms of a mass military establishment associated with the continental

9

John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); John M. MacKenzie, “Passion or Indifference: Popular
Imperialism in Britain, Continuities and Discontinuities over Two Centuries” in European Empires and the
People: Popular Responses to Imperialism in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and
Italy, ed. John M. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 57-89; John M.
MacKenzie, ed. Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850-1950, Studies in Imperialism, ed. John M.
MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The
Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932 (New York: Longman, 2000).
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Paul Ward, Britishness Since 1870 (London: Routledge, 2004), 30-31.
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powers, i.e. conscription, mass armies, and the predominance of the military over the
government and national economy. In those regards, in 1914 the British military was
certainly dwarfed by the military establishments of France and Germany. Its armed
forces were comprised of volunteers, and the principles of liberalism and civilian
governance reigned supreme. By these measures, Britain exhibited few signs of
militarism, and during the Great War Britain saw itself as a bulwark against that form of
militarism. Indeed the country’s devotion to constitutionalism and fear of absolutism
prevented its military from having an inordinate control over state affairs. Consequently,
while acknowledging the occasional outburst of jingoism, most discussions of British
society have insisted that it was free of the influence or presence of militarism.
But in examining the social environment of Britain at the turn of the century, I,
like Anne Summers, was struck by the possibility that militaristic elements had become
integrated into British society and were in part responsible for the unprecedented
response to the call to arms in 1914.11 Despite the predominant amount of literature that
has either dismissed or downplayed the presence of militarism in Victorian and
Edwardian society, a select number of historians have pointed to a variety of militaristic
elements within British society. These have included the varied efforts of the Navy and
National Service Leagues to raise awareness about the need to reform and professionalize
the British military through the introduction of universal drill and compulsory military
service, and the impact youth organizations such as the Boys’ Brigade and Boy Scouts,
which were deliberately patterned after the military. In addition, the cultural exchanges

11

Anne Summers, “Militarism in Britain Before the Great War,” History Workshop 2 (1976): 104-123.

5
between Oxford and Heidelberg Universities and the dynamics of British patriotism have
also come under scrutiny for militaristic characteristics.12
Admittedly such cultural elements do not embody militarism in the traditional and
strictest sense of the word. However, the Oxford English Dictionary and MerriamWebster’s Dictionary include in their definitions of militarism references to “military
attitudes or ideas,” the willingness to use the military “aggressively to defend or promote
national interests, “military habits or mannerisms,” and “a strong military spirit or
policy.”13 Consequently, these definitions raise questions as to whether the prevailing
understanding of militarism, which centers on conscription and massive standing armies,
has construed the concept too narrowly. Given that some have sensed that militarism
exhibited some presence in Victorian and Edwardian society, those discussions raise the
question from whence did such influences arise. More importantly, the discussion about
martial tones in British society opens broader questions that transcend the specific
question of militarism. Namely, it invites renewed inquiries into the reciprocal
relationship between the British public and the empire, especially in regards to military
experiences and military institutions.
By exploring the intersection between the Victorian era’s peripheral small wars
and the British public sphere, therefore, the present work responds to MacKenzie’s
invitation for further inquiries into the intersection of Britain’s colonial wars and popular
culture, and Thompson’s desire for attention to the impact that imperialism had on
12

See Hugh Cunningham, “Jingoism and the Working Class” Bulletin – Society for the Study of Labour
History 19 (1969): 6-9; Idem, “Jingoism in 1877-1878” Victorian Studies 14 (1971): 429-453; Idem,
“Militarism and Anti-Militarism in Britain,” in The Week of Studies on the Military Power in
Contemporary Society (Rome: Fondazione Lelio e Lisle Basso, 1983); Thomas Weber, Our Friend “The
Enemy”: Elite Education in Britain and Germany Before World War I (Stanford: University Press, 2008).
13
Oxford English Dictionary [OED] (2007), s.v. militarism; Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary
(2003), s.v. militarism.
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domestic politics and the empire’s role in shaping national identity.14 Taking into
account that Britishness, as discussed by Linda Colley, Keith Robbins, Richard Weight,
and Robert Colls, was and continues to be a construction that has existed above, and as a
composite of, English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh identities, it is only fitting to assess the
British relationship with the empire along those lines.15 Indeed, while those communities
almost certainly had a common point of reference in regards to the imperial wars and
their repercussions, it is also highly likely that responses would not have been uniform,
and that they would have been perceived differently and possibly co-opted for entirely
different purposes and ends, depending on regional allegiances within the British polity.
For simplicity’s sake, this work takes particular notice of ways those elements
emerged in England, the “dominant” partner in the United Kingdom, and Scotland, a
nation that has been seen to have a special relationship with the military. Indeed, in
contrast to England, a disproportionate percentage of the Scottish population served in
the British military where they earned a reputation for being particularly hardy and
seasoned warriors.16 This study will only delve tangentially into the relationship between
the empire and Ireland because the complexity of Ireland’s place within the United
Kingdom—as simultaneously colonized and colonizer—presents methodological issues
beyond the present scope. At the same time, although Wales certainly retained a sense of
British identity, especially within the military establishment, it was overshadowed by
England and Scotland. Even so, inquiries into Ireland’s and Wales’s reciprocal

14

John M. MacKenzie, ed., Popular Imperialism and the Military, 221; Thompson, Imperial Britain, 1-9.
Ward, Britishness Since 1870, 6-7.
16
Scotland’s military heritage has most recently been studied by Heather Streets in Martial Races: the
Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 in Studies in Imperialism, ed. John
Mackenzie (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004).
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relationships with the military experiences of imperialism and their role in the
construction of “national” identity would certainly be warranted in other studies.
In order to lend the argument some specificity, I will offer an overview of
Britain’s experiences in a large swath of Africa in the late nineteenth century, which
reveals much about the public’s awareness of and interaction with imperial questions and
military capabilities. In the first place, those instances reveal a certain inclination toward
the “sureness” offered by aggressive military and political action to resolve imperial
questions. Such actions were frequently incentivized by promises of material gain and
further underpinned by a Social Darwinist belief that British governance and rule of law
were superior to what settlers and officials in Britain considered to be the barbarous and
inefficient government of the indigenous populations.
Such interactions increased in frequency and severity, and drew more public
concern and scrutiny after the mid-1870s, at a time when the government in London
began taking a greater interest in directing imperial policy. The process culminated in
1899 with the outbreak of what was the most significant of Victoria’s “Little Wars,” the
Second Anglo-Boer War.17 Within that twenty-five year timeframe, a number of

17

Although these wars collectively involved a British army that numbered close to a quarter of a million
troops, the label “little wars” has been applied because these they were individually fought with relatively
few forces compared with those of the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War. For example, the British
expedition force to China in 1860 and Wolseley’s command in 1874 against the Ashanti in West Africa
numbered only 4,000 men. The final relief of Lucknow in 1858 was accomplished with 5,000 troops. In
1879, before additional reinforcements arrived, Lord Chelmsford defeated the Zulu armies, which
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drawn Auxiliaries. British forces in the three battles of the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-1881) numbered in
the hundreds. A somewhat larger military commitment was devoted to the destruction of the Mahdi in
1898, as Kitchener had under him at Omdurman 8,200 British and 17,000 Egyptians. Coming at the end of
the nineteenth century, only the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was notably different as it eventually
required that half a million troops be committed to the effort. This would be prefiguring the military
commitment that would be required in the First World War. Aside from being a comparative term, like the
origin of the term “imperialism,” the “little war” label had a critical edge to it, as Reynolds’s Weekly
Newspaper used it in 1881 to headline an article that highlighted Britain’s ongoing military instability in
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episodes stand out which provide a sufficient context for teasing out the public’s
engagement in imperial politics. This period can effectively be divided into three
segments according to geography, and which opportunely fall in line with the general ebb
and flow of Conservative and Liberal Party dominance.
Three periods will be addressed in three sequential chapters. The first, stretching
from 1877-1881, contains the Annexation of the Transvaal (1877), the Zulu War (1879),
and the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-81), and features the dominance of the Conservative
Party under Benjamin Disraeli, a vocal advocate of the imperialist cause. The second era
and chapter will focus the discussion on the questions surrounding the Egyptian Crisis
and the Mahdi Wars (1882-91), during which time the siege of General Charles
“Chinese” Gordon at Khartoum plagued Gladstone’s Liberal Government and led to the
creation of the first Salisbury administration. Returning to South Africa, the final chapter
covers the years 1895-1902 , that is, the period from the Jameson Raid to the capstone
event of nineteenth-century British imperialism, the Second Anglo-Boer War.
While these events represent only a segment of Britain’s imperial experience in
Africa, they were among the most significant of the period, not just regionally but also in
relation to developments occurring elsewhere in the empire. In many ways they were
representative of wider imperial events, and in order not to lose sight of that larger
context, I will refer to other theaters of empire and the parallels drawn by contemporaries
among those theaters. In so doing, the spelling of place names in the Cape to Cairo
corridor and beyond have been uniformly modernized.

Western and Southern Africa. Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars, 1, 16, 123, 196, 244-247, 335, 340341. Cf. Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper 13 February 1881, 5.
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In assessing the newspaper coverage of imperial activity, we find, in the first
place, that the press both commented on and sought to shape the prevailing thoughts and
opinions of the British government. They thus reveal that imperial matters were a part of
the national consciousness and not limited to the inner chambers of Whitehall, the veldts
of South Africa, or the deserts of Egypt-Sudan. As will be shown, the reading public had
its own mind and convictions when it came to matters about the British Empire as a
whole and military intervention specifically. While the press did not necessarily reflect
the opinion of the government, there were times when the commentary drove government
policy, agenda, and action. In terms of imperial activity, it will be seen that the public
favored military action only so long as it could be accomplished cheaply, both in terms of
finances and blood, and when it served a purpose deemed worthier than simple economic
gain. Continued colonial security, peace, and humanitarianism, all of which were then
frequently augmented by a firm belief in upholding national honor, were deemed by the
public to be much more important and justifiable reasons for action than economic gain
alone. However, when the empire and military intervention failed in those regards, the
public actively questioned such errors of judgment.
Reading newspapers and other forms of the popular press as source material on
attitudes is, of course, problematic. Indeed, one of the key challenges any historian
confronts is tracing attitudes through written records. Memoirs, diaries, and letters are of
course vital sources in this respect, but such sources may provide only an incomplete
account of a person’s personal reflections and feelings. The challenge becomes even
greater when attempting to ascertain the consciousness of a group of people. This is
especially true when dealing with public opinions on a national level, where the so-called

10
“national consciousness” was often splintered by political, social, cultural, historical,
geographical, and economic influences into a multitude of perspectives.
Nonetheless, as Michael de Nie has noted, the nineteenth-century British press
can appropriately be seen as a reflection and product of the public’s awareness and
engagement in the world around it. In addition the press, in particular the local press,
were for many the primary source of news and served effectively to connect the public to
the societal and governmental issues of the day.18 As Lord Lytton noted in 1833:
Large classes of men entertain certain views on matters of policy, trade or morals.
A newspaper supports itself by addressing these classes; it brings to light all the
knowledge requisite to enforce or illustrate the view of its supporters; it embodies
also the prejudice, the passion and the sectarian bigotry that belong to one body of
men engaged in active opposition to one another. It is, therefore, the organ of
opinion; expressing at once the truths, the errors, the good, and the bad of the
prevalent opinion it represents.19
This role was not lost upon the press itself. In the summer of 1882 amid the Suez Crisis,
the Aberdeen Journal editorialized:
Bravo for leading articles! “The duty of newspapers is, or ought to be, to put
before the public in a plain, straightforward way, not merely the news of the day,
but such considerations as, because of their common sense or fairness, may assist
the public to understand political and other difficulties.” What wisdom! and what
conscious virtue! Where but in the pages in which these words appear, are we to
find the absence of prejudice, the pure love of truth, the high patriotism, the noble
devotion to the good of the country, irrespective of party; or, in one word, the
singlemindedness which alone can produce the “common sense and fairness”
necessary for the guidance of a bewildered public in the struggle with its
“difficulties.”20
In addition, Alan Lee has contended that throughout the eighteenth century, the press
served a vital function of horizontally connecting the various segments of the reading

18

Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 28-30.
19
Edward Lytton Bulwer, England and the English, vol. xlviii (Paris: Baudry’s European Library, 1833),
245.
20
Aberdeen Journal, 31 May 1882, 4.
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public—a purpose that de Nie insists carried over into the nineteenth century.21 The
public then would almost certainly have gained an appreciation for that exchange of ideas
through the editorials, which would refer to other concurring and conflicting opinions, or
through serial columns such as the Pall Mall Gazette’s “Epitome of Opinion,” which
purposefully encapsulated snippets of the editorial pages of the London and provincial
papers on issues of national importance. In this way, not only did provincials gain
greater access to the opinion of the Londoners, but perhaps more importantly, Londoners
became connected to the opinions on the periphery of the country.
In addition to reflecting sentiments, the nineteenth-century press was also an
invaluable agent for creating public opinion. Having largely been the mouthpiece of the
government in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, by the mid-nineteenth
century the press had effectively become a “fourth estate” and challenged parliament as
the leading center of political discussion.22 At the end of the nineteenth century, imperial
critics, such as J. A. Hobson, raised concerns that the press was effectively being coopted by imperialists in order to further to propagandize the public. More recently, John
MacKenzie and others have built upon that argument and explored more deeply how the
empire became popularized. The degree to which those efforts succeeded is the focus of
Bernard Porter’s work Absent-Minded Imperialists. As discussed previously, the
conclusion he has come to is that the public remained mostly disinterested. However,
Simon Potter contends that such efforts by their very nature were necessarily rooted in a
pre-existing foundation of support.23

21

De Nie, The Eternal Paddy, 30.
Ibid.
23
Simon J. Potter, ed., Newspapers and Empire in Britain and Ireland: Reporting the British Empire, c.
1850-1921 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), 18-19.
22
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It is those foundational sentiments and opinions that the present study is interested
in exploring. Both as a reflection of public sentiment and as an important proactive agent
in driving public interest, the content of the national and provincial press provides a vital
conduit for the researcher to create a composite interpretation of the public discourse.24
However, both functions have their imperfections. As a reflection, one must consider
whether even the composite opinions by the press are fully representative of society as a
whole. For as de Nie points out, Victorians largely regarded the public opinion
associated with the press to be closely attached to the middle class.25 As a proactive
force, meanwhile, one must question—as does Porter—the degree to which such ideas
were readily accepted by the public. Taking those issues into account, when this
dissertation speaks of the public’s opinions on the issue of imperialism, what is meant by
this is the opinions of the public in so far as they were expressed by the press.
Bearing these considerations in mind, this dissertation seeks to tease out the
awareness of, involvement with, and responsiveness of the British public to the small
wars that spanned the nineteenth century by focusing specifically on the Cape to Cairo
corridor in the period between 1870 and 1900 because that theatre was home to some of
the most significant events in those years.
Second, recognizing that foreign policy was only one avenue through which the
public connected with the empire, I seek to assess public concerns over questions
regarding matériel and manpower. As part of his study of the impact of imperialism on
British politics, Thompson focused his attention on the development and modernization
of the Royal Navy, justifying this approach on the grounds that up until the First World
24

For the purposes of this study, the phrase “national press” refers to metropolitan papers, such as the
London Times, that reached out to a nationwide audience.
25
De Nie, The Eternal Paddy, 29.
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War, the Royal Navy was the paramount branch of service concerned with imperial
defense.26 Nevertheless, from the middle of the nineteenth century onward, imperial
matters raised considerable concern about the size, ability, efficiency, and
professionalization of the army as well, which led to numerous calls for military reform,
by the likes of Secretaries of War Edward Cardwell and Hugh Childers, as well as MPs
such as Sir Charles Dilke and H. Spenser Wilkinson. This debate created opportunities
for the public to engage with imperial-military questions. In such circumstances,
questions regarding the appropriateness and ramifications of imposing universal military
drill and service upon Britain’s civil society were of particular concern. However, if
connections with the military and its imperial exploits truly made inroads into British
civil society, one would expect that they would transcend the context of politics and
would appear elsewhere in civil society.
Indeed such permeations did occur. This dissertation argues that the public was
not only aware of the empire, but deeply involved with and invested in imperial matters.
Political questions and concerns regarding the place of Britain in the world were not just
relegated to the halls of Parliament, but discussed and engaged by the press and the
general public at large. As a part of their being politically aware in general, the British
public was very much mindful of imperial matters. Moving beyond the national level,
the work demonstrates that while English and Scottish communities engaged military
aspects of British imperialism as a part of a national discourse and from common points
of reference, those communities also engaged and consumed such matters uniquely and
to varying degrees. While England tended to relate to the empire and the military as
national enterprises and institutions, members of the Scottish public was made keenly
26

Thompson, Imperial Britain, 110-32.

14
aware of their singular contributions to the empire and the military as a way of
accentuating Scotland’s position as an equal partner in the United Kingdom. Indeed, at
the end of the nineteenth-century the press was integrally involved in promoting the
martial character of the Highlander as an acceptable and esteemed symbol not only for all
of Scotland, but the British Empire as well.
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PART I
THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON IMPERIAL INTERVENTION
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CHAPTER 1:
PUBLIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS (1870-1881): THE
ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, THE ZULU WAR, AND THE FIRST
ANGLO-BOER WAR

From the time that Britain took possession of the Cape Colony in 1802 to the end
of the nineteenth century, Britain’s presence in the Cape to Cairo corridor gave rise to a
series of significant interactions with the native and Boer communities.1 In 1834, in an
attempt to remove themselves from British rule, Boers began migrating northward from
the Cape into the Natal, Orange River, and Transvaal regions. These treks not only upset
the inland peoples; they also did little to resolve the tensions between the British and the
Boers.2 At the same time, British settler movements eastward from the Cape further
unsettled relations with native and Boer populations, and by the late 1840s, settler
interests, indigenous resistance, and a growing willingness on the part of the Cape
government and Colonial Office to use violence often coalesced.3 For the remainder of
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the nineteenth century, Britain’s relations with the Africans and Boers would
intermittently be strained and frequently develop into open war, as Britons expanded their
colonial boundaries in response to geopolitical threats to their hegemonic position at the
Cape and in Africa as a whole, and as they actively pursued their own economic
opportunities.4
In examining the British presence in South Africa from the annexation of the
Transvaal through the First Anglo-Boer War, this chapter will focus on how the press
coverage and popular opinion concerning those events are suggestive of the parameters in
which aggressive or interventionist policies were deemed acceptable. The reaction of
Britons to their government’s interventionism at the Cape between 1877 and 1881 serves
as an important foundation against which their engagement with imperial adventures in
the 1880s and 1890s can be weighed. The first period included the use of coercive
diplomacy against the Transvaal Boers, which led to wars against the Zulus and
ultimately the Boers themselves. In subsequent decades, diplomatic efforts and military
force would be used as complementary tools, and in some instances, armed conflict—
including instances that were not authorized by the British state, such as the Jameson
Raid—sought to drive the agenda. The varied cases and forms of interventionism in the
Cape to Cairo theatre from 1877 to 1900, then, provide a discreet set of information from

Tony Kirk, “The Cape Economy and the Expropriation of the Kat River Settlement, 1846-1853,” in
Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, ed. Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (London:
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Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century Africa
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4
Over the course of the nineteenth century Britain became enmeshed in a series of frontier wars with the
Xhosa in the 1810s, ʼ30s, ʼ40s, ʼ50s, and ʼ70s, and the Zulus in the 1870s. It also used intermittent military
force to curtail the Boers in the 1830s, ʼ70s, ʼ80s, and ʼ90s.
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which to ascertain the extents and parameters under which intervention was deemed to be
acceptable by the British public.
THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1877

The annexation of the Transvaal was, in many ways, overshadowed by the
attention paid between 1876 and 1878 to the so-called Eastern Crisis. In the context of
Britain’s imperial experience in the Cape to Cairo corridor, however, the event was
crucially significant as it set the stage for two wars with the Boers and marked the first
instance when the Colonial Office and not the “man on the spot” initiated action in
southern Africa. The public’s apparent approval of this action undertaken with the
approval of the Colonial Office helps to establish the parameters within which saber
rattling remained acceptable in imperial affairs.
Only a few years after it had contained the Boer treks through a series of
territorial expansions in the 1840s, the British government dramatically retraced its steps
due to the increasing economic and administrative strain on the Cape Colony. 5 Ignoring
the complaints of the British residents and those Boers who preferred British rule, the
British government had recognized the independence of the South African Republic (the
Transvaal) and the Orange Free State through the Sand River and Bloemfontein
conventions in 1852 and 1854 respectively.6 In doing so, the government hoped that the
newly established republics would act as buffers between the Cape and the Basutos, and
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that Boer native policies could be influenced through diplomatic pressure.7 Those
expectations fell short as persistent Boer-Basuto hostilities proved to be a growing thorn
in the side of the British colonies at the Cape and in Natal.
The discovery of diamonds along the northern boundaries of the Cape Colony in
1867 significantly altered the colonial intentions of the British in the region and the
nature of Anglo-Boer relations.8 Britons and Boers alike rushed into the areas of
Bechuanaland and Griqualand West in search of personal fortunes, and the Boer
republican governments particularly saw access to those resources as a solution to their
financial problems. These discoveries also increased the importance of southern Africa’s
limited number of deepwater ports, such as Delagoa Bay, which were vital in connecting
the hinterlands to international trade. Recognizing that republican access to those
resources would threaten the economic supremacy of the British in the region and
provide immunity from British influence, Cape Governor Sir Philip Wodehouse annexed
Basutoland in 1868 to block the Boers’ access to Delagoa Bay.9 Then, in October 1871
amid legal arbitration negotiations with the Orange Free State for control of Griqualand
West, Sir Henry Barkly, the newly appointed High Commissioner of South Africa,
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unilaterally declared British sovereignty over the region in order to pressure the Boers
into participating in the formation of a confederation of South African states.10
Instead of succeeding in manipulating the Boer republics into accepting
confederation, however, Barkly’s action only encouraged their desire to remain
independent and to resist calls for confederation.11 Indeed, far from being the feeble
states that they had been in the 1850s, by the 1870s the Boer republics had increased as
regional powers, and they renewed their efforts to gain access to the Indian Ocean via
Delagoa Bay in 1874.12 These changed strategic circumstances roughly coincided with
the beginning of Disraeli’s first government, in which George Herbert, the Fourth Earl of
Carnarvon, served as Colonial Secretary. Recognizing the geo-political circumstances,
and motivated by socio-economic considerations, Carnarvon set in motion a
confederation scheme that differed from the proposed confederation of the 1850s, in that
it would necessarily have to include the Transvaal and Orange Free State.13
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Carnarvon initially intended to achieve that goal diplomatically.14 Successive
efforts in 1875 and 1876, however, failed to overcome the obstacles posed by the relative
isolation and diversity of the various colonies and by stiff resistance from within the Cape
Colony and the Boer republics.15 Those failures notwithstanding, Carnarvon remained
convinced that circumstances in South Africa necessitated that the Colonial Office take
whatever action was necessary to force the matter through. Ultimately, he concluded that
that action entailed the annexation of the Transvaal. Although Britain later insisted that
the action was absolutely necessary and justifiable, Carnarvon rarely explained his
specific reasons for pursuing confederation. He generally presented it as having selfevident, intrinsic value, and as being a justifiable goal in and of itself. In a letter to High
Commissioner of South Africa Sir Henry Barkly, he wrote that “the safety and prosperity
of the [Transvaal] would be best assured by union with the British Colonies, when no
occasion for local wars would continue to exist.”16
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News reached London in the autumn of 1876 that a war between the Transvaal
and the Bapedi was exacerbating the internal fragility of the Boer republic, and
Carnarvon saw a golden opportunity.17 He impressed upon Disraeli that
by acting at once, we may prevent a [broader] war and acquire at a stroke the
whole of the Transvaal Republic, after which the Orange Free State will follow,
and the whole policy in South Africa, for which two years we have been laboring
[will be] fully and completely justified.18
The acquisition of which Carnarvon spoke was not the voluntary cooperation of the
Transvaal in a scheme of confederation, but its coerced annexation. To execute this task,
Carnarvon chose Theophilus Shepstone, a man with thirty years of experience as a native
agent for the Cape government.19 Carnarvon perceived that action had to proceed quickly
in order to prevent the Boer-Bapedi conflict from expanding into a broader war and
drawing in the British colonies, and also to ensure that the existing uncertain situation
would lead to the annexation of the Transvaal.20 As Carnarvon wrote to Shepstone in
October 1876:
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The more that I consider the prospect of Affairs, the more important does it seem
to me to obtain the Transvaal. This will give us the key of the position and will
solve many of our most pressing questions. Lastly we can never hope that the
opportunity will, if now lost, recur.21
Informing Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant Governor of Natal, of Shepstone’s mission,
Carnarvon likewise made it clear that “under no circumstances does it seem possible to
revert to the status quo.” 22
When he appointed Shepstone as a special commissioner on 5 October 1876,
Carnarvon had instructed him that, “if the emergency should … render it necessary,” to
annex the Transvaal.23 Technically, Shepstone was restrained from making any unilateral
proclamation of annexation, unless he was convinced that a majority of the Boers would
accept British rule, and that the annexation had been approved by the high commissioner
at the Cape.24 In any case, any resistance from the high commissioner’s office was
effectively removed, when in February 1877 Carnarvon replaced Barkly, with Sir Henry
Bartle Frere, an individual who was a more avid supporter of confederation.25 However,
the fact that Shepstone was extraordinarily empowered to determine if circumstances
were ripe for annexation essentially made the oversight of the high commissioner moot.
Indeed W. J. Leyds, a man who held various offices in the Transvaal government in the
1880s and 1890s, concluded that Shepstone’s instructions had essentially made him
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“judge, jury, and prosecuting counsel in one, with the Republic as a criminal in the
dock.”26
Carnarvon rarely expressed concern that annexation without the approval of the
Boers would violate the Sand River Convention. Indeed two weeks before Shepstone’s
commission was issued, he had informed Disraeli that he was “preparing a permissive bill
to allow these colonies and states to Confederate.”27 By “these colonies and states,”
Carnarvon clearly meant the Boer republics, and yet his most recent attempt to cajole
them into confederation had been rebuffed only a couple of weeks earlier. Far from
offering honest assistance to the Transvaal as an equally sovereign state, Carnarvon had
been working to exacerbate the troubles in the Transvaal in order to coerce it into
confederation.28 Rather, Carnarvon’s reservations were rooted in the long-term viability
of the annexation and whether such an action would create further turmoil in South
Africa instead of lessening it.29 Having received reports that indicated that the English
residents and many of the Boers looked to Britain as their only salvation, Carnarvon had
some reason to believe that the annexation would occur amicably and with Boer
approval.
Further, while Shepstone’s mission cannot be seen as a military intervention, it
was not a purely diplomatic affair either, as the government deployed forces to the Cape
26
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to “add weight and incline obedience to any declaration which Her Majesty’s
Government might seem fit to make.” 30 Thus, two days after Shepstone departed for the
Cape, Carnarvon ordered that the 2d Battalion of the 3rd “Buffs” Regiment of Foot, then
stationed in Ireland, to mobilize for the Cape.
Arriving in South Africa in early November, Shepstone waited to move until he
was first convinced that his entrance into the Transvaal would not ward off the Zulus
from attacking the Transvaal, and thus relieve the pressure on the Boers to accept British
annexation. In late December Shepstone informed President Burghers that he was in
South Africa to inquire into the causes of the present native war, to resolve those
disputes, and to prevent those disputes from arising in the future. Then on 4 January
1877, Shepstone crossed into the Transvaal with an entourage of twenty-five mounted
policemen.31 While the greater part of the population was generally listless in the face of
mounting external and internal problems and could be expected not to oppose adamantly
what he offered, Shepstone was convinced that the sizeable number of ardent Boer
nationalists in the general population, and particularly in the Transvaal government,
would have to “see the strong arm before they [would] yield.”32 Any mystery as to
Shepstone’s real intentions evaporated when he announced to Vice-President Paul Kruger
30
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and the Attorney Genereal E. J. Jorissen that he was there to resolve the weakness of the
Transvaal and the danger which it presented to itself and its neighbors, by “initiating a
new state of things which would guarantee security for the future.”33 His insinuation was
perfectly clear to the representatives of the Transvaal government. Acting as an agent of
the British government, Shepstone meant to annex the Transvaal.
Responding that it was willing to discuss the causes of the Transvaal’s weakness,
the Volksraad utterly refused to discuss any measures that would undermine the
Transvaal’s independence.34 After meeting with President Thomas Burghers, however,
Shepstone was convinced that the president himself was inclined towards embracing the
security offered by British annexation, and consequently believed that he would soon be
in a position to proclaim “Her Majesty’s sovereignty over the country.”35 Shepstone thus
bided his time, and waited for the pot to boil over. His silence not only kept the Boers off
balance, but it provided him time to move the 1/13th “Buffs” up to Newcastle on the
Transvaal border, with the expectation that the annexation would be accomplished more
through a reliance on military power than on diplomacy.36 Ostensibly these troops were
to be deployed “for the protection of the frontier.” In reality, Shepstone desired troops
33
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near at hand and ready to enter the Transvaal in the event “the exhibition of strong force”
was needed “to control it and maintain the peace of the country.”37
In early April, that moment presented itself. Boer attempts at cajoling the Bapedi
into signing a peace treaty had failed. The Zulu under Cetshwayo were marching toward
the Transvaal border; and the Boers had lost almost all confidence in Burghers’s ability to
lead. It was at this point that Shepstone acted. With British troops poised to invade, he
promised Burghers that if the Volksraad enacted constitutional and governmental
reforms, he would refrain from taking any action. Despite Burghers’s attempts, the
Volksraad refused to take up the legislation, utterly rejected Carnarvon’s Permissive
Federation Act, and issued a stern warning to Shepstone to refrain from interfering in
their independence.38 Pragmatically, however, the Transvaal was in no condition to
defend its independence militarily. With British annexation immediately forthcoming,
the Volksraad, in an act of desperation, gave emergency powers to Burghers in the hopes
that the strength of their resolve would thwart Shepstone. It did not. Allowing Burghers
to issue a formal protest for posterity, on 12 April 1877 Shepstone raised the Union Jack
over Pretoria, the capital of the South African Republic. He then dissolved the
representative government, installed himself as the sole administrator of the territory, and
imposed martial law.39 Brushing aside the objections of President Burghers and the
Volksraad, as well as public petitions which insisted upon the independence of the
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Transvaal and the rejection of British rule, Shepstone legitimized his action by insisting
that “a large proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal…earnestly desire the
establishment within and over it of Her Majesty’s Government.”40
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE SHEPSTONE MISSION, 1877-78

In one of its first assessments of the annexation, on 14 May, the Times astutely
described the action as a “coup d’état,” and numerous papers, including the Times,
forthrightly reprinted Shepstone’s own acknowledgement that he had annexed the
Transvaal simply because he “could wait no longer” for the Boers to consent to Britain’s
demands.41 Despite this admission, there was hardly any outcry against the action from
the British public or the press, and these articles were deliberately framed to demonstrate
that circumstances on the ground had forced Britain to act. The Dundee Courier noted:
It is a circumstance deserving of passing notice that the news of the annexation of
a republic to the British Empire fails at present to excite here even a weak and
ephemeral interest. Questions are asked in Parliament about the reported
annexation of the Transvaal republic, but they attract rather less attention than
questions about “the Claimant” or the many other trifling matters on which
Ministers are rightly catechized…The annexation of the Transvaal was of course
not desired in the interests of the extension of the British empire; the act is
probably one of these necessities which are so frequently devolved on powerful
and civilized States coming in contact with weak, inferior, and semi-barbarous
communities.42
While the Dundee Courier’s observation was that the public was largely uninterested in
the annexation question, the national and provincial presses did engage the issue. On the
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whole, like the Courier, they overwhelmingly approved of the action. While
acknowledging the protests that President Burghers and the Volksraad had lodged with
the British government and the international community, the papers stressed the absence
of any sizeable Boer objection to British rule and that the Volksraad had ultimately
instructed the population to cooperate with the British.43 To that end, they largely
reiterated Shepstone’s contention that the need to overturn the Sand River Convention
had been forced upon Britain by the inability of the Boers to govern themselves, and that
British rule would usher in greater security and prosperity to the region as a whole.44
That such action was enthusiastically supported at the same time that Britain was
“horrified at the prospect of Russian annexations in the East” was not lost upon the
editors of the Liverpool Mercury. Insisting that the timing of the annexation was “the
only dark spot on an otherwise unexceptional transaction,” the paper maintained that
there never was an annexation accomplished with purer motives, with less
resistance, or with less injury to the populations, who are not even deprived of
that measure of self-government which they had always proposed to retain, but
only that ‘independence’ which they all knew they must, after more or less
troublesome negotiation, abandon.45
The façade of British altruism was somewhat laid bear with an acknowledgement by the
Standard that the annexation of the Transvaal had, at least in part, been made necessary
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by the Boer government’s obstruction of British capitalists, who sought to profit from
the mineral riches which lay within the territory.46
The one small glimmer of opposition in parliament came primarily from a small
contingent of the Irish Home Rule Party. Identifying the plight of the Boers with
Britain’s oppression of Ireland, Home Rule Leaguers Charles Stewart Parnell, Purcell
O’Gorman, Frank Hugh O’Donnell, and Joseph Biggar hotly contested the annexation of
the Transvaal.47 When Carnarvon’s South Africa Bill, which would allow for
establishment of a South African Confederation, came before the House in July 1877, it
became the occasion for an epic display of parliamentary obstruction.48 Amid
considerable commotion and distraction, Parnell declared to the Commons that:
As it was with Ireland, so it was with the South African Colonies…Therefore, as
an Irishman, coming from a country that had experienced to its fullest extent the
results of English interference in its affairs and the consequences of English
cruelty and tyranny, he felt a special satisfaction in preventing and thwarting the
intentions of the government in respect to this Bill.49
He further accused the government of acting “on the immoral doctrine that the interests
of the people of South Africa were subservient to the interests of the Empire at large.”
The House was asked to sanction the annexation of the South African Republic,
not because it was for the benefit of the Colonies, but because it was alleged that
it would be beneficial to the Empire generally.50

46

Standard, 14 July 1877, 2.
As a whole, Irish politicians were much more interested in drawing connections between broader
imperial developments and Ireland in the 1880s than in the 1870s. Collectively Isaac Butt, Charles Stewart
Parnell, Frank Hugh O’Donnell, and Alfred Webb were keenly interested in imperial matters and their
implications for Ireland. Individually, their interests represent the divergent ways in which Irish
nationalism viewed and engaged British imperialism. See Jennifer Regan-Lefebvre, Cosmopolitan
Nationalism in the Victorian Empire: Ireland, India and the Politics of Alfred Webb (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), 132-36.
48
Robert Kee, The Laurel and the Ivy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 145-51; F. S. L. Lyons, Charles
Stewart Parnell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 63-69.
49
Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser. vol. 235, col. 1809.
50
Ibid., col. 1834
47

31
In addressing what he considered to be the transgressions of the British
government more specifically, O’Donnell charged that the “forcible annexation of the
independent Republics of South Africa had taken place in a time of peace, and [was] in
violation of the most solemn covenants entered into by Her Majesty's Government.”51
This point, he insisted, had not gone unnoticed by continental powers, namely the
Republic of the United Provinces, and he presented to the Commons protests from the
Dutch government. In appealing to “the free people of England,” the Dutch expressed
their hope that the British would denounce the annexation as “an odious attempt and act
of brigandage,” which violated “the guarantees given to the South African Republic in
the name of the British Crown.”52 Even if the “Government had a right to declare war
against the Transvaal Republic,” O’Donnell insisted that there was an enormous
distinction between limited conditions that might be imposed after a “righteous war,” and
“the needless exaction of unjust conditions.”

To that end, he rhetorically asked whether

Germany or the United States would be justified in blotting out the Swiss Republic or
federalizing Jamaica, respectively, for the only reason that it was in their best interest to
do so.53
These few Home Rulers were joined in their protests by the Liberal M.P. from
Liskeard, Leonard Courtney, who would later become a leading figure of the Pro-Boer
party. While not interested in the ramifications for Ireland, he was nevertheless deeply
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concerned about the implications of the Transvaal annexation.54 “The Government,” he
explained,
has just annexed an independent Republic in South Africa. It may be said that it
will involve no risk; but to that I reply, Wait till the end. That act, without any
justification of policy or principle, exposes the country to greater peril of war than
my suggestions for the coercion of Turkey.55
The majority of parliament and the general public were largely deaf to these
voices. In parliament Parnell and O’Donnell were consistently rebuked and informed
that, because the annexation of the Transvaal was not pertinent to the Bill at hand, they
were out of order to raise the issue; nevertheless, they held up the third reading for fortyfive hours.56 This type of criticism is of course highly ironic given that the Bill was
meant to retroactively justify the annexation. The select few M.P.s who did actually
engage the issue, such as William Forster, a former Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies in the Gladstone administration, and imperialist Liberals Joseph Cowen and
Alexander McArthur, insisted that such an action was necessary to prevent utter anarchy,
that it prevented a “most destructive and bloody war,” and that the majority of the white
population appeared to be in favor of annexation.57 Cowen went a step further to object
to Courtney’s use of the term “annexation” to describe what had taken place in the
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Transvaal because that label incorrectly “presupposed the exercise of physical force.”
Instead, Cowen preferred the label of “incorporation,” which entailed a “union of mutual
consent.”58 Cowen’s confidence notwithstanding, he was hardly the only critic to brush
aside Courtney. Thus, the Morning Post expressed its hope that the criticisms of the
member for Liskeard would be the last heard in the present session of parliament, and
that before the next session, Shepstone’s action would “come to be regarded by the
present objectors as fait accompli that it is useless any longer to question.”59
Notably absent from the discussion were the voices of the Peace Society and
Workingman’s Peace Association which had been vocal in denouncing the “bellicose
policies of theatrical Imperialism,” which were associated with Beaconsfield imperialism
in other spheres during those same years.60 Between 1876 and 1878, Henry Richard, a
Liberal M.P. and Secretary of the Peace Society, along with the broader peace movement
had aggressively engaged the jingo call for war against Russia over the Eastern Question.
Similarly, they had been and would be highly critical of the government’s aggressive
imperialism in China, West Africa, Afghanistan, and toward the Zulus in South Africa.61
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In so doing, the peace movement attacked on two fronts. On the one hand, the Peace
Society, which depended on the support of the Quaker community, took a peace-at-anyprice position on the government’s pursuit of Britain’s imperial wars.62 Others, such as
Henry Richard and the Workingman’s Peace Association, however, took a more nuanced
stance and emphasized a need for greater arbitration and a reduction of armaments, as
well as pressing for non-interventionist policies on the grounds of “reason, justice,
humanity, and the interests of mankind.”63 Richard consistently focused on the lack of
sufficient justification for the extension of brute force. To him, the Arrow, Ashanti,
Second Afghan, and Zulu Wars were completely unnecessary wars of imperialism. He
contended that the Arrow War, sometimes called the Second Opium War, had been
contrived to further the immorality of the opium trade.64 Similarly, he viewed the
Ashanti, Second Afghan, and Zulu Wars as unnecessary and unrighteous; further, they
had also been contrived by the men on the spot and then condoned by the government.65
The onset of the Zulu War (about which more below) and British conduct in it were so
egregious that Richard branded that war “the most inglorious war waged by the arms of
England.”66 The results of such unjustified wars, Richard insisted, “were not triumphs of
Christian civilization, but of barbarism and brute force.”67
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However, Richard voiced no opposition or concern about the annexation of the
Transvaal in parliament until after the First Anglo-Boer War broke out in December
1880. On that occasion, he submitted a memorial to Lord Kimberley, the Colonial
Secretary, on behalf of the Peace Society and signed by twenty-five other Members of
Parliament. Richard insisted that the Transvaal had been fraudulently obtained, and that
as such, Britain should renounce its aggression and restore Boer independence.68 Yet he
had not expressed such views at the time of the annexation or during the debate over the
South Africa Bill. What Richard had petitioned for at the time of the South Africa Bill
was the extension of a selective franchise to “native Africans who [had] acquired both
education and property” in establishing a confederated government of South African
States.69
Given their consistent track record of vocally opposing untoward intervention and
the opportunistic use of brute force to further British imperialistic interests, why then did
the peace movement not levy charges against Shepstone and the British government for
annexing the Transvaal? Certainly the events of 1877 were well known to the British
public. The fact that there were individuals, such as Parnell and Courtney, who spoke out
against the annexation on the grounds that it was an unrighteous act, only makes their
silence all the more remarkable. We have seen that although the annexation was effected
by Shepstone with only a small police escort, with a contingent of the British army on the
Transvaal border, Shepstone effectively telegraphed to the Transvaal government that
refusal was not a viable option, but those troops did not intercede. To be sure, regardless
68
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of how the press spun the incident, the annexation was certainly not agreeable to the
Boers, and the British absorption of the Transvaal was hardly altruistic or honorable. But
the peace movement’s silence was in all likelihood based on the fact that no actual
fighting occurred, especially when compared to the Afghan and other campaigns.
Taken together, that silence juxtaposed against the overwhelming approval of the
press suggest a number of key components to the British attitude toward the use of
coercive military force. First and foremost, the largely one-sided reception of the
annexation strongly indicates that the normal grounds for objecting to “war” and brute
military force were largely mitigated by the specific circumstances of the annexation.
Namely, the annexation was not hampered by moral questions of the sort that had
accompanied British interventionism in China or the destruction and bloodbath that
accompanied other concurrent episodes of Beaconsfieldism, such as the Ashanti, Second
Afghan, or Zulu Wars. The complete lack of armed exchange, furthermore, almost
certainly made the annexation of the Transvaal more palatable to the country. Had there
been a strong demonstration of military opposition by the Boers, the incident would
likely have garnered more searching public commentary, if not outright, criticism, by the
British public as a whole and by concerned pacifist groups. As there was virtually none,
the public was free to assume that British rule was completely acceptable to the Transvaal
Boers, and therefore to assert that Britain was innocent of violating the Transvaal’s
sovereignty.70
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Given the relatively positive response at home, high-ranking officials within the
Colonial Office declared that protests levied by the Boer government, Dutch citizens, and
Transvaal Boers, and presumably those issued by the handful of critics in parliament,
“were not worthy of consideration.”71 The end result was that in this instance, there was
an almost universal acceptance of using strong-arm negotiating tactics to advance British
humanitarianism and security, even by papers, such as the Leeds Mercury, which had—
like the Peace Society—staunchly criticized aggressive interventionism on the occasions
of the Opium and Arrow Wars in 1840 and 1857. Significant differences certainly
distinguish the annexation and the Opium Wars, most importantly that in one case
intervention was accomplished peacefully and in the other it resulted in war. Still, the
criticism of the Leeds Mercury for Palmerston’s China policy went further than merely
condemning the expense of blood and capital; it challenged the justification of Britain in
interfering in the right of the Chinese to self-government.72
Further evidence that public attitudes about saber rattling were determined on a
case-by-case basis and not on a systemic feature of British governance is suggested by
the circumstances of Carnarvon’s resignation in January 1878.73 Just one year after his
directives had provoked the absorption of the Transvaal, Carnarvon willingly resigned as
Colonial Secretary as a protest to the rising tide of jingoism and the willingness of
Disraeli and his cabinet to use force to defend British interests in the Near East amid
Russian encroachments on the Ottoman Empire.74 Carnarvon’s resignation was
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noteworthy as it exemplified a characteristic of British belligerence. While he was
perfectly willing to use the threat of military force to pressure the Transvaal into
compliance, that mindset was far from a philosophical precept for him. Instead, the
decision of whether or not to use force was determined by the immediate circumstances,
including the potential foe to be confronted, and the ends which were sought.
THE ZULU WAR OF 1879

Despite Carnarvon’s belief that the expansion of British hegemony would bring
more tranquility and security to southern Africa, that desired effect did not materialize.
In annexing the Transvaal, Britain now assumed responsibility for protecting the region
from threats posed from Zululand. In his former capacity as the commissioner of Native
Affairs, Shepstone had developed cordial relations with the Zulu. But as the selfappointed administrator of the Transvaal, he took up the cause of the Boers in their
border dispute with the Zulu, and convinced Sir Bartle Frere, who had been appointed
high commissioner of South Africa, to effect the confederation of the subcontinent.
Shepstone’s motivation was that he believed that no long-term peace could be found so
long as the Zulu kingdom remained intact. When the Boer-Zulu border dispute was put
to an arbitration commission, its members ruled in July 1878 in favor of the Zulus.75
Had the ruling been allowed to stand, it might have led to peace in South Africa.
However, Frere perceived it to be a humiliating impediment to his and Carnarvon’s
confederation designs for South Africa. As such, although he had built a reputation as an
evangelical defender of the oppressed, over the next several months Frere began taking
75
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steps to subjugate the Zulus. Emphasizing the menace posed by the Zulus, Frere asked
that reinforcements be sent to southern Africa, and continued to present himself publicly
as someone who desired to maintain peace through diplomacy.76 Sir Michael HicksBeach, Carnarvon’s successor as the colonial secretary, responded that the government
would not send troops and that—in addition to the Eastern Crisis and the brewing war in
Afghanistan—it could not “now have a Zulu war in addition to other greater and too
possible troubles.”77 That warning notwithstanding, when Frere informed the Zulu chief
Cetshwayo of the commission’s findings, he inserted an additional set of stipulations,
which were designed to dismantle the Zulu military and essentially strip the kingdom of
its sovereignty.78 Submitted in the form of an ultimatum, those stipulations did not
preclude the Zulus from requiring universal service in times of war, but they admonished
that “the regiments were not to be called up without permission of the great council of the
Zulu Nation assembled and the consent of the British government.” In addition, the
missionaries who resided within Zululand were to be protected, and Zulus were to be
allowed to marry and attend school as matters of free choice. To ensure that these terms
were adhered to a British resident was to be stationed either within Zululand or on its
immediate border.79 Confident that the Zulu would not comply with his demands, Frere
ordered British forces to mobilize along the border of Zululand, and when the ultimatum
expired on 11 January 1879, a force of 5,000 British Regulars and roughly the same
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number of Auxiliaries crossed over the Buffalo and Tugela Rivers into Zululand and
instigated hostilities.80
Despite the high commissioner’s expressed “fear” of an imminent invasion from
Zululand, most Natal colonials believed that their neighbors posed little, if any,
substantive threat to the British presence in Natal. Indeed, in early November 1878, a
month before Frere delivered his ultimatum, the Natal Witness concluded that, while
hostilities were a possibility, it would take “an overt act of defiance … or some violation
of British territory” by the Zulus to instigate a war.81 Shortly thereafter, it noted that any
fear of a Zulu invasion had all but subsided, and the paper reiterated its confidence that
Cetshwayo would not initiate hostilities. It went on to assert that “things were not yet
ripe enough” to warrant a British invasion of Zululand and seemingly suggested that the
mere mobilization of the British forces on the border would be enough to cause
Cetshwayo to back down.82 Even after Frere had sent the ultimatum to the Zulus, the
Witness argued that the chances of the crisis leading to violence were still quite remote.83
Likewise, Lt. Col. Anthony Durnford of the Royal Engineers also believed that a
war was completely unnecessary. Durnford personally found Frere’s approach to native
affairs in South Africa distasteful. As a member of the arbitration commission that had
decided the Blood River Territory dispute in favor of Cetshwayo, he attempted to
adjudicate the matter fairly and opposed Frere’s belligerent posturing. Moreover, he was
concerned that the British public was being swayed by what he considered to be false and
exaggerated reports from the Cape. As late as mid-November 1878, Durnford believed
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that there was utterly no reason for an offensive war against the Zulus because they posed
no threat to Natal. However, once the movement toward war was set in motion, the
dutiful soldier kept any continuing reservation about the commissioner’s policies to
himself.84 Given the weight of public opinion in Natal against any military action, it is
likely that Frere deliberately fomented the myth of a Zulu threat in order to court British
public opinion and government support for his plan to expand British hegemony and
solidify South African confederation.85
In the event, colonists and officials alike were confident that, although the Zulu
army vastly outnumbered British forces in the colony, Britain’s technological advantage
assured that the Zulus could be subjugated with relative ease. The Natal Mercury went
so far as to claim arrogantly that “this army could not be beaten the world over.”86
Likewise, although Durnford believed the war to be unnecessary, he felt that if handled
correctly, the invasion could be a bloodless affair and amount to nothing more than a
“military promenade.”87
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Reports from the high commissioner’s office and the Cape press, took time to
reach Britain, arriving a little more than a week before the ultimatum was set to expire.
But once the government and the British public became aware of Bartle Frere’s
provocation, they became keenly interested in the developing controversy.88 In stark
contrast to the overwhelming approval of Shepstone’s use of heavy-handed coercive
diplomacy to expand the boundaries of British territory in southern Africa in 1877, the
public was divided over the legitimacy of Frere’s instigation of a war with the Zulus.
The perception was that the region was unstable and that the threat to Natal was
questionable. In general, editorial stances were split along party lines. Liberal presses
such the Bristol Mercury, Lloyd’s Newspaper, Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, and the
Daily News had track records of opposing the use of military force to advance British
interests elsewhere in the world. Earlier, they had come out against the Opium Wars in
China in the 1840s and 1850s, which had been instigated by the men on the spot and
approved by the Whig governments of Lords Melbourne and Palmerston.89 In 1879,
meanwhile, the parallels and resemblances between the concurrent overreaches of Bartle
Frere and Lord Lytton in issuing ultimatums to Cetshwayo and the Afghan Ameer,
respectively, to force their compliance with British interests were not lost upon Liberal
papers such as Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper.90 Noting that the ultimatum issued by
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Lytton had led to a second war in Afghanistan, Reynolds’s expressed little doubt that
Bartle Frere’s action would likewise result in a war, if one had not broken out already,
and the paper charged that “Beaconsfield’s ‘ultipomatums’ [sic] which were marked by
“blood, slaughter, and pensive devilment,” were “as efficacious as a dose of forked
lightning in a powder magazine.”91 Reynolds’s further insisted that there was no
justifiable pretext for war, and decried the history of Disraeli’s government for being
traced in blood, arguing that “Britain was reaping the bitter fruits of imperial jingoism”
by “continually drifting into costly wars, debt, distress, and destitution.”92
While they may have acquiesced to the annexation of the Transvaal, Liberal
papers found Frere’s arguments vapid and condemned him for exceeding his authority
and for acting in conflict to the wishes of the Colonial Office. For instance, in 1877 the
Daily News had seemingly concurred with the Cape Times’s belief that “the annexation
[of the Transvaal] gives peace to South Africa,” and “wars with the natives are things of
the past.”93 Subsequently, they questioned the annexation policy, with the Reynolds’s
Weekly arguing that it had done nothing but continue the contentions between the
European and native communities, a sentiment which was echoed in the Daily News.94 In
assessing the gravity of Frere’s ultimatum, the Daily News concluded that war with the
Zulu was all but certain, if it had not already broken out. Emphasizing the indefensibility
of Frere’s demands, the editors argued that Britain would never have been drawn into a
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war with the Zulu had it not assumed responsibility for the Transvaal. It further charged
that, given the recent developments in South Africa, it was clear that insufficient attention
was being devoted to assessing the means and consequences of territorial expansion:
We can hardly want another South African kingdom on our hands. As it is, our
territories in that continent are too wide for the European population, which
sparsely inhabits them; and it has been most desirable that the most friendly
relations should be kept with the vast native population.95
Likewise, the Bristol Mercury charged that the High Commissioner had instigated
the imbroglio without the permission of the Government, precisely because he knew that
they would not support his assessment of the situation or the use of force to resolve the
matter.96 On the other hand, however, the paper charged that Frere had acted in concert
with colonial public opinion. The Mercury labeled colonists at the Cape as jingoes who
believed that a successful war against the Zulu was essential for the future security of
British South Africa.97
In contrast, the Conservative press generally had fewer qualms about a military
solution. Writing just one day after Frere’s ultimatum was announced in Britain, the
Standard upheld that action and argued that the mobilization of troops against the Zulu
was justified in light of the “absurd and insolent claims of Cetywayo [sic].”98 Noting the
lockstep opposition of the Liberals to “another little war,” the Derby Mercury condemned
those who would put party matters before patriotism and objected to those who took the
side of the “savage” in any colonial or foreign policy dispute. The war at hand, the paper
claimed, was not one of Britain’s making, but rather had been forced upon the country by
the aggressiveness of Cetshwayo. Moreover, while the paper acknowledged that
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developments at the Cape raised questions about colonial self-rule and the financial
burdens of imperial defense, such issues did not outweigh Britain’s responsibility to
protect the Transvaal.99 The Conservative presses were joined in their support of the
High Commissioner by at least some of the independent presses. For example, the
Huddersfield Chronicle insisted that there was plenty of evidence to prove a war with the
Zulu was not a war of aggression. The Chronicle claimed, moreover, that this conflict
was not designed to advance imperialism, nor was it intended to keep the nation in an
excited state.100
This variegated public response to the outbreak of the Zulu War differed
considerably from the more unified and apparently sympathetic reaction to Shepstone’s
annexation of the Transvaal. The difference can, in no small way, likely be accounted for
by the courses of the respective enterprises. Whereas Shepstone had been able to achieve
his mission without mishap and without an actual battle, Chelmsford’s invasion of
Zululand was beset by numerous setbacks, which shocked the British at home and British
colonials, who fully expected the invasion to be nothing short of a complete success.
The greatest shock, and arguably one of the most humiliating and unexpected military
disasters in any theatre in the Victorian era, came eleven days into the campaign.101 On
22 January nearly half of Lord Chelmsford’s central column was annihilated at
Isandhlwana en route to the Zulu capital at Ulundi. In that battle, nearly 1450 out of 1800
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officers and men were massacred by a force of roughly 20,000 Zulus.102 The gallant
defense of 140 men of “B” Co. 2/24th Regiment of Foot at Rorke’s Drift against 4,000
Zulus mollified the sting of the disaster at Isandhlwana only slightly.103 Regrouping after
Colonel Henry Wood’s decisive victory over the Zulus at Kambula (29 March),
Chelmsford launched a second invasion of Zululand at the end of May, and by the middle
of July his forces had secured the country after defeating Cetshwayo at Ulundi.
As was so often the case in Britain’s small imperial wars, the opening shots at
Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift took place before the government in London and the
British public even knew for certain that war had erupted.104 Coming so soon after the
start of the war, those events did much to shape, fuel, and encourage public interest in
and the debate over the war. If the public had been too preoccupied with the Afghan
War, the Eastern Crisis, the collapse of the Glasgow Bank, and labor strikes to notice yet
“another little war” in South Africa, it could hardly have failed to become astutely aware
after Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift as the details were splashed across the pages of the
provincial press. The press’s interest in the Zulu war was evident in the personal tone
with which the satirical journal Punch covered developments. It claimed that Sir Garnet
Wolseley himself had desired “Punch” at his elbow when he embarked at Portsmouth for
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South Africa, insisting that “if anyone [could] make things straight” it was “Punch.” The
paper then pictured Mr. Punch variously offering advice to both Zulu and Afghan leaders,
crushing of the Zulus single-handedly, and yet tipping his hat to the beleaguered figures
of Bromhead and Chard at Rorke’s Drift.105
For those already disposed against the war, these setbacks were seen as irrefutable
proof of the incompetence of Frere and Chelmsford, respectively, as colonial
administrator and military strategist. In that vein, a chorus of voices in Parliament and
the general public began calling for Frere to be censured on the grounds that he had failed
to abide by the will of the cabinet and Parliament and that his unsanctioned and
precipitous actions had been completely unnecessary to secure Natal against an invasion.
While Lloyds’ Newspaper paid homage to the heroic stand of the 2/24th at
Rorke’s Drift, it blamed Frere for that near disaster and the earlier catastrophe at
Isandhlwana, and insisted that there were “few men in the country indeed who would not
condemn the war as a most reprehensible and a wanton act of mischief on the part of
Bartle Frere.”106 Even if that estimation of public opinion was accurate, such beliefs
certainly did not prevent the public from enthusiastically sending off British regulars
from Southampton bound for the Cape. Indeed, while the paper reckoned that these new
reinforcements would provide Chelmsford the means to “scatter the barbarous legions of
the Zulu King,” it denounced the pattern of bombastic bluster and disastrous chauvinism
which on so many occasions led Britain into trouble. Frere’s actions were therefore only
the most recent instance in which a government official had defied the Government’s
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warnings and devoted himself to war and one can imagine that the shadow of the Afghan
War loomed large in this judgment.107
The editors of Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper broadened their earlier attack and
linked the most recent failure in South Africa to what they saw as the systemic and
inescapable failures of Beaconsfieldism and Tory governance. Such actions made Britain
financially poorer and morally weaker.108 In particular, the mounting costs and the
disaster at Isandhlwana were, in their minds, the “bitter fruits of imperial jingoism.” The
editors of Reynolds’s, along with those of the North-Eastern Daily Gazette, pointedly
charged that the Government had blood on its hands for sanctioning the High
Commissioner’s “mischievous policy.” As such, it should thus share in the blame for the
South African debacle.109 Furthermore, in reflecting upon Lord Derby’s insistence that
Britain’s first interest was peace and how men in the Government had recently dragged
the country into wars with the Ashanti, Afghan, Zulu and Burmese, Reynolds’s
subsequently argued that decisive action must be taken to “make it impossible for men
like Sir Henry Layard and Sir Bartle Frere to call up fleets, or to send for reinforcements
to execute a policy which the British people have never had the opportunity of
considering in Parliament.”110
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The disaster of Isandhlwana, however, did little to dissuade the Conservative
Aberdeen Journal and the Liberal Pall Mall Gazette, which had broken ranks with the
other Liberal presses, from supporting the embattled high commissioner from the start.
Arguing that Frere should be given the benefit of the doubt until the facts became more
fully known, they encouraged the public not to rush to judgment. They argued that Frere
had not overestimated the Zulu peril, and postulated that, while it may have been rash to
invade Zululand, a delay may have proved to be a far more dangerous course of action.111
Even after Parliament moved to censure Frere in April 1879, the Pall Mall Gazette
continued to defend him. It insisted that it was completely disingenuous and “the wrong
mode of … treating public servants abroad” for officials, such as Lord Salisbury, to tout
Frere’s “patriotism” and to refuse his resignation on the grounds that he continued to
have confidence in his abilities, having voted earlier to censure the administrator.112
While much of the public’s attention was focused on Frere’s supposed intention to
foment another colonial war, Chelmsford did not escape criticism for his part in the
disaster at Isandhlwana. Despite Chelmsford’s attempts to lay the blame for the disaster
on Durnford, the senior officer in the camp when the Zulus attacked, Liberal and
Conservative papers alike, including the Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper and the Standard,
concurred that a more able commander needed to be assigned.113 This stance was
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particularly noteworthy coming from the Standard, a paper whose correspondent Charles
“Noggs” Norris-Newman had accepted the mobilization of British troops as an
appropriate reaction to the “absurd and insolent claims of Cetywayo [sic].”114 The
obvious choice for this assignment was Britain’s premier military commander Major
General Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had become a household name after proving himself
against the Ashanti in West Africa in 1873-74. So confident and familiar was the public
with Wolseley’s abilities that some provincial newspapers argued that had he been in
charge from the beginning, Isandhlwana would never have happened.115
While the London and provincial press brought the war and the questions
surrounding it home to the public through news reports, editorials, and occasional maps,
illustrated broadsheets such as the Illustrated London News, the Graphic and the Penny
Illustrated Paper effectively brought the public more intimately into contact with the
dramatic course of the Zulu and other wars by splashing engravings of maps, the terrain,
the events, and the personalities involved alongside written reports and analyses of the
war. In the case of the Zulu War, these included depictions of troop activity and battles,
the embarkation and transit of the 91st Highlanders and 60th Rifles to South Africa,
Buller’s defeat of the Zulus at Kambula, as well as the military and social life of Britain’s
African adversary.116 In the aftermath of Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift, mosaics of the
tragic and auspicious heroes of those incidents, appeared in the Graphic, Illustrated
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London News, and the Penny Illustrated Paper.117 The overall effect of such publications
was that many of those who fell at Isandhlwana, along with those who successfully
fended off the attack at the mission station at Rorke’s Drift, were quickly elevated to hero
status. Significantly, the mosaic which appeared in the Graphic on 1 March integrated
the heroes of the Zulu War with those of the war in Afghanistan, which was an unrelated
but contemporaneous affair, and strongly suggests that the public understood the breadth
of imperial activity within an interconnected framework.118
IMPERIAL RETREAT:
MIDLOTHIAN AND THE FIRST ANGLO-BOER WAR, 1879-1881
Just a little more than a year after the close of the Zulu War, public interest was
again focused on the African subcontinent as war erupted between the Boers and Britain.
The public’s interest in South African affairs in the years leading up to the war and
during the war itself cannot be divorced from the broader framework of empire and
public awareness. Moreover, the backdrop for the war and the public discourse about it,
illustrate the reciprocal relationship that existed between imperial developments on the
periphery and local matters in Britain itself, both on personal and national levels.
That intersection is most clearly seen in the life of William Ewart Gladstone
between 1879 and early 1880. In February 1879, to Gladstone’s dismay, Britain was
awash with jingoistic fervor as Prime Minister Disraeli authorized £6 million for a naval
expedition to intervene on behalf of Turkey against Russian encroachment. That fervor
put Gladstone at odds with his own Greenwich constituency, some of whom
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demonstrated in a mob-like fashion in front of his house, requiring police intervention to
disperse the crowd. In turn, Gladstone found that his political future depended upon
severing his ties with Greenwich. Turning down an opportunity to represent Leeds,
Gladstone ultimately decided to challenge Lord Dalkeith for the Midlothian seat. As
Gladstone biographers H. G. C. Matthew and Roy Jenkins have noted, this move marked
a pivotal turning point in parliamentary history. It exemplified the tendency of Liberals
to focus on deriving influence and power from more agrarian and non-English
constituencies instead of potentially less predictable English constituencies, such as
Leeds. Indeed after Gladstone’s premiership of 1868-1874 all future Liberal prime
ministers emerged from non-English constituencies.119
In the forthcoming campaign, Gladstone made imperial affairs a central issue
because he believed that the preceding years of Conservative governance had had the
“effect of vexing and alarming the people of this country and compromising the interests
of the empire.”120 He, therefore, denounced the jingoism associated with Disraeli’s
Eastern policy, and what he believed were unjustifiable wars against the Zulu and Afghan
peoples. In addition, he accused Disraeli of fiscal mismanagement, by emphasizing that
during his premiership the government had gone from enjoying a £6 million surplus to an
£8 million deficit.121 Further, although he had publicly remained silent on the Transvaal
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at the time of its annexation and throughout the debate over the South Africa Bill,
Gladstone now added that action to the list of Beaconsfield’s imperial missteps:122
They have annexed in Africa the Transvaal territory inhabited by a free European
Christian republican community which they have thought proper to bring within
the limits of a monarchy, although out of 8000 persons in that republic qualified
to vote upon the subject we are told—and I have never seen the statement
officially contradicted—that 6500 protested against it. These are the
circumstances under which we undertake to transform republicans into the
subjects of the monarchy.123
In the Transvaal we have chosen most unwisely – I am tempted to say insanely –
to put ourselves in the strange predicament of the free subjects of the Monarch
going to coerce the free subjects of the Republic and to compel them to accept a
citizenship which they decline and refuse. If they refuse, it must be done by
force. And if we pass into Afghanistan and occupy Kabul and Kandahar, and, as
some say we are going to do, occupy Heart – and I can see no limit to these
operations, everything of that kind means a necessity for more money, and means
a necessity for more men.124
Such actions, he insisted, did not strengthen the empire; instead, like the threads holding
down Gulliver in Gulliver’s Travels, they would coalesce and thereby considerably
weaken Britain to the point where the country would become practically incapacitated.125
Gladstone intended that his Midlothian bid would represent more than a contest
for a single seat in Parliament. In headlining what he believed were the imperial and
domestic failures of Beaconsfieldism, Gladstone intended to launch a popular crusade,
and in so doing he revolutionized British electioneering. While popular political crusades
had been seen before, most notably with the Chartist movement of the 1830s, it was
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unprecedented for a former prime minister to lead such a movement. It was also
innovatory, as Gladstone did not restrict his campaign speeches to the Midlothian
electorate. On the way to Edinburgh on 24 November, he gave campaign speeches at
Carlyle on the English-Scottish Border, and then at Hawick, and at Galashiels in the
Scottish Borders. After spending only a week in Midlothian itself, Gladstone then
headed north into the Central Lowlands and southern Highlands of Scotland, stopping
along the way to speak in Inverkeithing, Dunfermline, Perth, Aberfeldy, and Taymouth.
He then turned south and finished off the campaign with six meetings in Glasgow and
Motherwell in Lanarkshire. His campaign, however, reached out even more broadly than
that, as the national and provincial press made his speeches available throughout Britain.
Indeed it was this wider readership that was Gladstone’s intended audience. 126
When the final votes were tallied, in April 1880, Gladstone and the Liberals were
swept into power. Receiving 55% of the popular vote and winning a net gain of 110
seats, they quite literally reversed the results of the 1874 election. Moreover, while the
voting returns in Midlothian did not exhibit a drastic shift from previous years, the effect
of the campaign could be seen elsewhere. In Scotland, Conservatives retained only six of
the eighteen seats they had won in 1874, the first and only time before the twentieth
century that Conservative representation was held to single digits in Scotland. In Wales,
Tory candidates lost ten seats and were left with only four. In England, for only the
second time since 1832, Conservative representation dropped below 200 seats, something
that would not be repeated until 1906 and then again in 1945. Losing only three seats in
Ireland, the Conservatives continued to outnumber the Liberals, but they themselves were
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drastically outnumbered by the Home Rule party of Charles Stewart Parnell, who held 63
out of the 103 seats.127
Between 1877 and 1880, meanwhile, Boer nationalism and resentment of British
rule had percolated in the Transvaal, and the Boers were encouraged by the Gladstone’s
repudiation of the annexation. Those condemnations, however, did not lead to an attempt
by Gladstone to undo the annexation. After the Queen’s Speech of 20 May 1880,
Gladstone explained that his new administration would not endeavor to undo that legacy
of Beaconsfieldism. While he had personally disagreed with it in the first place, the
positive consequences from that action, he argued, could not be denied. He and others
had promised to protect the native populations of the region, and British sovereignty
provided that security.128 Believing that they had been betrayed by Gladstone, the Boers
revolted against British rule in December 1880 and announced the reestablishment of a
republic to be led by a triumvirate executive of Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert, and exPresident J. W. Pretorius.129 Within days of that declaration, the Boers had ambushed
and effectively wiped out a detachment of the 94th Regiment at Bronkhorstspruit; had laid
siege to British army garrisons at Potchefstroom, Pretoria, and five other towns in the
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Transvaal; and had taken command of Laing’s Nek, effectively controlling the approach
into the Transvaal from Natal.130
The Boers struck at a time when the Cape was also woefully unprepared and
undermanned, a point that was not lost upon the British public.131 London had drawn
down the forces deployed in South Africa in the aftermath of the Zulu War to 3,500 men,
and the Cape government was then involved in suppressing an uprising of the Basutos.
Convinced, however, that the Boers were inferior fighters and insufficiently supplied,
British leaders in South Africa overlooked their own shortcomings, and the public in
Britain effectively lulled themselves into a false sense of security.132
Throughout the Zulu War, Gladstone’s Midlothian Campaign, the Basuto War,
and its correlations to the Government’s policies in Afghanistan, the questionable
annexation of the Transvaal had never completely disappeared from the public
discourse.133 The rising of the Boers, however, quickly returned that issue to the
forefront of public discussion. Far from being satisfied with merely relaying the news
from Cape Town, Durban, and Potchefstroom, the national and provincial papers engaged
the implications of the annexation, and expressed a variety of opinions, while offering
myriad interpretations of events in South Africa that both reflected and shaped public
awareness of imperial affairs.
To be sure, the British public was concerned about the security of the nation’s
imperial holdings. The Boer rebellion coincided with the Cape’s war with the Basutos,
exacerbating the challenge to Britain’s position in South Africa. Some also claimed that
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the rebellion was also deliberately timed and influenced by the Land War in Ireland,
though the York Herald thought that it was highly unlikely that the Boers were paying
that much attention to the domestic concerns of Britain.134 Even so, newspapers did their
utmost to allay fears about the situation on the ground, with papers such as the Bristol
Mercury and the Glasgow Herald insisting that British supremacy would be upheld.135
The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle and the Standard, which likewise recognized the
seriousness of the situation and acknowledged that imperial troops would likely be
needed, nevertheless insisted that it did not believe the British “position in the Transvaal
was in any immediate danger.”136 Holding the military ability of the Boers more openly
in contempt, the Standard emphasized the inability of the Boers to protect themselves
against native attacks, an issue which had made the annexation of the Transvaal
necessary in the first place. The need for additional troops, rather, was due to the
vastness of the region and not to the fighting prowess of the Boers.137 Meanwhile, the
Times assumed inaccurately that Britain possessed enough in the way of military
resources in the region to disperse the Boers quickly.138 So convinced were Britons at
home in the superiority of their forces that when news of the attack on the 94th Regiment
filtered back to Britain, a few presses questioned the accuracy of the report. The
Glasgow Herald was convinced that, if it were true, confirmation would have been
provided by the Governor at Natal. At the same time, there were reports that the Boers
had been repulsed by British troops at Potchefstroom, whose commander, Colonel
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Lanyon, sent reassurances that the “forces of the enemy cannot hold together.”139 While
the editorial staff of the Times was forced to admit that its earlier dismissal of the Boers
had been inaccurate, it nevertheless found it impossible to believe that the Boers were
capable of launching simultaneous operations against both Heidelberg and
Potchefstroom, while also coordinating an attack strong enough to wipe out the
detachment of the 94th Regiment. It was much more likely, or so the editors of the Times
initially thought, that those accounts had been fabricated by the Boers to elevate their
abilities in the eyes of their enemies.140
But if papers such as the Times and Huddersfield Daily Chronicle insinuated that
the Transvaal was secure for the time being, others were not so confident. Taking the
reports of the Boer movements against Potchefstroom and Heidelberg as accurate, the
Daily News insisted that they proved that the Boers felt strong enough to assume the
offensive, and that the elements committed there were “a part of the troops at their
disposal.”141 Likewise, the Morning Advertiser, the voice of the London Society of
Licensed Victuallers and the second-most read paper in the nation, insisted that “if the
Boers have not reasoned all the chances out, and struck just at the right moment to
enforce their arguments upon the cabinet, they are less clever than we take them to be.”142
Indeed almost everyone, including the optimistic Huddersfield Daily Chronicle
recognized quickly that the long-term pacification of the region would require the
deployment of imperial reinforcements.143
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Press attention to calls for reinforcements also raised the public awareness about
the costs, both fiscal and material, and Britain’s imperial responsibilities.
Acknowledging the public’s aversion to and weariness at having to rescue colonial
administrations repeatedly from their own missteps, many papers insisted that this was
not such a case. The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle reminded the public that the
annexation of the Transvaal had been undertaken by the government and was not a
decision of the colonial administration at the Cape.144 Still, as far as the editors of the
Standard were concerned, even though the government bore responsibility for the
annexation, the acquisition of the Transvaal had been the “result of an accident, rather
than a deliberate design.”145 The Boer rebellion was brought on by the actions of an
ungrateful people, who had ignored the sacrifices that Britain had made on their behalf,
and had rebelled against British rule despite being forewarned that such an action would
be nothing but “folly.”146 For these reasons, the government and the nation had
legitimate interests in taking steps to preserve the territory.
Whether intervention would happen under a Gladstone administration was
apparently of some concern to at least a portion of the public, who were no doubt mindful
of the premier’s strong anti-imperial stance in his recent Midlothian Campaign. Putting
any such fears to rest, the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle insisted that despite Gladstone’s
denunciation of imperial entanglements, he now showed signs that he was reconciled to
defending the ground that had been previously acquired. True, the paper acknowledged,
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the British were withdrawing from Kabul in Afghanistan, but no move had yet been made
to withdraw entirely from the Transvaal.147
Another issue that emerged in the pages of the newspapers involved the need to
uphold the nation’s honor. Bemoaning on 22 December that the decisions of Lords
Carnarvon and Kimberley had given rise to yet another imperial war, the Independent
Dundee Courier contended:
It would thus appear that troops will be required from home. That is an
unfortunate necessity, but perhaps it will not occur to anybody in this country to
say that we should rather let the Transvaal go than be at the trouble and expense
of recovering it. There will doubtless be persons, however, who would give such
advice were it not for the shame of the thing, and whose first thought, on hearing
of the rebellion, will be that we should never have had this trouble at all if it had
not been one of the iniquities of the late Conservative Government that they
annexed the Transvaal. But responsible statesmen will not speak in that way.148
They were joined in this regard by the Manchester Guardian which, while arguing that
Britain had never been justified in annexing the Transvaal and that it had no “clear right
to overrule [the Boers’] will,” nevertheless insisted that “whatever may be done hereafter,
they must not be allowed to show an example of successful rebellion.”149 The insinuation
clearly was that if Britain acquiesced to the Boer demands other parts of the empire
would find encouragement in this sign of national weakness. The Birmingham Daily
Post also feared that the success of the Boers would raise the hopes of natives living in
the region and thus appeared conflicted over what Britain’s recourse should be.150 Such
ramifications were brought closer to home by the Standard and the Aberdeen Journal,
which placed the rising of the Transvaal alongside the disturbances in Ireland over rents
and the land tenures, a situation that editors believed might also require the deployment
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of troops, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan.151 The Journal conceded that while the
“pestilent class of professional [Boer and Irish] agitators had different motives for
resisting British rule, it insisted that as “men who are strangers to honest industry, whose
heads are as light as their pockets, and who having nothing to lose were not indisposed to
have their little world turned upside down.”152
Newspaper readers, meanwhile, did not have a compartmentalized view of the
empire, but placed specific imperial developments within a much broader framework.
Thus, the Dundee Courier expected that the Boers were not only motivated to rebel when
they did because of the preoccupation of the Cape with the Basutos, but also because they
believed that the “strange immunity which the authors of treasonable disorders in Ireland
have hitherto enjoyed, from any serious action on the part of the executive government,
would also be extended to them.”153 Such views were not held by Conservatives alone,
as they were also expressed by Liberal-minded papers such as the Leeds Mercury and the
Newcastle Courant, which insisted that after the Boers had been shown the “folly of their
ways” with a “prompt display of vigour,” the questions regarding Britain’s long-term
position in the Transvaal would have to be rethought.154 At the time, however, the papers
did not speculate as to the precise form the British position in South Africa should take.
Still another segment of the press argued against taking any action at all against
the Boers. Trumpeting the false promises and what they portrayed as the proven failures
of the Conservatives’ imperial policy in South Africa, many Liberal papers argued that
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military intervention would only validate the injustice and blunders that had previously
been committed against the Boers and the Basutos. The Daily News, for instance,
insisted that the Boer demand for independence was legitimate and in accord with the
Sand River Convention, so long as the Boers acceded to Britain’s demands that the native
populations should be protected and that a “uniform system of native government” could
be agreed upon. Even with this stipulation, the paper believed that it was highly likely
that a compromise could and should be struck.155 The Sheffield and Rotherham
Independent concurred and boldly stated:
We do not want the Boers…Why in the world can we not acknowledge, honestly
and frankly, that Sir Theophilus Shepstone made a blunder, and declare that we
will not supplement it by greater?156
Insisting that the government should take a position of magnanimity, the Liberal South
Wales Daily News called for the “authors of mischief” to be punished and argued that
others should be ordered to make peace.157
Taken as a whole, the variety of positions in print demonstrates that the public
was neither mindless about the imperial issues, nor was it of entirely one mind when it
came to how Britain should respond to the Boers. To that end, the public was keenly
interested in reforming the relationship between the administration at the Cape and the
government in London, so that the Cabinet would have more direct oversight of colonial
affairs. The hoped-for result was that the home country would be less likely to be drawn
into wars and military interventions against its better judgment.
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Given the speed with which the Boer uprising escalated, it is difficult to assess
properly the public’s awareness of or interest in events as they unfolded. The content and
editorial pages of London’s daily papers indicate that on a broad national level,
metropolitan readers were certainly attuned to what was going on in the Transvaal. The
degree to which provincial readers discussed the issue is more difficult to ascertain.
Many of the provincial papers were published only weekly, and only days elapsed
between when the first announcements of the Boers’ declaration of independence and the
confirmation of the attack on the detachment of the 94th Regiment at Bronkhorstspruit
reached Britain. The result was that the first reports by many provincial papers on
developments in the Transvaal came after the attacks had been confirmed.
Provincial attentiveness became more acute when the rumors of the Boer attack
on the 94th Regiment were proved accurate. Between 20 and 24 December, the editorial
columns of the Conservative Aberdeen Journal had been silent on the developments in
South Africa, because they focused on the violence in Ireland over the land-tenure
question. Nevertheless, its readership would have seen coverage of the Transvaal
rebellion in its news pages.158 On 28 December, however, the editorial page erupted.
Labeling the the Boer attack at Bronkhorstspruit a “massacre” and that on Potchefstroom
a “ruthless assassination,” the paper demanded an energetic response.159
Concerned with the impact of recent developments on Britain’s national prestige
and imperial mission in South Africa, the presses increasingly became consumed with the
question, as repeatedly phrased by the Pall Mall Gazette’s “Epitome of Opinion” column,
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“Should We Give Up the Transvaal?” 160 For those papers that had already come out in
favor of military intervention, the Boer attack quite naturally did little to alter their views.
Continuing to lament Britain’s past history with the Boers and admitting that the
annexation had been a mistake, the Times nonetheless held firm that the “reconquest of
the Transvaal was a necessary act.” In appealing to the sword, the Boers gave Britain no
choice but “to meet force by force.” Under no circumstances could Britain allow the
Transvaal to boast that their independence came as a result of “their own forwardness in
asserting it for themselves by arms.”161 The Standard, meanwhile, advanced that the
annexation of the Transvaal should be protected on the grounds that British control
provided necessary security not only for the Boers but for the native communities as
well.162
To a limited extent, the Boers’ opening attack did cause some presses to shift their
opinion on the matter in favor of a more aggressive policy. Just one day after arguing
that the annexation should be reversed, the Daily News reacted to the news from
Bronkhorstspruit by saying that it had eliminated any chance that the situation could be
resolved peaceably now that the Boers had proved that they were fully committed to
armed rebellion. Moreover, because the Boers’ success would only further encourage
their efforts and make it impossible for them to draw back, Britain had no choice but to
crush the rebellion:
A terrible calamity has befallen our arms … [but] it will be a still greater calamity
for the Boers. Their one victory will cost them as dearly in the end, as much his
one success cost Cetewayo [sic]. But it will bring little satisfaction to Englishmen
to feel that the Boers will be defeated and crushed before long.163
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To that end, the paper insisted that Britain took no satisfaction in the “petty, although
sanguinary and costly, struggle,” or the success which would inevitably come. Nor was it
sympathetic to the policies which gave rise to the war. Rather, the Daily News justified
crushing the Boers on the grounds that Britain had been drawn into the war by
circumstances beyond its control, namely, by the aggressive actions of the Boers
themselves. Further, because the Boers remained in a position where they were
essentially the masters of the Transvaal, it maintained that “it is all the more difficult for
us to discuss terms of reconciliation.”164 Indeed, by early January, a consensus point was
seemingly reached—with Liberal papers such as the Aberdeen Free Press, the Daily
News, the Leeds Mercury, the Bradford Observer, and the Scotsman, as well as
Conservative papers like the Aberdeen Journal, the Standard, and the Daily Telegraph,
and independent papers such as the Times—all collectively arguing that the question of
the Transvaal’s independence could and should only be sorted out after Britain had
reestablished its dominance in the area.165
Despite this apparent coming together, press opinion remained anything but
unified. Papers which had opposed the military suppression of the Boers from the onset
deftly rebutted the arguments of those who favored it. The Liberal-minded Northern
Echo continued to question the legitimacy of Britain’s original act of annexation and
argued that the security of Natal no longer depended on British overlordship of the
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Transvaal.166 Speaking to the issue of national prestige and honor, the Liberal Weekly
Dispatch advanced that Britain had sacrificed neither in granting the Orange Free State
its independence in 1854, and that there was thus no reason to think that Britain would
lose prestige by again granting the Transvaal’s demand for independence.167
Additionally, the two Liberal papers from Liverpool, the Daily Post and the Mercury,
commiserated with the plight of the Boers and held that those who would deny them their
right to self-government were taking a position that was antithetical to British principles
of liberty. That position, the Mercury asserted, had caused the nation to be “so far
steeped in blood as Macbeth was.”168 The only proper recourse was for the government
to ignore the howls of the jingoes and to move forward by confessing past mistakes and
reconsidering the situation of the Transvaal. Thus, the Daily Post insisted, “anything is
better than that England should exhibit herself to the world as the crusher of national
feeling, the enemy of self-government.”169
The defense of the Boers, also enjoyed the support of C. E. Trevelyan, who had
previously served as governor of Madras and as the Indian finance minister. In a letter to
the Times, Trevelyan reminded readers of missteps in imperial administration and insisted
that the war with the Zulu and the recent rebellion of the Boers warranted a complete
reconsideration of Britain’s “shortsighted” imperial policy:
We make ourselves directly responsible for preserving order over widelyextended regions inhabited by warlike races with various conflicting interests, and
forcibly compress springs of action which recoil in augmented force whenever an
opportunity offers.170
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Trevelyan thus encouraged Britons to apply what had been learned from their experiences
in India, and to allow self-rule to flourish under an umbrella of British influence and
protection. The Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper took an even more pronounced and
demonstrative pro-Boer stance, when it not only criticized the original annexation of the
Transvaal but congratulated the Transvaalers for “the calm courage they have displayed
in proclaiming the republic of which they were some four years ago defrauded.”171 In
making this declaration the paper expressed its hope that the Boers would thus be
conscious that not every Briton supported the policies of Sir Bartle Frere.
ON THE WAR AND PEACE: JANUARY – MARCH 1881

In the first two weeks of January the British government announced that
reinforcements, which included the 92nd (Gordon Highlanders) Regiment and the 83rd
(County of Dublin) Regiment of Foot, were being dispatched to Natal.172 Otherwise, as it
had been throughout the greater part of 1880, Gladstone’s attention remained focused on
trying to keep his government together as the Irish Land League’s demands for greater
tenant rights threatened to split the Liberal Party and drag Ireland into civil disorder.173
Indeed, while matters such as Ireland and the withdrawal from Afghanistan made were
addressed in the Queen’s Speech and the subsequent parliamentary debates, the issue of
the Transvaal was remarkably not discussed or even mentioned.174 But if Gladstone was
deprioritizing the Transvaal matter in deference to other concerns, in practically every
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edition, whether it was a daily or a weekly, the national and provincial news pages
included full reporting on the latest happenings in the Transvaal.
In the month following the disaster at Bronkhorstspruit, discouraging news from
the front flooded the pages of the national and provincial presses. In the first place,
Major General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, who had recently been appointed high
commissioner and who was recognized as one of the most capable of the “Wolseley
Ring,” was failing in his attempt to crush the rebellion.175 Setting out for the Transvaal
on 10 January, Colley was soundly beaten at Laing’s Nek on 28 January and then at
Ingogo on 7 February. Second, and more disturbing, were reports that the Orange Free
Staters were mobilizing to support their fellow Boers to the north. These developments
forced South African affairs onto the ministerial front burner, alongside the Irish and
Afghan issues.176 Influenced by his colonial secretary, Lord Kimberley, the prime
minister believed circumstances had changed to such an extent that it was now more
advantageous for Britain to negotiate a settlement with the Boers, through which they
would be granted independence so long as they agreed to permit British “suzerainty.”177
In 1881, as defined by Sir Evelyn Wood, “suzerainty” meant that the Transvaal would
have complete “self-government as regards its own interior affairs, but that it cannot take
action against or with an outside Power without the permission of the suzerain,” Great
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Britain.178 The precise meaning of suzerainty, however, remained undefined and would
be debated by Boer and British officials in the decades to come.
Kimberley therefore ordered Colley to present the Boers with the British offer and
see if terms could be established. Colley, however, was convinced that Britain should not
abandon its position in the Transvaal in such an ignominious fashion. To that end, he
sought to put Britain on a stronger footing in negotiating a peace. He placed an
impossibly short deadline of forty-eight hours for the Boers to respond to the peace
overtures, something he had been told would take at least six days. When the Boer
response was not forthcoming, Colley launched another offensive at the Boer line at
Laing’s Nek, having been reinforced by the troops from Europe.179 Positioning his troops
atop the dominant Majuba Hill on the night of Saturday 26 February, Colley was
confident because of his position atop the hill, the quality of his men, and the inferiority
of the Boer forces. Fully expecting the Boers to withdraw at finding their position at
Laing’s Nek compromised, he took no precautions in preparing his position against an
attack. Instead of fleeing at the sight of the British position, the Boers attacked the
following morning, making use of abundant cover and their expert marksmanship.180 The
result was a rout: Of the 27 officers and 568 men who had moved out with Colley the
night before, 20 officers and 261 men, including Colley himself, became casualties. The
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Boers, attacking with some 300 men, suffered only one man killed and six others
wounded.181
As they had done during the Zulu War, illustrated presses, including the Graphic,
the Illustrated London News, and the Penny Illustrated Paper, encapsulated the course of
the war with descriptive narratives and vignettes, complete with engravings of maps,
fallen heroes, and troop movements. In the case of the Penny Illustrated Paper, these
were packaged into a section called “The Pictorial Chronicle of the Boer War.”182
Examples of these works included the Graphic’s depiction of Colley’s 8 February assault
on Laing’s Nek which included notations on specific troop positions. Illuminating
Colley’s stand on Majuba Hill, the Illustrated London News portrayed the general’s last
minutes as those of a gallant hero who unswervingly faced the enemy with calm
determination.183 These incidents would leave an indelible mark in the minds of the
British public. More than eighteen years after the fact, as Britain was on the verge of
another war with the Boers, the Penny Illustrated Paper depicted these battlefields, with
a caption “Places Tommy Atkins Doesn’t Forget; Laing’s Nek and Majuba Hill.”184
In the spring of 1881, the nation was stunned and horrified by the sudden turn of
events. For the second time in three years the British military had been humiliated in the
field by an opponent they had presumed to be inferior. While Conservatives and Liberals
pointed fingers at whose imperial policies were more to blame for getting the country into
such a position, they were nevertheless largely unified on the question of how Britain
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should proceed. In harkening back to the original motives for refusing to recognize the
independence of the Transvaal and with the cognizance of the interconnectedness of the
empire, British honor had to be preserved in order to prevent future disturbances in the
region. The Times summarized the position:
Unless we are prepared to retire from South Africa immediately and
unconditionally, we must restore our authority where it has been defied, and treat
only with those who submit to the representatives of the Queen.185
This insistence came despite the paper having previously called Colley’s taking an
aggressive forward position “unnecessary,” although “not without some appearance of
justification,” given that it was fully known that reinforcements under General Wood
were being more forward.186 Whether the Times was aware that Colley had been
expressly ordered to wait for Wood is not certain, but its 21 February editorial indicates
that the paper fully expected that Colley would wait, and that their combined forces
would then move against the Boers.187 That reinforcements were required to handle the
Boer rebellion was in and of itself cause for great concern and, according to the Times,
ratcheted up public attention to events in South Africa.188
The attention of the press more generally was focused less on Colley’s rashness
than on the need to redeem British honor.189 The Liberal Daily Chronicle insisted that
“Englishmen are not in the least likely, after what has occurred, to listen to proposals of
independence until after the Boers have laid down their arms and submit – a contingency,
it is to be feared, rather remote until they have received a severe repulse at the hands of
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the British Army.”190 The Conservative Standard likewise maintained that the “English
people” would not allow their honor to be trampled upon and that therefore the Boers had
to be beaten to such an extent that they would be convinced of their complete inability to
resist the power of Britain.191 Firing a direct rebuke at Gladstone’s calculation to
withdraw from the Transvaal and echoing Disraeli’s Crystal Palace speech, the
Conservative Daily Telegraph was so adamant that Britain effectively respond to the
humiliation that it demanded that “the united nation proclaims that there must be no more
of this piecemeal half-hearted policy, which is utterly disastrous to a great empire.”
Charging that Gladstone’s imperial policy was wrongfully being dictated by financial
considerations, the Telegraph further demanded “there must be no more counting by
sixpences the cost of the things and reckoning up over narrowly to see that victory abroad
may not compromise budgets at home.”192
Provincial newspapers expressed similar sentiments, suggesting that such
opinions were widely held. Applauding the appointment of Sir Frederick Roberts to
continue the war against the Transvaal, the Scotsman maintained that “unless Great
Britain is prepared to give up her colonies in South Africa, and to bear the stain of defeat
at the hands of a few hundred Boers, she must make her power felt.”193 In assessing the
implications of Colley’s defeat, papers such as the Leeds Mercury, Manchester’s two
Liberal papers, the Guardian and the Examiner, and its Conservative paper, the Courier
Gazette, all expressed the belief that there was no hope of a quick end to the war because
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it was utterly impossible for Britain to pull back. To do so would welcome greater losses
than just the Transvaal. As the Manchester Courier Gazette concluded, the government
is obligated “to secure speedy and effective victory, in order that our military credit may
not fall into universal discredit.”194 The Essex Standard put the matter succinctly: an
armistice and peace process at that time would be “hollow, humiliating, and ominous.”195
And one “W. B. D.” even submitted a cautionary fifty-nine line poem entitled “Peace
with Dishonour” to the Morning Post.196
Even so, not everyone believed that the defeat at Majuba Hill demanded a
military response. The editors of Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, for instance, hoped that
the disaster would convince the government of the errors of the “military spirit” which
they believed had permeated British society and advance the cause of peace:
This is our danger – that the military spirit, thinking only of conquest, of victory,
of marches, and countermarches, decorations and promotion, may conduct
England to ruin by the same road that Rome went to destruction.197
The idea that a final peace would ensure British suzerainty also seemed to soothe some of
the hot tempers. Only a week after it expressed its conviction that Colley’s defeat made
it impossible to proceed with peace negotiations, the Liberal Birmingham Daily Post
changed its position:
If the Boers are willing to subscribe to such terms of peace as are consistent with
the national dignity and the particular merits of the case, Government, we are
convinced, will not be deterred from doing its duty by the clamour of an
interested party, however active and influential.198
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The Daily News also took confidence in the knowledge that the peace negotiations were
being led by Sir Evelyn Wood, who seemed assured that the peace concessions would in
no way demonstrate British weakness.199
Queen Victoria, meanwhile, was particularly upset at what she perceived as the
government’s weak policies that had led to the disastrous war and which now seemed
ready to ignominiously withdraw from the region:
I do not like a peace before we have retrieved our honor…I am sure you
[Gladstone] will agree with me that even the semblance of any concessions after
our recent defeats would have a deplorable effect.200
Yet Gladstone and Kimberley resisted such pressure and assessed the situation
pragmatically. They realized that Britain risked losing all of its holdings in South Africa
if the Orange Free State entered into the war on the side of the Transvaal. Concurrently,
the Boers feared they would lose any leverage they had gained whenever British
reinforcements under Roberts would arrive in the region.201 Thus, both sides had reasons
for concluding a peace as quickly as possible. The final peace treaty emerged in August
and stayed true to Kimberley’s initial peace feelers, by providing for the independence of
the Transvaal while insuring that Britain would retain the rights of suzerainty.202 By that
time, the public had mostly lost its revengeful attitude and found the terms to be
acceptable.203 It was, after all, what most of the country had favored at the onset of the
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crisis. But while that finalized peace treaty resolved the immediate conflict of 18801881, the meaning of “suzerainty,” would continue to be a contentious thorn in AngloBoer relations, as we will see in Chapter Three.
In assessing the public’s attitude toward military interventionism in South Africa
between 1877 and 1881, we find a number of consistencies. In the first place, as
evidenced by the widespread approval of the annexation of the Transvaal, the public was
more likely to endorse coercive diplomacy or military force to advance the British
position when it was apparent that the action would result in little or no added cost, either
in blood or capital. It was only when that action led to further disturbances and failed to
resolve contentious relationships, such as during the Zulu War and the Transvaal
rebellion that the public began to rethink the legitimacy of its aggressiveness toward the
Boers. Secondly, the press coverage and leading articles regarding the annexation of the
Transvaal, the Zulu War, and the First Anglo-Boer War showed that the economic
opportunities associated with imperial expansionism in South Africa factored very little if
at all into the public debate. What was a concern to the general public was the
advancement of British humanitarianism toward the native populations, along with
continued peace and security both within the Cape and Natal and in surrounding
territories. To that end, what the public in Britain desired for the colonials was peace
through a live-and-let-live imperial philosophy, so long as humanitarianism did not
conflict with a need for security. If that type of peace could only be obtained via the
point of the sword, then so be it, but only if Britain and the colonial administration had
done nothing to provoke the conflict, and the motivation for the using military force had
proved to be sufficiently legitimate and virtuous.
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That the opinion of the general public mattered to government officials and colonial
administrators is borne out by the lengths to which policy-makers went to present the
appearance of acting in self-defense, even when Britain’s motives and actions were very
much on the side of the aggressor. In explaining the action he had taken toward the
Transvaal, Shepstone insisted that he had the overwhelming support of the Boers
themselves. In dealing with the Zulu, Bartle Frere constructed an ultimatum that he knew
Cetshwayo could not possibly agree to, and thus he could defend the invasion of
Zululand on the premise that the noncompliant and militant Zulus had made a war
necessary. And while public opinion factored less in Britain’s response to the Transvaal
rebellion in 1881, the public was certainly active in attempting to drive and influence the
government’s response. Lastly, taking into account the myriad instances of British
belligerence throughout the latter nineteenth century, one finds that policymakers, such as
Carnarvon and Frere, were much more likely to take—and the public to support—an
aggressive stance and to use either military force or diplomatic coercion to settle a
dispute when the country faced an adversary that was considered to be an inferior power
and the circumstances of immediate importance to British interests.
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Figure 1-1: Illustrated London News, 10 May 1879, 429. Caption reads: “The Zulu War:
Attack on an escort of the 80th Regiment at the Intombi River – See p. 434. From a
sketch by Lieutenant Beverley W. R. Ussher, 80th Regiment.”
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Figure 1-2: “British Officers Engaged in the Zulu and Afghan War,” Graphic, 1 March
1879, 212. From left to right: Col. C. H. Palliser, Maj. Gen. E. F. Maude, Lt. Francis
Pender Porteous, Lt. Herbert Valiant Willis, Lt. Henry Julian Dyer, Lt. Col. Pulleine, Col.
A. W. Durnford, Capt. John Cook, Lt. Chard, and Lt. Gonville Bromhead.

Image 1-3: “The Rebellion in the Transvaal - The Attack on Laing’s Nek Under the Late Sir G. P. Colley, January 28 1881,” Graphic, 19 March 1881,
290. Engraving is further labeled designating troop locations.
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Figure 1-4: “The Transvaal War: Major General Sir George Colley at the Battle of
Majuba Mountain just before he was killed,” Illustrated London News, 14 May 1881,
409.
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CHAPTER 2:
BRITISH INTRIGUE AND INTERVENTION
IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 1882-1898

In December 1881, Gladstone wrote to his son relishing the success he had had
thus far in dismantling the imperial politics associated with Beaconsfieldism and
contemplating his own retirement from public life.1 But, given the expanse of Britain’s
imperial reach, it was all but certain that the retreats from Afghanistan and the Transvaal
would not remove the empire from public attention. Indeed Irish Home Rule remained
an ever-present issue, and while the Indian, Chinese, Afghan, and South African theatres
had been the focus of public attention throughout much of the nineteenth century, a new
theater had opened since mid-century, Egypt. Within months of the resolution of the
South African War, affairs in Egypt and the Sudan would come to transfix the attention
of the country and vault one man’s reputation to that of national hero. Aside perhaps from
the Second Anglo-Boer War, no greater example of the intersection of public interest and
imperial policy exists than that which involved Major General Sir Charles “Chinese”
Gordon’s mission to the Sudan and the subsequent debate over relieving the besieged
general at Khartoum.
THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1882-1883

Since the late-eighteenth century, Britain had had an interest in preserving the
power of the Ottoman Empire in order to protect British India. This interest had led to
British intervention on behalf of the Turks in 1854 in the Crimean War. In the resulting
peace negotiations the Palmerston administration had worked to ensure that the European
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powers would respect the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and prior to the 1870s neither
Conservative nor Liberal administrations had any real interest in expanding British
influence over the Turks.
The completion of the Suez Canal by the French in 1869 caused Britain to begin
readdressing its strategic interests and priorities in the Near East as they pertained to
India. Consequently, when the Egyptian khedivate offered to sell its shares in the canal
in 1875 in order to resolve its financial difficulties, Disraeli took the opportunity to
cement Britain’s position in the region. Thereafter, the khedive’s continued financial
problems led to the establishment of joint Anglo-French oversight of Egyptian finances in
1879. Even so, the Disraeli government had no real desire to bring the Egyptian
government directly into the Empire. Instead, the British and French governments
intervened for the purpose of liberalizing the Egyptian government and strengthening the
khedive’s fiscal position.2
The Anglo-French presence in Egypt, however, actually served to undermine the
tenuous authority of the khedivate by rallying rival nationalist elements against foreign
direction. These elements included Egyptian liberals, who opposed the nominal
overlordship of the Turks and favored western constitutionalism, as well as Muslim
conservatives, who condemned the encroachment of Christianity. Landlords also rallied
in order to preserve their traditional privileges against the fiscal reforms of the khedivate,
while the peasantry bore the brunt of funding the government’s industrial schemes and
paying off its debt. More importantly, Western intervention drove a wedge between the
khedive and the Egyptian military upon which much of his authority rested. In April
2
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1879, the Khedive Ismail attempted to resist Western reforms, but the European powers
were able to pressure the Turkish sultan into replacing Ismail with his eldest son Tewfik.
Simmering beneath the surface throughout 1880, nationalist sentiments boiled over in
1881. On 1 February Colonel Ahmed Arabi and a number of fellow officers forced the
khedive to replace the minister of war. Eight months later, on 9 September the army
surrounded the palace and demanded to be restored to its former status and compelled the
khedive to replace his entire ministry.3
Due its financial investments with the khedive and its strategic interests in the
canal, Britain’s position in Egypt was severely complicated by these developments.
Prime Minister Gladstone was philosophically opposed to the imperial interventionism
promoted by his predecessors Palmerston and Disraeli. Nevertheless, British interests
demanded that some action be taken, if for no other reason than to prevent France from
acting unilaterally and gaining sole control over the canal. To that end, throughout much
of 1881, at the same time that he was heavily involved in calming down tensions in
Ireland, Gladstone was also engaged in complex negotiations with the French
government to carve out an Egyptian policy that would be mutually acceptable.4
The result of the complicated Anglo-French diplomatic wrangling was the
issuance of a Joint Note in early January 1882, which declared the powers’ intent to
defend the khedivate and threatened a future military expedition to restore order.
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The Joint Note, however, did little to quell the situation. Instead it emboldened the
nationalists to be more assertive in throwing off foreign oversight and it served to
galvanize support around Arabi who was named minister of war in early February 1882.
With the Joint Note failing to have any effect on its own and fearing that the Egyptian
developments would increasingly threaten Anglo-French dual control, British and French
officials once again struggled to carve out a mutually agreeable course of action. In the
middle of May, the two powers agreed to send an Anglo-French squadron, commanded
by British and French officers, which would precede a Turkish military expedition.
Those forces would then restore order in Egypt under a European mandate. That plan fell
through after the Germans and the French legislature raised objections. As a result, the
Anglo-French force arrived off Alexandria without a clear mission and without the
prospect of relief from a Turkish force. The squadron’s mere presence, however,
emboldened the khedive, and he summarily dismissed his Arabist ministers. This action
set off a powder keg of Egyptian nationalistic fervor, and on 11 and 12 June rioting
erupted in Alexandria, which left fifty foreign residents dead.5 Faced with the outbreak
of such violence, the British and French governments renewed their efforts to work out a
viable solution to the unrest in Egypt.6
By early July, a group of key cabinet officers had become convinced that Britain
needed to act with or without France and without the approval of the Concert of Europe.
Although these officials presented a united front, the specific motivations which brought
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them together varied. Whereas Joseph Chamberlain, president of the Board of Trade, and
Charles Dilke, president of the Local Government Board, were primarily concerned with
the broader strategic importance of the Suez Canal, Lord Hartington as secretary of state
for India and Lord Northbrook in the Admiralty were attuned to the financial implications
of the canal.7 Meanwhile, Admiral Seymour, who commanded the Alexandria squadron,
worried about its long-term security, and indeed Arabi anticipated a naval action and he
began strengthening the coastal forts at Alexandria in the aftermath of the 11 June riots.
If completed, those fortifications would have posed a significant threat to the anchorage
of the British warships and to their ability to support any future land operations.
Seymour, therefore, called for authorization to issue an ultimatum to the khedivate to halt
those efforts. This activist group of officials pressured Gladstone to issue an ultimatum
to Arabi, recognizing that such an action might well escalate the crisis, and that British
troops would be needed to ensure the security of the canal.8
Although Gladstone remained reluctant to intervene, he recognized that he would
need to authorize the ultimatum in order to keep the cabinet together. He again sought
French support and invited them to join in presenting the ultimatum. The French
government, however, did not believe the situation was serious enough to warrant a
military option. Rather, it was inclined to negotiate a settlement with Arabi, and thus
rejected the British offer. With little option but to proceed alone, Gladstone authorized
the ultimatum, and when it expired, he authorized Seymour to fire on Alexandria’s
defenses.9
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The British bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July did little to resolve the
situation on the ground in Egypt. Outraged that Britain had proceeded to act alone, the
French government immediately withdrew its warships in remonstration.10 In Egypt, the
bombardment incited further nationalist riots and forced the khedive to flee to Alexandria
and seek the protection of the British fleet. Assuming power, the Arabist regime declared
war against Britain and the Western powers, and warned that it would destroy the canal.
Such developments left little doubt in the minds of Gladstone’s cabinet that a military
expedition would have to be sent immediately to Egypt to secure the canal and the
Egyptian interior as well. John Bright, the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and a
Quaker with a lifelong aversion to the use of military force, was the lone exception to this
decision, and he resigned from the cabinet in protest.11
With the rest of the cabinet behind him, Gladstone pushed Parliament to authorize
the expedition.12 Having abstained from participating in the naval action, the French
promised through Charles Freycinet, the foreign minister, to support this operation, but
the French legislature again refused to authorize the necessary credit, and the ministry fell
from office. Italy also decided not to answer Britain’s request for a joint action. 13 With
the other powers not willing to offer assistance, therefore, Gladstone insisted to
Parliament that Britain had no choice but to act alone.
Parliament authorized the expenditure of £2.3 million on 27 July, and on 2 August
Major General Garnet Wolseley left for Egypt to take command of an expeditionary force
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of over 30,000 men.14 Arriving in Egypt later that month, Wolseley’s force defeated
Arabi’s decisively at Tel El-Kebir on 13 September. Two days later, the British
commander entered Cairo, declared the war over, and helped to reinstate Tewfik as
khedive. With its unilateral action effectively abolishing Anglo-French dual control, the
British government assumed sole responsibility for rebuilding the Egyptian government.
By the end of October, the bulk of the expeditionary force withdrew, and under the
direction of Sir Evelyn Wood, who had been appointed sirdar (or commander), the
process of rebuilding the Egyptian army under British officers commenced in December
1882. As that force took shape, the gradual drawing down of the British garrison
continued throughout 1883.15
Still, questions lingered concerning Britain’s longstanding presence in Egypt.
Having reluctantly led Britain into Egypt, Gladstone and the bulk of his cabinet preferred
to leave a token military force there in order to maintain the khedivate as a British
protectorate.16 Outspoken supporters of withdrawal in the cabinet included Granville,
Hartington, Home Secretary Sir William Harcourt, Chamberlain, Dilke, and Northbrook
in the Admiralty. For his part, Hartington believed that the primary necessity for British
dominance was political rather than military, and consequently he encouraged the
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drawdown of British forces during 1883.17 However, as circumstances on the ground in
Egypt changed and Britain’s colonial relations with Germany shifted in 1884, Hartington,
Chamberlain and Dilke reversed their position and began insisting upon maintaining a
permanent British military presence not only in Egypt but elsewhere throughout the
Empire to present a strong front against German imperial designs.18
Outside the cabinet, Lord Randolph Churchill also strongly favored a British
withdrawal, but he argued that the administration had falsely represented the necessary
importance of the canal to India and the need to place Egypt under sole British protection.
He instead favored establishing Egypt as a protectorate under all of the European
powers.19 Wolseley was sympathetic to the cause of “Egypt for Egyptians” and had
opposed British intervention before being sent to quell the Arabist revolt. With that
mission accomplished, he urged that all British troops be withdrawn as soon as possible
and warned Hartington in February 1883 that “these small detached forces are … always
a source of danger to a nation like ours whose army is so small.”20 On the other hand, Sir
Evelyn Baring (later the earl of Cromer), who had served as the British controller-general
in Egypt from 1878-1879 and who was familiar with Egyptian affairs, insisted that the
reconstruction of Egypt would be impossible without a strong continued British military
presence.21
To Gladstone’s chagrin the strongest proponent of maintaining a strong military
presence in Egypt was Queen Victoria. Writing to her private secretary Sir Henry
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Ponsonby on 17 September about the recent military and diplomatic developments in
Egypt, the queen included a note to be sent to Granville:
Think you should be very cautious in speaking of early withdrawal of troops. We
must bind ourselves to nothing. We have not fought and shed precious blood and
gone to great expense for nothing. Short of annexation we must obtain a firm
hold and power in Egypt for the future. A large force will have to be left there for
some time; and some troops, doubtless, indefinitely. If you bind yourselves
beforehand you will be hampered as you were by the conference and convention.
We shall be laughed at and despised by all Europe if we do not hold a high tone.22
Five days later in a letter to Harcourt, she insisted that Britain had to secure a position in
Egypt “short of annexation” to protect “our Indian dominions and to maintain our
superiority in the East, which is the greatest importance to ourselves as much for
civilization in general.”23 On 26 October Lord Salisbury, the leader of the Conservatives,
made similar remarks in the House of Lords, insisting that Britain could not withdraw
and leave Egypt in a state of absolute anarchy:
To do so would be utterly to condemn the whole of the policy of the war. It would
be to say that all this valuable blood has been spilt, that these terrible risks have
been run, that this mighty force has been dispersed, and that heavy burdens have
been eased upon the English taxpayer, in vain.…[It is] an historical fact that Her
Majesty's government preferred to postpone the period of their intervention till the
khedive was absolutely overthrown by his rebellious soldiers; that they
deliberately preferred to do that rather than interfere at a time when his soldiery
were submissive and his authority intact. The result of this fact is that the position
of the khedive when he comes back is as far removed as possible from his
position when he went away. He comes back on foreign bayonets…I do not say
that after a sufficient lapse of time, if his government is strong, and firm, and
equitable, he may not acquire sources of power and support which are
independent of any foreign aid; but…unless we are prepared to do the business
over again, and to leave Egypt to an anarchy which is inconsistent with all our
professions, and fatal to our interests, he must be sustained by that which is the
only thing upright in that land—namely, the power of Great Britain.24
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The practical considerations reflected in these arguments, combined with a petition
submitted by the 2,600 Europeans residing in Alexandria, which called upon the British
government to maintain a sizeable military presence, convinced those who favored an
immediate withdrawal that some British forces would have to remain in Egypt for at least
the time being.25 Communicating the government’s intentions to the Powers on 3
January 1883 Granville insisted:
Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of
public tranquility, Her Majesty's government are desirous of withdrawing it as
soon as the state of the country and the organisation of proper means for the
maintenance of the khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the
position in which Her Majesty's government are placed towards His Highness
imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the
order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess
the elements of stability and progress.26
Exactly when those goals would be satisfactorily accomplished remained undefined.
PRESS COVERAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SUEZ CRISIS

The national and provincial press kept the British public well-informed about the
developments in Egypt, as well as their financial and strategic implications. Throughout
the early months of the crisis, the opinions of the national and provincial press reflected
the divided opinions that characterized the Parliament and cabinet over the issue of
intervention. These divisions in turn reflected both party difference and the shifting
political opinions within the Liberal Party itself.
Immediately following the signing of the Joint Note which formalized AngloFrench cooperation in handling the Egyptian crisis, many Conservative and independent
papers responded with stiff criticism. Responding to the Times’s insistence that Britain
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had signed the Joint Note with the “utmost great reluctance,” the Aberdeen Journal
stressed that “there could hardly be a more cutting censure” of the British government’s
Eastern policy, and charged:
Why should we be dragged ‘reluctantly’ into any policy whatever, or at the heels
of any power on the face of the earth? If it be our duty to contemplate such an
intervention as that indicated by the Joint Note, why not go to that duty like a
nation of men; and, if not, why be coerced into it like a nation of children?27
Similarly, concerned about maintaining British prestige, Berrow’s Worcester Journal
feared that the arrangement would compromise Britain’s imperial interests in the region,
by giving France the power to “use the joint note as a pretext for hindering any
counteraction on our part.”28 A more moderate piece appeared in the independent
Morning Advertiser, calling the joint Anglo-French approach regretful but nevertheless
prudent, and pressing for assurances that “England” would not be blindly led into a
situation where “the peaceful interests of this country would be subordinated to the
necessities or ambitions of M. Gambetta.”29 Acknowledging that there was as yet no
consensus as to how best to resolve the developing crisis in Egypt, the Times likewise
regretted that the country had abandoned its position of strength in the Near East:
Before 1879 we were masters of our own action, and were at liberty to maintain in
whatever way we judged best an influence in a country where our interests are
beyond all comparison greater than those of all other Powers put together.30
In summing up Gladstone’s second administration, the Derby Mercury declared that “two
years of Liberal government have brought the country to a lower position than it occupied
when Mr. Gladstone last quitted office; and the public desire to know the reason why.”31
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After Gladstone sent warships to the region, Conservatives continued to accuse
him of diminishing British prestige. Musing at the end of May that Gladstone was not
being more aggressive to defend Britain’s “highway to India,” the Aberdeen Journal
contended that the Arabi revolution might not have occurred at all or would have quickly
collapsed had British diplomatic power been consistently and strongly exerted.32 The
Daily Telegraph similarly grumbled that Gladstone’s “muddled” approach to the crisis
was causing Britain to “sink back to play a humble part in the European concert, and
above all places on earth in Egypt, where at one time our word alone was law.”33
Moreover, Conservative papers wove Gladstone’s handling of the Egyptian crisis
into a broader narrative which sought to demonstrate a pattern of misguided Liberal
governance at home and abroad. In an article that was reprinted by the Derby Mercury, a
correspondent for the Daily Telegraph eagerly cited an article in the Cologne Gazette to
refute the “bombastic and unfounded assertions” by A. J. Mundella that there was not a
“single newspaper paragraph in any civilized country, or any legislature, decrying the
magnanimity and justice of England”:
Abroad and at home alike, Great Britain’s experiences during the past year were
of an uniformly disagreeable character. It seemed as though the good genius of
the realm had vanished with Lord Beaconsfield and closed his eyes forever on
April 19. The Irish Land Bill certainly did not contribute to raise the Government
in general esteem… The leaders of the rebellion [i.e., the Land War] are under
lock and key, the police force has been strengthened, the last available regiment
has been transferred to Irish soil. Nevertheless, outrages are perpetrated daily
with impunity…It cannot reckon the restoration of the Transvaal to the plucky
Boers as a particularly meritorious achievement; by giving up Afghanistan it has
simply proved its lack of perspicacity and has conjured up terrible
embarrassments for India.
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The correspondent accordingly concluded that “Mr. Gladstone’s statesmanship has
obviously run to the very end of its tether.”34 Querying whether Gladstone’s Egyptian
policy amounted to something more substantive than merely “not to quarrel with France,”
the Standard cautioned that, if British interests were sacrificed too cheaply in order to
maintain that cooperation with France, Britain’s position in Egypt might well “soon be as
embarrassing as our position in Ireland.”35 Taking issue with Harcourt for what it
considered his obfuscating the truth at a Liberal political rally in Burton-on-Trent,
Yorkshire, the Derby Mercury reminded its readers of the “total failure of the Irish policy
of the government, of their rupture of the European Concert, of the dangerous state of
affairs in Egypt, and of the Russian advance in Central Asia.”36 In the aftermath of the
bombardment of Alexandria, Berrow’s Worcester Journal passionately reminded its
readers of what it considered to be Gladstone’s failings in Ireland, South Africa,
Afghanistan, and Egypt, and lamented that the pattern of imperial retreat would not likely
end so long as Gladstone remained in office:
If John Bull hates anything, it is to be made ridiculous in the eyes of others. He
has an exalted idea of his own importance, and rarely forgives those who lower
his prestige before Europe…Since the present government came into office we
have not had a single example of that British spirit and pluck which of old has
carried us through all difficulties, or spirited them away even before they were
fairly developed…The Boers rule the Transvaal, the Land League rules Ireland,
and Arabi Pasha rules Egypt...The Government have gone on a principle of
turning each cheek to the smiter, of sacrificing any interest rather than defending
it with the sword.37
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The paper thus cautioned that, with Britain’s prestige so diminished, that it would take
“greater deeds than would have sufficed to retain it where it was three or four years ago”
and urged the Conservative Party to be vigilant in safeguarding British honor.38
Despite insisting that the Government address the Egyptian crisis to avoid eroding
British prestige, many Conservative papers were hardly cavalier about using military
force to restore order. Questioning the administration’s demand in January that troops
would only be landed in order to secure the status quo and not to advance Britain’s
footprint, the Aberdeen Journal asked whether such action would in the end only further
the destruction of the status quo.39 The Morning Post similarly cautioned that, while a
joint Anglo-Turkish military action might be possible, a unilateral British action invited
significant risks:
England and Turkey in alliance could hold Egypt and the Suez Canal against a
world in arms. But it is a very different thing for England herself to assail the
united forces of the Ottoman Empire…[it] would be no child’s play, but by
tremendous exertions, by the most costly sacrifices, that such adventure could be
crowned with success. But even when we had occupied Egypt at the cost of
thousands of lives and with the aid of a hundred thousand French ‘helpmates,’
what then?40
Conservatives, nevertheless, generally favored using a show of military strength
as a tool of diplomacy, but, they argued, the application of that force would ultimately
prove unnecessary. At the end of May and again in the aftermath of the bombardment of
Alexandria on 11 July, the Aberdeen Journal criticized Gladstone’s “muddled”
diplomacy and the “certainly avoidable violence” by reminding its readers of how,
“without firing a shot or risking a life,” Disraeli had effectively used British military
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power to defend British interests and prestige in the Near East.41 To that point, the
Aberdeen Journal along with Berrow’s Worcester Journal maintained that had Gladstone
offered consistent and vigorous support for the khedive from the start rather than backing
the nationalist “Egypt for Egyptians” movement, such pressure would have diffused the
crisis and might even have prevented the revolution outright.42 By sending warships into
Alexandrian waters, where Britain “had no natural right,” the papers maintained that the
government had only invited a response by Alexandrian shore batteries and incurred an
unnecessary loss of life. It would have been better, the Aberdeen Journal maintained, to
station the vessels in the vicinity of the Suez Canal which was Britain’s chief priority and
interest.43
Concurring with that point, the Standard charged that “the Allied Fleets are not
the protectors of order, but the instigators of disorder:
Had it not been for the presence of the English and French squadrons in the Port
of Alexandria—a feeble demonstration that has served only to irritate the
Egyptian fanatics—the massacre of Sunday might never have taken place.
To that end, the Standard further held that the fleets would retain that “mischievous
character” until a land force arrived to drive Arabi out of Egypt and to convey Tewfik
back to Cairo.44
Speaking before a Conservative demonstration in Charlton, the Conservative MP
for Exeter, Sir Stafford Northcote, told the crowd that he feared that the Government “by
their vacillation and tardy recognition of the preponderance of British interests in the
East, have imperiled those interests, and are mainly responsible for the present state of
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affairs in Egypt, which may involve this country in a disastrous and costly war.”45
Editorializing on Northcote’s speech, Berrow’s Worcester Journal contrasted Tory
attitudes with those of the Liberals:
However much we may lament or condemn the course of diplomacy which has
led up to the crisis, if England has to put forth her strength, Sir Stafford Northcote
promises that her Conservative sons will be ready to support her. The
Conservatives of England will not impede or embarrass the exertion of that
strength, but will show, and not for the first time, an example of loyalty to our
country and our country’s interests which rarely marks a Liberal Opposition.46
Likewise, in the aftermath of the bombardment, the Derby Mercury decried that little
attention had been given to the consequences of sending the fleet to Alexandria without
the ability to follow up the action with land forces, maintaining that the “catastrophic”
incident profoundly demonstrated the administration’s naïve belief that a moderate show
of force would coerce Arabi to desist his activities.47
Confident that a strong display of military force had been needed from the start,
Conservative newspapers were less certain about who should supply it. The Daily
Telegraph had allowed in January, at a time when Gladstone was intent on cooperating
with France, that such collaboration was regrettable, but that “it is, at any rate, better to
have a single partner whom we may one day buy out than to admit four or five with rival
claims.” Even so, the paper further maintained, “we will never consent to any restoration
of direct Turkish rule, to any removal of the exactions of Ismail’s time, or to any
intervention by the four European Powers whose interests lie outside.”48 Later, in the
aftermath of the attack on Alexandria, as Gladstone worked to prompt the Turks to
intervene, the Standard opined that if the Sultanate offered to send in troops, “however
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much we may dislike it, or suspect the motives that prompt it, we fail to see what answer
can be given, save an affirmative one.”49
Not surprisingly, when Gladstone decided to act unilaterally and called for a tax
increase to fund a full military expedition to put down the Arabi insurrection,
Conservative papers gleefully pointed out the irony that Gladstone’s request validated
their own longstanding position.
The Conservatives are not factious when they see the policy of their late lamented
Chief adopted by his opponents and successors…The very policy [the Whigs]
condemned they have adopted. They raised an outcry against the bringing of
native troops from India, and now they are following that wise example. There
are few who will deny that whilst we hold India we must preserve our highway
thither and our communications intact. We have therefore to uphold the khedive
and his authority against what Mr. Gladstone calls a military faction opposed to
the lawful rulers in Egypt.50
For the Lancaster Gazette, Bright’s resignation from the cabinet made the Liberal
hypocrisy all the more evident:
It would seem, however, that the principles of the Peace-at-any-price Party enable
its supporters to join in threats of war, and show of force, indeed all preliminaries
which lead up to actual warfare; but they must [retire] ignominiously with the first
shot…If he wished to have been a consistent member of the Peace-at-any-Price
party, he should have withdrawn some time ago; if he wished to be a consistent
member of the cabinet, the present is certainly not the time to leave it.51
From the start, Liberal papers throughout the country did not let Conservative
accusations go unanswered. Questioning how it was that Conservatives could honestly
criticize Gladstone and his ministers for “persevering in a course that had been set by
Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury,” the Scotsman insisted that such attacks would
“not likely influence public opinion” against the premier. Additionally, the paper refuted
the idea that France or other Western powers had a “desire to enlarge their scope of
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control,” arguing that Anglo-French cooperation in Egypt did not endanger British
supremacy in the region.52 The Daily News, meanwhile, championed the notion that the
two political parties and the country were more unified than not regarding British
cooperation with France in Egypt. Further it maintained that “the interests of Britain are
paramount even over that of her partner in control to a certain well-defined extent.”53 A
week later the Daily News sounded surprisingly interventionist when it emphasized that
Gladstone fully appreciated the “delicacy and difficulty” of the Egyptian crisis and would
not hesitate to defend the canal and oppose misrule:
To guard her own rights…this country would be ready and willing to act, even, if
that were necessary without allies...While it is most important to keep up a good
understanding with France, we cannot afford either to neglect our own position, or
to violate sound principle by standing in the way of a genuine movement toward
independence among the Egyptian people.54
The Bristol Mercury speculated that any direct intervention would take place only if the
hoped-for nationalist movement became dictatorial, and it reassured readers that any such
action would not be taken unilaterally, but would occur within the European concert:
While [the government] was prepared to protect interests in Egypt which are
exclusively English, they refuse to take up a dog-in-the-manger attitude toward
the Powers who claim a voice in Egypt. Mr. Gladstone stated distinctly that the
Government were prepared to welcome the cooperation of Germany, Russia,
Austria, and Italy in dealing with the Egyptian question. This prevents jealousy,
and restores the European concert at Cairo.55
By early summer the opinions of the national and provincial Liberal press
increasingly sounded more like their Conservative counterparts as they leaned toward
direct intervention. For example, in late May the Daily Chronicle, a paper which
supported the left-wing of the Liberal Party, strongly criticized Radically-minded MPs,
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such as Sir Wilfred Lawson, for opposing any display of force to stabilize the situation.
“The real strength of the foreign policy of the Liberal Party,” it wrote,
lies in the fact that…it can speak clearly and distinctly when occasion arises.
There are times when it is as much the absolute duty of England to be ready to
intervene abroad as it is for the London police to be ready to intervene in our
streets. Officious meddling in either case is to be deprecated but absolute apathy
would be absurd.56
A few days later the paper maintained that “the first duty of our government is to remove
obstacles and reassert our influence; and this to be done effectually must be done
promptly.”57 The Daily News likewise doubted that the general public approved of using
Turkish troops to maintain order in Egypt and maintained that not only was it imperative
for Britain to protect the khedive, but that the nation had “a moral duty to promote the
welfare of Egyptian people.”58
At the same time, other papers resisted making such a shift in their political
opinion. Regretting that unfortunate circumstances had caused Britain to take direct
action by sending a naval squadron to Egypt, the Scotsman remained confident that the
Government could be trusted to end the crisis with the “least possible friction and least
danger to further complications.” It then cautioned:
The cry for more vigorous action in asserting British interests is a survival of
Jingoism. It means a repudiation of the right of anyone but ourselves to interfere
in Egypt, and the curious circumstance is that it is advocated by the partisans of
the Ministry to whom we are indebted for the copartnership [sic] with France.59
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The Times joined in opposing direct British intervention. Throwing its influence behind
Gladstone by maintaining that he had “accurately estimated the situation from the
outset,” the Times shared his optimism that no force by Britain would be needed and that
Turkish intervention was “the least objectionable expedient for restoring tranquility.”60
As the situation became more serious, more papers began pointing to the need for
Britain to intervene directly. As the Bristol Mercury contended, the unwillingness or
inability of the Turkish government to stabilize the situation had moved matters to the
point where the major powers needed to act more assertively.
The conference of the powers cannot prudently maintain its present indefinite
form, which leaves the Khedive open at moment to conspiracies organized in
Constantinople. The mere repugnance of the Sultan to the deliberations of the
Great Powers proves the absolute necessity of devising better guarantees for the
existing control, for the safety of the European population, and for the
constitutional system which the Turkish agents have outraged.61
In the immediate aftermath of the massacre in Alexandria on 11 June, the Liverpool Post
submitted:
We heartily regret the legacy of a French partnership in Egypt left us by the late
Government…If England were alone in this adventure she would know what to
do better than she does. European Concert if you please; but not partnership with
one unpopular State, with all the rest looking on with ill-disguised suspicion.62
At the end of June, the Pall Mall Gazette asserted in its front page editorial that its
“business [was] to point out with the light of recent published official despatches how
unfortunately the influence of France has operated in the development of the present
crisis in Egypt.”63 Over the next month, that aggressive shift in tone became even more
pronounced after Arabi usurped control of the Egyptian government and the British
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government authorized the H.M.S. Seymour to bombard Alexandria. It was at this point
that the Times declared that “we cannot afford to allow Egypt to fall further into anarchy,
as it will certainly do if the action of the fleet is not immediately followed up.”64
While Liberal newspapers had consistently attacked Conservatives for imperial
interventionism, they now found themselves advocating similar intervention in Egypt.
Increasingly, as summer 1881 progressed, they rationalized such action on the grounds
that it was necessary to secure British interests, that it was not inconsistent with
fundamental Liberal principles, and that it furthered the cause of western civilization in
the region. Assessing reaction to the bombardment of Alexandria on 11 July, the London
correspondent for the Leeds Mercury, a paper which in January had emphasized
Gladstone’s commitment to direct intervention if necessary, held that the recent events
had widely convinced Liberals that to uphold a “policy of absolute non-intervention
would be perilous to British commerce.” The correspondent further claimed that there
was “no great sympathy even among the Radical Members, most of whom are capable of
distinguishing between the policy of mere aggression and a policy of legitimate defence”
for the positions held by peace Radicals such as Sir Wilfred Lawson and Mr. Henry
Richard. “There are not ten Members on the Liberal side of the House,” he claimed, “who
sympathise with the views of Mr. Lawson.”65 The Times insisted if Britain delayed any
longer Arabi would be able to greatly strengthen his position and pose a “standing
menace to European life and property, and even to the existence of Cairo itself.”66
Lauding Bright’s long stance against the use of military force, the Bristol Mercury
asserted that the “popularity of the veteran statesman will not be lessened by his
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resignation, however little the public may share in the sentiments by which he has been
actuated.”67 The Mercury also asserted that the “country at large, in common with the
Government, may admit the principle whilst reasonably demurring to the application.”
Still, “in view of the extreme exigencies and almost unprecedented calamities of the
moment,” the paper concluded:
We are surely entitled to avert further exigencies and perhaps more deplorable
calamities, by defending—not merely the vast interests of England but imperiled
civilization. One can hardly imagine any object for which a Power like Great
Britain could more beneficently exercise its material resources than in preserving
Egypt from the horde of savages which a military adventurer has let loose upon
it.68
The Pall Mall Gazette, meanwhile, offered reassurance to its readers regarding
the government’s altruistic intentions for bombarding Alexandria. According to the
Gazette,
This then is the programme of the day:—England preparing to do the work for
Europe and possibly at the request of Europe, which the Sultan refuses to do; that
work, the suppression of the army; this done, the Egyptian minister and popular
delegates to have wider opportunity of doing their own business. That the
programme may be hindered by Turkey on the one hand and by France on the
other is only too true, and there is plenty to be said on both of these hands. But
the above, at any rate, describes the general drift of a policy that is not unworthy
of the government of Great Britain, and to which the powers will be more likely
to ascent, whether expressly or implicitly, than any other.69
Conveying the speeches of William Woodall and Henry Broadhurst at the Liberal Club at
Hanley on 15 July, the Bristol Mercury reported that they insisted, “the government had
done all that was possible to avoid interferences by force,…[and that] England was acting
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in full command with the other powers, and the relations had not been shaken by the
bombardment of Alexandria.”70
The widespread approval for British intervention across the spectrum and the
thorough coverage of Wolseley’s campaign and victory at Tel-el-Kebir were also
accompanied by continued concerns about the government’s long-term strategy for
Egypt. Agreeing with Gladstone that “anarchy must be put down in Egypt and that
English interests must be protected against attack,” the Times forcefully maintained that
“the restoration of the khedive, if it is to lead to any permanent settlement of affairs in
Egypt, must be supported by something more stable and lasting that the shadowy
authority of the sultan or the futile approval of the Concert of Europe.”71 The paper
asserted that, having taken sole responsibility for restoring order in Egypt, Britain had an
undisputed right to control the future arrangements for the government of the Egyptian
territory. With the vote to authorize a military expedition pending, the Liberal
Birmingham Daily Post insisted that “it is now of much more importance that we
should…ascertain definitely the objects for which we are fighting, and the conditions
under which we are to lay down our arms.”72 Exhaustively engaging the dynamics of
restoring order to Egypt while protecting British and European interests, the paper
recognized the implication of defeating the Egyptian army:
This leads to one of the most important points of all. Without such an army as
would be sufficient to protect the internal order and the external independence of
Egypt, how is the khedive to be able to perform those international duties, and
protect those foreign interests, in which England is of all countries the most
immediately concerned? It is not enough, then, to say that we desire to restore
70
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self-government to Egypt, we must be prepared to replace the military forces
which we shall have destroyed, and to define the English and the European
interests which have to be recognized and preserved. It is essential that on these
subjects we should be moderate and unselfish.
The Post, therefore, definitively held that “we shall scarcely have closed our mission in
Egypt until there is established a government there able and willing to secure that
object.73 While the Liberal Liverpool Post approved of British intervention, it
nevertheless appealed to the government and the nation:
We have retired ere now without enriching ourselves from territories which we
have seized and controlled in the interests of civilization. Let us determine to
retire at the earliest possible moment from Egypt, even though under the peculiar
circumstances of the case the earliest possible moment may be considerably
postponed.74
The editors of the Conservative Spectator magazine, meanwhile, called upon the country
to stay the course and finish what it had started in Egypt no matter the difficulty.75
Over the following months, as the government struggled to work out its policy
concerning Egypt, the provincial presses also found it difficult to articulate a stance
toward Anglo-Egyptian relations. For instance, on 7 December 1882, the Liberal
Manchester Examiner weighed in on the queen’s avowed commitment to “promote the
happiness of the people and the prudent development of [Egypt’s] institutions.” While it
gauged that nobody in Britain expected to annex Egypt formally, the paper firmly
believed that the government, having “learned how to abandon the semblance of power
and yet grasp the substance of power,” was almost certainly “bent upon pursuing in
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Egypt one of those subtle and complex policies which, as developed in India, the world
has come to admire as models of ingenious statecraft.”76
Beyond the ranks of editorial writers, the public remained engaged with
developments in Egypt. According to the London correspondent for the Leeds Mercury,
“there was no part of the country where the policy of the government finds stronger
approval than among the Liberals of the north of England...and if the government had
shown itself indifferent to English interests, the outcry in the north of England would
have been very great.”77 In addition to inferences from national and provincial papers
which alluded to public sentiment, the public’s active engagement in the Egyptian crisis
was manifestly expressed in a number of different ways, such as the frequent publishing
of letters to the editor, including those submitted by former and active government
officials such as former Liberal MPs Julian Goldsmid and William H. Gregory, as well as
the standing Liberal MP for Waterford, Henry Villiers-Stuart.78 Also included were
letters from individuals such as the traveler and explorer Samuel W. Baker, Charles H.
Allen, Alfred J. Butler, and Robert W. Felkin.79
Popular opinion was dramatically evident at numerous public demonstrations.
Provincial papers reported on and advertised for these events. For instance, in
association with the 12 July Orange celebrations commemorating the Battle of the Boyne,
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between 5,000 and 10,000 members of the Liberal Orange Institution of England turned
out at Hooton Park in Liverpool to celebrate the principles of Beaconsfieldism.
Occurring just one day after the bombardment of Alexandria, the demonstrators
denounced “the total and disastrous failure” of Gladstone’s government at home and
abroad, specifically in the cases of Ireland and Egypt. The meeting consequently moved
that “Gladstone’s government is unworthy of the nation’s confidence, and should be put
an end to at the earliest possible moment.”80 At another demonstration held in
Blackburn, the keynote speaker warned:
The dishonor through which England has had to go in Zululand, in Egypt, and in
other places should be a caution to the leaders in England, and should excite in the
breast of every man and woman who cares for his and her country a determination
to get ready for the coming conflict which might be close upon us, closer than we
think.81
At a similar rally in Brookhill near Lisburn, spectators welcomed the criticisms of the
administration’s handling of Egyptian and Irish affairs with supportive cries of “Shame
and put them out.”82
Similar events continued to occur into the autumn months. For instance, on 21
July Conservatives from West Kent and the Borough of Greenwich demonstrated at
Charlton Park in Wiltshire.83 Significantly the Charlton event occurred in a district
formerly represented by Gladstone. Driving home this point, identical editorials which
appeared in Berrow’s Worcester Journal and the Isle of Wight Observer pressed that
events such as the one in Charlton, as well as in Oxford and South Lancaster,
demonstrated how deeply the general public objected to the premier’s handling of Egypt
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and other policy matters. They further speculated that, while the premier still carried the
support of his present home district of Midlothian, his backing would likely soon
diminish there as well.84 Claiming that Conservatives were resurgent and reporting that
more than 30,000 individuals had attended the event in Charlton, the Essex Standard
similarly took note of “the remarkable fact that, even where Liberalism was strongest a
few years ago, there the most hostile demonstrations are made against the government.”85
On 7 August 5,000 demonstrators attended a nationally advertised event at Stoke Edith
Park in Ledbury, Herefordshire, and enthusiastically approved an equally critical
resolution.86 Subsequently, on 7 October, “a great demonstration” of Conservatives
turned out in Manchester to “consider the Irish and Egyptian policies of the government.”
The attendees unanimously resolved:
That this meeting strongly disapproves of much of the government policy in
Ireland; and while, cordially recognising the gallant conduct of Her Majesty’s
forces during the late campaign in Egypt, condemns the action of the
administration, believing that, by judgment, firmness, and foresight, the cabinet
might have secured British interests, averted the war, saved many valuable lives,
and prevented much unnecessary pressure upon the national resources...This
meeting is convinced that the proceedings of the government in Afghanistan and
South Africa, as well at home, are calculated to bring discredit upon the country;
and pledges itself to use every means consistent with law to reinstate a
Conservative administration which will have an enlightened and consist[ent]
regard for the honour and true welfare of the empire.87
Conservatives were not the only ones to demonstrate, however. If Tories
capitalized on Bright’s resignation to ridicule what they called the hypocritical shift in
Gladstone’s foreign policy, the Birmingham Reform League met to celebrate politicians
such as Bright, Sir Wilfred Lawson, and Joseph Cowen, who had denounced “the cruel
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and unnecessary bombardment of Alexandria.”88 On 15 July at Bowood Park near
Chippenham and on 16 August in Brownhills in the West Midlands, other Liberals
gathered amidst marching bands, in order to dismiss Conservative critics and reinforce
public confidence in the government. With the bombardment of Alexandria having
occurred only days earlier, the chairman of the Bowood rally insisted that there was “not
the slightest discredit attached to our government under the circumstances,” an
assessment met with applause and cheers of “here here.”89 A month later at the
Brownhills demonstration, Mr. Henry Wiggin, MP, emphatically denied that the Liberals
were the “Peace-at-any-Price” party, and professed that “recent events had shown clearly
that when the honour and dignity of England were about to be attacked, Liberals were
willing to strain every nerve in defence.”90
The public’s engagement with Britain’s presence in Egypt did not cease once the
Arabi revolt had been suppressed. Over the next year provincial presses continued to
engage questions about the nation’s commitment to remain there, and that interest was
elevated still further as complications arose in the Egyptian protectorate of the Sudan.
BRITAIN IN THE SUDAN, 1883-JANUARY 1884

Having assumed responsibility for Egypt—however reluctantly—Gladstone’s
administration was additionally burdened with overseeing the Sudan. Annexed by Egypt
in 1821, the Sudan had been in open rebellion since 1881. That revolt was led by
Muhammad Ahmad, the son of a Sudanese boat builder, who proclaimed himself the
Mahdi (the Expected One), who called for a jihad against Turkish rule. Over the next
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two years, the movement gained strength. Defeating sizeable Egyptian armies that were
sent against it, the Mahdi’s forces contributed to and benefited from the instability caused
by the Arabi revolt.91 With his government propped up by the British military, Tewfik
sought to reassert control over the Sudan and eliminate the Mahdi threat to Upper Egypt.
In early 1883, therefore, he dispatched an Egyptian army of 10,000 men, many of whom
were survivors of Arabi’s army at Tel-el-Kebir. The army was officered by British
soldiers and commanded by Colonel William Hicks, who was a veteran of the Indian
Army and, in being hired by the khedive, was elevated to the rank of general. After
drilling and training his army for several months in Omdurman, Hicks had succeeded in
clearing Mahdists from the region between the White and Blue Niles by the end of May
1883. Encouraged by these results Tewfik and his ministers sought to reassert Egyptian
control over Kordofan, a region that lay southwest of the capital at Khartoum. Gladstone,
Baring and other British officials opposed such a move, because they feared the financial
strain a Sudanese dependency might put on the weakened Egyptian state. However,
because the British were preparing to turn over full control of Egypt to the khedive,
including drawing down their military presence there, and because they wanted no part in
the Sudan question, they chose to refrain as much as possible from interfering in the
matter. Leaving Omdurman on 8 September with a force numbering close to 10,000
men, Hicks’s expedition into Kordofan met with disaster on 5 November. Abushed at El
Obeid, Hicks’s force was almost completely annihilated.92
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This defeat left 32,000 Egyptian soldiers cut off in garrisons in Khartoum, Sennar,
and other places. When news of the disaster reached London about two weeks later, it
immediately raised questions about Egypt’s long-term presence in the Sudan and forced
the cabinet to reconsider Britain’s Egyptian policy. Prompted by General Wolseley,
Hartington as war secretary argued that Britain was bound to support Egypt in retaining
control over Khartoum and its surrounding regions for the sake of preserving British
prestige and protecting the route to India,. At the same time, he believed that it was
reasonable that Egypt be persuaded to evacuate from the provinces of Kordofan, Darfur,
and Fashoda, which lacked strategic importance.93 Gladstone concurred with Baring,
who had recently been named British consul-general, that it would be impossible for
Egypt to hold on to even those limited sectors of the Sudan without British assistance.94
Lord Northbrook soon agreed that it would be impossible for Egypt to retain control over
its southern neighbor on its own and that the operation was too costly for the Turks or
Britain to pursue.95 But when Baring advised the khedive in early December to abandon
the territory south of Aswan, Tewfik’s ministers summarily resigned rather than take
responsibility for relinquishing Egyptian territory. Bankrupt and with his army
destroyed, the khedive was powerless to defend his own borders let alone to withdraw
from the Sudan without assistance. Recognizing the situation, the cabinet was obliged to
assume responsibility for the protection of Egypt proper and the Red Sea coast.96 The
political effect of this decision was that instead of advancing the process of granting
Egypt its independence, British oversight was all the more formalized. The khedive was
93
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relegated, for all intents and purposes, to the status of a puppet ruler, with the real
decision-making power residing in Baring’s hands.97
The task of evacuating more than 33,000 Egyptian troops and civilians out of the
Sudan fell to Major General Charles “Chinese” Gordon.98 A fervent Christian who
avidly supported charitable and humanitarian causes, Gordon had previously served as
governor general of Equatoria and the Sudan under Khedive Ismail in the 1870s, and he
had used his position to suppress the slave trade.99
There were initially significant reservations about sending Gordon, both in
London and in Cairo. At the time he agreed to accept the cabinet’s offer to go to the
Sudan in mid-January 1884, Gordon had already resigned his commission in the British
army to accept a contract with King Leopold of Belgium to eradicate the Afro-Arab slave
trade in the Congo.100 Aware of Gordon’s tendency to interpret his orders to serve his
own convictions, Gladstone was wary about giving him the power to act on his own and
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preferred that he be given only advisory responsibilities.101 In fact, Sir Edward Walter
Hamilton, Gladstone’s personal secretary, recorded that “[Gordon] seems to be a halfcracked fatalist; and what can one expect from such a man?”102 Meanwhile, Baring had
initially opposed the appointment of Gordon or any other British officer for that matter,
but he also believed that the Egyptians were incapable of administering the situation,
which called for both an advisory and an executive functionary. At the urging of his
military advisors--some of whom had served previously with Gordon--Baring became
convinced that Gordon was the only officer suitable to effect the evacuation of the
Sudan.103
Gordon met with a select cabinet committee comprised of Hartington, Granville,
Dilke, and Northbrook to finalize his commission on 18 January. The committee offered
potentially conflicting instructions to him. The members told Gordon to proceed to the
Sudan in an advisory capacity and to “report on the best way of withdrawing garrisons,
settling the country, and to perform other duties as may be entrusted to him by the
khedive’s government” through Baring.104 Gladstone was notably absent from that final
meeting, as he was resting at his home in Hawarden, and his absence may well have
contributed to his subsequent befuddlement over Gordon’s actions and his persistent
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belief that Gordon had only been given at most advisory responsibilities. “We sent
Gordon on a mission of peace and liberation,” he later wrote. “I never understood how it
was that Gordon’s mission of peace became one of war.”105 As Elton notes in his
account of Gordon’s commissioning, Hartington’s report to Gladstone made no mention
of the reference to Gordon being authorized to perform “other duties.” Consequently,
Gladstone, who intended from the onset that Gordon only be sent in an advisory capacity,
remained convinced that Gordon embarked on nothing more than a fact-finding and
advisory mission.106
Gordon, however, understood his orders to be executive in nature. Recounting his
meeting with the ministers to his sister Augusta the following day, he wrote:
Wolseley came for me, I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and
Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas. I said yes,
and repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which was ‘they would
evacuate Sudan.’ They were pleased and said, that was their idea. Would I go? I
said ‘yes.’
They said ‘when?’ I said, ‘To-night.’ And it was over.107
Immediately following his meeting with the cabinet ministers, Gordon, accompanied by
Lt. Col. J. D. H. Stewart as his staff officer, departed for Egypt by way of the evening
boat-train to Calais. They arrived in Port Said on 24 January.
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THE POWER OF THE BRITISH PRESS AND GORDON’S MISSION TO SUDAN,
NOVEMBER 1883-JANUARY 1884108

Throughout 1883, the provincial presses remained attentive to questions regarding
Britain’s future interest in Egypt and the Sudan. That interest only heightened after
Hicks’s army was massacred by Mahdist forces on 5 November 1883. In the course of
printing detailed articles on the disaster, the newspapers of the country quickly reacted by
calling for a withdrawal from the Sudan. The Conservative Bury Post asserted on 27
November that “it is no concern of ours to conquer the Sudan, and we should be stupid to
attempt it.”109 The independent Dundee Courier cautioned against sending troops into
the Sudan, insisting “we have no interest there and no right to be fighting where our
interests are not threatened.”110 Declaring Khartoum to be the “extreme outpost of
Egypt,” the Economist firmly declared “[we] not only refuse to assist in any expedition,
but refuse consent to it while the army is being commanded by British officers.”111
Likewise the Liberal Daily News insisted, “it is absurd to suppose that the policy of
England can be affected by the deplorable catastrophe in the Sudan. Even if the Mahdi
should be defeated in the end, there ought to be no further thought of conquering the
Sudan.”112 Despite the widespread bipartisan call in the press for the British government
to dispense with any responsibility for the Sudan, at least a few papers disagreed. The
independent Glasgow Herald did not rule out the possibility of a British expedition
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against the Mahdi and contested the notion that Britain had no compelling interest in the
Sudan:
Although a serious enterprise…such an effort as this would probably not be
wasted as insurance against total anarchy in Egypt and still more against loss of
our continuing influence there. But it must be expected to fail—and indeed it
ought not to be made—unless a clear understanding is come to the Nile Valley,
and still more in Downing Street, as to the real meaning and extent of that
influence.113
Characterizing the news as “a mene tekel to the government scheme of withdrawal,” the
Saturday Review maintained that it would be impossible “for us to disregard an
overthrow of Colonel Hicks and an advance of the insurgents on Khartoum…If Egypt
under English influence, or Egypt under some influence, does not attempt the opening of
the Sudan, it will be done somehow.”114
In spite of the press’s widespread call for a British retreat from the Sudan, they
did not advocate a complete withdrawal from the region in the aftermath of the Hicks
disaster. Rather they suggested that Britain should retain and even increase its presence
in Egypt. The Times immediately urged that:
We cannot believe that, in the presence of facts the significance of which only
wilful blindness can refuse to see, the Ministry will persist in the project of
weakening the small British force in Egypt. The policy, in which the evacuation
of Cairo, recently announced, but, happily, not yet accomplished, is a step, has
been adopted in defiance of the advice of every person of authority and
experience in Egyptian affairs from Lord Dufferin downwards.115
It further held that “a sudden turn of affairs…has made the country ask whether, instead
of weakening the British garrison in Egypt we shall now be compelled to face the
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necessity of reinforcing it.”116 The independent Dundee Courier, likewise, contended
that Britain’s great interest in Egypt must be preserved.117 And the Conservative
Lancaster Gazette warned:
Radical non-interventionists are prompt with the assertion that British interests are
confined to the Nile delta so the Mahdi leader should be permitted to freely work
his will in the Sudan. But what if the False Prophet advances to Cairo?...The first
result of this startling disaster is a countermand of the order for withdrawing
British troops…The only method of securing order is the maintenance of the
British forces.”118
In thus engaging the mounting questions pertaining to Britain’s presence in the
Sudan, the press was not only highly responsive to imperial activity, but proved to be
highly influential in determining British policy. Indeed, Gladstone’s decision to send
Gordon and his subsequent decision to dispatch a relief expedition to Khartoum was so
fundamentally connected to the activities of the press, that one must account for those
shifting opinions in order to understand fully the government’s actions.
To be sure, while the press was not the only party interested in seeing Gordon sent
to the Sudan, it would be their efforts that would prove vital to Gordon’s eventual
appointment. At the end of November in the aftermath of the Hicks disaster, Colonel
Brevan Edwards, an officer in the Royal Engineers, and Sir Andrew Clarke, the
superintendent of fortifications, recommended that Gordon be sent to Sudan to Hugh
Childers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. According to Edwards, “there was no one
more qualified to deal with the question [of the Sudan] than Charlie Gordon…His name
alone would do wonders, but no time should be lost.” And Clarke insisted that, “if the
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Mahdi is a prophet, Gordon in the Sudan is greater.” 119 Childers then forwarded the
proposal on to Foreign Secretary Granville, who asked Gladstone:
Do you see any objection to using Gordon in some way? He has an immense
name in Egypt. He is popular at home. He is a strong but sensible opponent to
slavery. He has a bee in his bonnet.120
On 1 December the proposition was then sent on to Baring in Cairo for his consideration.
But Baring, after conferencing with the Khedive, flatly rejected the offer because he felt
that appointing a Christian to deal with a Muslim uprising would be grossly
counterproductive.121 Consequently, as matters stood in early December, little was done
officially to impede Gordon’s intention to resign his commission and serve Leopold in
the Congo. There is also every indication that the public at large was unaware of these
exchanges, as no mention of the possibility that Gordon might be sent to the Sudan
appeared in the press in November and December. In fact on 4 and 6 December the
Times reported that Zubehr Pasha, a former slaver who carried considerable influence in
the region, was likely to be named the commander of the forthcoming expedition into the
Sudan.122
That changed briefly on New Year’s Day. Sir Samuel Baker, an esteemed
explorer and authority on the Middle East, wrote a letter to the Times in which he asked,
“Why should not General Gordon Pasha be invited to assist the government. [sic] There
is no man living who would be more capable or so well fitted to represent the justice
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which Great Britain should establish in the Sudan.” 123 Privately, he also wrote on the
subject to Gordon, with whom he was friends, but Gordon replied that he was intent on
serving in the Congo. 124 Five days later the paper congratulated Gordon on his future
post in central Africa and reported with disappointment that the government had not
followed up on Baker’s suggestion.125
The cabinet at that juncture remained intent that the khedive’s ministers take
responsibility for evacuating the Sudan.126 Indeed, Baker’s plea seemed to have fallen
almost completely on deaf ears. Almost all other references to Gordon in the press
between November and 8 January involved passing remarks concerning his upcoming
assignment to the Congo, or his past work in China and the Sudan.127 Aside from these
glancing remarks, the only notable mention of Gordon and the Sudan came from a
correspondent stationed in Cairo that first appeared in the Standard on 5 January:
“Chinese” Gordon has left Syria in order to succeed to the functions and position
of Mr. Stanley on the Congo, under the King of the Belgians. I hear, however,
that proposals have been made to him by the Foreign Office which may induce
him to turn his steps to Egypt. Such an appointment would be generally approved
should Gordon accept it.128
Two days later the editors of the Glasgow Herald may have been hinting at this when
they vaguely asked in passing, “why, by the way, was the general not bespoke for a still
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darker region of the Dark Continent.”129 The lack of attention to Gordon, especially in
the wake of Baker’s proposal, supports Gordon biographer John Pollock’s observation,
that at the time “Gordon’s name had been almost completely forgotten.”130
The tenor and direction of the public’s interest and the cabinet’s intentions
dramatically shifted thanks to efforts of W. T. Stead of the Pall Mall Gazette.131 On the
eve of Gordon’s departure for the Congo, Stead having learned that Gordon had arrived
in Britain, showed up unexpectedly at the home of the general’s sister in Southampton on
8 January, and pressed him for an interview regarding the Sudan.132 Gordon was at first
reluctant to speak and insisted that he “did not want to press [his] opinions on the public.”
Stead reassured him that the public was genuinely interested in his authoritative views,
and Gordon obliged Stead’s request. In the course of that discussion, Gordon strongly
questioned the wisdom of a full British withdrawal:
So you would abandon the Sudan? But the eastern Sudan is indispensible to
Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your hold upon Egypt proper if you
abandon your hold on the eastern Sudan to the Mahdi or even to the Turk than
what it would to retain your hold upon the eastern Sudan by the aid of such
material as exists in the provinces. Darfur and Kordofan must be abandoned.
That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White Nile should be
retained, and north of Senaar. The danger is altogether of a different nature. It
arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering Mahommedan
power, established close to your frontiers, will exercise upon the populations you
govern.133
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He also maintained that “the great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the
weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Sudan.” 134 Whether Egypt abandoned
the Sudan or not, Gordon asserted that financial costs would accrue regardless, but in
either case he believed such costs would only be temporary. On a more pragmatic note,
he insisted that it was logistically impossible to withdraw the troops garrisoned in Sudan
safely, and thus concluded that “the only course which ought to be entertained” was to
“defend Khartoum at all hazards.”135 Introducing Stead’s interview the following day, 9
January, with a forceful leader that read “Chinese Gordon for the Sudan,” the Pall Mall
Gazette urged that Gordon’s expertise made him indispensable and that he should be
dispatched to Sudan immediately “to do what can be done.”136
Intrigued with the Sudan as early as 22 November following the news on Hicks, it
is not known if Stead was influenced by Baker’s appeal in the Times. Years later Wilfred
Scawen Blunt accused Reginald Brett (later Lord Esher), a personal friend of Gordon’s
and Hartington’s private secretary, of purposefully orchestrating Stead and the other
newspapers to push for Gordon’s appointment.137 When he reviewed Blunt’s work in
November 1911, Stead boldly claimed full credit for Gordon’s appointment, including a
section entitled, “My Reason for Sending Gordon to Khartoum,” and declared: “I not
only said so, but I was obeyed.”138 Whether or not the call for Gordon was solely Stead’s
own idea or was devised by others, it is nonetheless impossible to deny the impact of
Stead’s piece.
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The day after the interview appeared papers around the country reprinted portions
of the scoop and discussed Gordon’s assessment of the strategic situation in the Sudan.139
In Maryport on 10 January, at a crowded Liberal meeting that was meant to affirm
confidence in the leadership of the party and return Liberal MPs to parliament, Sir
Wilfred Lawson utilized Gordon’s critique to heap condemnation on the premier for
entering Egypt in the first place and for disgracefully “enslaving” the Sudan., He pledged
“to do everything in his power to get the troops out of Egypt.”140 While it paid tribute to
Gordon’s expertise by insisting that “everyone ought to pay the fullest attention to any
opinion expressed with regard to the Egyptian crisis by General Gordon,” the Daily News
stood firmly behind Gladstone’s decision to withdraw from Sudan and dismissed the
persistent accusations that the government’s decisions were continuing to lead to a “loss
of prestige.” To that end, the papers stressed to their readers that Gordon’s statements
were a warning against abandoning the Sudan rashly, but that they were not, per se,
directed against an orderly withdrawal.141 Concurring with the government’s decision to
make Wadi Halfa the southern boundary of Egypt, the Bristol Mercury rejected Gordon’s
contention that an abrupt extraction was unadvisable when it maintained that the garrison
at Khartoum “at present could be withdrawn without danger.”142 Such responses were
not limited to the Liberal papers. Taking issue with a Sheffield politician who advocated
sending 30,000 British troops into the Sudan to crush the Mahdi and then marching on to
Madagascar to flush out the French, the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent declared:
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“This…is what Tory journalism means when it insists upon the government protecting
British interests and the prestige and honour of England in Egypt and the Sudan.” The
only sound course of action, the paper determined, was that which the government had
already resolved to do, the withdrawal from the South and Western Sudan to Wadi
Halfa.143
From the perspective of the Conservative and independent presses, which
seemingly took Gordon’s warnings more seriously, a military expedition to extract the
garrisons or to defend Britain’s position in the Sudan, was simply the responsible and
necessary course of action. Claiming that the European papers widely perceived
Gladstone’s withdrawal from Sudan to be a sign of weakness, the Hampshire Advertiser
exhaustively argued that it was impossible to conclude otherwise since their suppositions
were supported by experts such as Baker and Gordon. The Advertiser went on to observe
regretfully that in the long run the cabinet’s “humiliating policy would hardly settle the
crisis.”144
Although many Conservative papers did not mention Gordon directly, their
arguments were consistent with what he had advocated in his interview with Stead.
Insisting that the entire country was amazed by the government’s “resolution to leave
Khartoum, Sinkat, and Tokar to their fate with humiliation and anxiety,” the Standard
hoped that the government would not “tarnish the English name by withholding
assistance from the beleaguered garrisons who, with the exercise of a little spirit and the
expenditure of a little money, might be—or would have been—rescued from a terrible
fate.” The Standard further contended that, if Britain gave the Sudan to the Mahdi,
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“there would be no hope of a strong and beneficial administration at Cairo.” The paper
claimed that with proper governance, “there was no reason why his southern domains
should not add strength and dignity to the throne of the khedive.”145 The Daily Telegraph
similarly charged:
It is necessary to urge that the British government shall spare no effort to rescue
the victims of its tardy resolution. There are British soldiers enough in Egypt today to drive the Mahdi over the equator if they could only get at him; and yet, in
fear as we are of hearing of frightful disasters, they are helpless at Cairo.146
The Morning Post counseled that “if the six thousand Egyptian troops at Khartoum, with
the Europeans in that town…are massacred in attempting to retreat across the desert, the
responsibility of the British government for such a catastrophe cannot be disavowed.”147
It therefore recommended that a force of some four to six thousand Indians and Nubians
could affect the safe withdrawal of the Khartoum garrison.148 The Morning Advertiser
echoed those remarks stating:
It seems to us that no effort that Her Majesty’s government could make would be
too great for securing the safety of the defenders of Khartoum and the remnant of
the European population under its protection. If disaster, and possibly massacre,
should overtake the column of fugitives from Khartoum there would be an
outburst of indignation from the civilized world.149
The Liverpool Courier posited that “the abandonment of the Sudan may or may not be
wise as a political step, [but] the abandonment of the imperiled garrison and the Christian
people who imagined that England was ruling Egypt is a crime that will cover the British
name with indelible infamy.”150
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That Gordon’s statements had an impact on public opinion and policy decisions
did not go unnoticed by a London correspondent for the Hampshire Advertiser who
observed just a few days after Stead’s interview appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette:
The publication of General Gordon’s opinions has done a great deal to strengthen
the hands of those who have all along urged the fatality of the abandonment,
while the sensitiveness, even of the government itself, to the criticism on its own
project, is shown by its contradiction of the suggested abandonment of Souakim
[sic]. “Nothing of the kind,” we are told by the semi-official journalists. Perhaps
we shall be told by and bye [sic] that it is not intended to abandon Khartoum, and
then that Berber is to be held, while as to Wady Halfa [sic] that is to be a mere
basis of alterations.151
Moreover, in contrast to Baker’s earlier plea in the Times for Gordon’s services, the Pall
Mall Gazette’s demand that Gordon be sent to the Sudan provoked a great deal of
positive response by the presses. For instance, the London correspondent for the
Sheffield and Rotherham Independent reported, that
“Chinese” Gordon and his opinions on the Sudan are on the lips of all active
politicians here to-night, and the possibility of the government intercepting his
projected voyage to the Congo, and sending him to Egypt with extensive powers,
is being eagerly discussed.152
And while it noted that “some fancy the mere whisper of his name throughout the Sudan
would dispel all danger,” the correspondent cautioned that “a little less hysterical
enthusiasm would be likelier to secure the approval of the general public to any such step
being taken.”153 Dismayed by the situation in Egypt, the Morning Advertiser likewise
wrote, “it is not too much to ask that all England has been looking for the employment of
General Gordon in the present crisis in Egypt.”154 The Morning Post insisted that “surely
it is not too late for the government to admit to their councils a man whose advice and co-
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operation in such a crisis as the present would be of incalculable value.”155 The Times
suggested that it was good that Gordon’s resignation had not yet been formally accepted
by the War Office, as it was proof that the government recognized “his eminent services
and [were] unwilling to lose them.” It optimistically offered that those services might not
only be utilized to secure the defense of Egypt but also to effect “the restoration of the
khedive’s authority over a part of the Sudan.”156
Still apparently intent upon going to the Congo, Gordon’s reaction to the flurry of
such articles and demands for his services was to press for Baker’s appointment to the
Sudan in a letter to the Times.157 That suggestion, however, was completely ignored by
the presses; they wanted Gordon. So too did Hartington, the war secretary, who having
favored sending Gordon to the Sudan for some time, redoubled his efforts.158 With
journalistic and political pressure quickly mounting, Gladstone and Granville acquiesced
and offered the Sudan mission to Gordon.159 The aforementioned process by which
Gordon was sent to the Sudan rapidly went into motion. Only nine days after Stead’s
article appeared in print, Gordon was on his way to the Sudan.
The significance of Stead’s accomplishment in effecting the appointment of
Gordon did not go unnoticed by the general public. As one observer expressed to the
Times:
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The people who first obtained and forced on the attention of ministers the
general’s opinions were the press, and it is to them that the country owes a tardy
recognition of this great man’s power, and it is they who must be thanked if
England and Egypt are rescued from their difficulties by his courage and
gallantry.160
Raymond Schults has contended that Stead’s efforts marked a truly significant point in
the history of journalism. To be sure, this was certainly not the first time the press had
influenced a government into take a certain course of action. What made it especially
notable, as R. H. Gretton pointed out, was that this “was probably the first occasion on
which a newspaper set itself, by acting as the organiser of opinion on a particular detail of
policy, to change a government’s mind at high speed. However strongly newspapers had
spoken before this on political subjects, they had not adopted the method of hammering,
day in, day out, at a single detail, and turning policy into a catchword.”161 That the press
was so successful may have been due, as Gretton suggested, to the government being
encouraged that they had been right all along to consider sending Gordon to the Sudan
back in December.162
THE SWAY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND GORDON AT KHARTOUM,
FEBRUARY 1884-AUGUST 1885
Any ambiguity concerning Gordon’s orders evaporated when he arrived in Cairo
on 24 January. The Egyptian government bestowed upon him the title of governorgeneral of the Sudan, and he was expressly charged by Baring to
arrange for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons etc. as rapidly as is
consistent with (1) the saving of life and so far as possible, property; (2) the
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establishment of some form of government which will prevent, so far as possible,
anarchy and confusion arising out of the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops.163
To effect the second part of that commission, Gordon elicited the support of Zubehr
Pasha, whom the government had considered as a possible leader prior to Gordon’s
appointment. He was also the only person, Gordon believed, who had any chance of
establishing a responsible temperate government in the wake of an Egyptian exodus. On
that basis, Gordon requested that the cabinet approve Zubehr’s appointment.164
From the moment Gordon left Britain, hardly a day went by without leading
articles in the British papers that reported or offered comments on his position.165
Already successful in effecting Gordon’s appointment to the Sudan, the press continued
to exert influence. For example, the British government ultimately rejected Gordon’s
request to install Zubehr because, in the words of Granville, “the public would not
tolerate the appointment of Zubehr Pasha.”166 Ostensibly this was because the public
opposed the idea of an ex-slaver being named governor-general of the Sudan.167 Leading
the charge against Zubehr was the highly influential British and Foreign Anti-Slavery
Society. In December, when it was reported that he might be named the commander of
an Egyptian army in the Sudan, the Anti-Slavery Society along with the Times strongly
protested that move on the grounds that, given Zubehr’s history of slaving and resisting
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the authority of the khedive, the appointment would be “improper and dangerous in the
highest degree.”168 Three months later, although the Times recognized that Gordon ought
not leave Khartoum without first establishing a responsible government, it declared that
“it is very much open to doubt whether any Government with a notorious slave-driver at
its head can be fitly entrusted to take the place he vacates.”169 Reiterating its opposition
to the rumored appointment, the Anti-Slavery Society firmly urged that the government
not “stultify that anti-slavery policy which has so long been the high distinction of
England.”170 That the public was so adamantly against Zubehr, Elton asserted, was not
so much a result of a campaign by the press, as it was because the government had not
done enough to “enlighten public opinion” about the necessity of the appointment.171
Queen Victoria, meanwhile, complained to Gladstone at the end of February that “the
decisive factor should be ‘the good and permanent tranquility of Egypt…and not public
opinion HERE which is fickle and changeable.’”172
Even while they opposed the appointment of Zubehr, the press and the public
were still highly eager to see that Gordon was adequately supported in his mission. As
early as 23 January the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle had contended that “General
Gordon may have great influence among the natives, and he may know more about the
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Sudan than any other officer, but unless he is well backed up by a strong force of English
troops he might as well stay at home as seek to turn by his single arm the blow which
threatens the chief town of the Sudan.”173 In emphasizing the humanitarian aspects of
Gordon’s mission in the Sudan and Gordon’s future ambition to stamp out the slave trade
in the Congo, one clergyman wrote to the Essex Standard at the beginning of February
that “under these circumstances is it not a national, nay a world-wide duty that we should
give him all that we can give him—all that he asks for—our prayers.”174 On 11 February,
meanwhile, the Times demanded that the government support Gordon adequately:
It is incredible that the strength of the British Empire should not be adequate for
such an effort, and, if it be, the obligation upon us to use it for the purpose is
dictated alike for humanity and policy…At home, practically all classes and
sections are agreed in calling upon the government to recognize and give effect to
that responsibility, and ministers will commit an astounding and
incomprehensible error if they delude themselves with the notion that a movement
of public opinion so powerful and unanimous can be defied even by this phalanx
of a parliamentary majority.175
Gladstone’s administration was extremely reluctant to offer military support
directly to Gordon in the weeks following his departure, a position that left the prime
minister and his colleagues open to criticism. To be sure, the Egyptian and British
governments did send forces into the Sudan in 1884. At the very time that Gordon and
Stewart were making their way to Khartoum, for example, General Valentine Baker led a
failed attempt to relieve a garrison at Tokar. Immediately after, at the insistence of
Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief of the army, a second
expedition under Major General Sir Gerald Graham set out to relieve Suakin, a location
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believed vital for effecting a retreat from Khartoum. 176 This latter effort received
considerable public support, as evidenced by a meeting held at the Guildhall in London
and chaired by the lord mayor on 15 February. 177 Nevertheless, the Gladstone
administration faced a Vote of No Confidence in the Commons four days later, and
during the debate on that motion, Hartington spelled out the government’s position vis-àvis Sudan. “We are not responsible,” he said, “for the relief or rescue of garrisons in
either the western or the southern or the eastern Sudan.” 178 He further claimed—
disingenuously—that Gordon was not acting on behalf of the British government but
rather for the Egyptian government, which had occupied Sudan. 179
The day before this debate at Westminster, Gordon and Stewart arrived at
Khartoum, where Gordon was received as “‘father’ by an adoring and enthusiastic
crowd,” and he immediately set about the slow process of evacuating the 11,000
Egyptian troops and civilians who resided in Khartoum down the Nile by means of
government steamers.180 When word reached him in early March of London’s decision
not to approve the appointment of Zubehr, Gordon informed Baring that, while he would
proceed in evacuating Khartoum, he could not guarantee the completion of his
instructions to leave behind a responsible government without the assistance of Zubehr.
By that time he had come to understand that the Mahdi’s movement was not just a
176
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response to ineffective and corrupt governance, but that it was a religiously inspired
movement, and that as such the Mahdi could not be negotiated into allowing the
establishment of an effective government other than one of his own making in the Sudan.
Gordon consequently warned Baring that “if Egypt is to be quiet, the Mahdi must be
smashed up.”181 Conveying to Baring a week later the paramount need for additional
support from “the government,” and specifically referencing the necessity of Zubehr’s
confirmation, Gordon maintained: “I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I
feel a conviction that I will be caught in Khartoum.”182
On 12 March the Mahdists closed the siege around Khartoum—a situation that
would last some 320 days. Telegraph communication between Khartoum and Cairo were
severed and the only means for Khartoum to communicate with the outside world was by
messenger across the desert. The plans for evacuating the city thus came to a halt. Even
without the relief of Berber, there remained a window of opportunity for Gordon and a
great portion of the Egyptian and Foreign contingent to escape in the early summer while
the Nile remained high. Such an expedition, though, was beset with considerable danger
and had no certainty of success. Weighing the risks and refusing to leave the Sudan in
crisis, Gordon opted to stay in Khartoum, doing his best to secure the city militarily,
attempting to ease the ever increasing fiscal and food shortages, and holding up
morale.183 All the while, he awaited the arrival of military relief—that relief, which
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messages from London during the spring and summer insisted would not be
forthcoming—ultimately did come, but it came too late.184
Throughout the spring and summer of 1884, the cabinet continued not to
appreciate fully Gordon’s assessment of the impending Mahdi threat to Khartoum
specifically or to the Sudan more generally. Upon receiving his warnings and pleas for
military resources with which to “smash the Mahdi,” the cabinet believed that Gordon
was not only advising British military intervention but was announcing his intention to
pursue his own course of action and willfully to disobey his orders to withdraw. To be
sure, earlier transmissions from Gordon to Baring, which had been forwarded to the
government in London, suggested that he was launching military attacks against the
Mahdi. In truth, however, such actions were little more than intelligence gathering
missions, and Gordon’s warning to Baring was nothing more than a predictive
assessment of the situation. In addition, messages from Gordon, such as the one that
arrived on 30 March, offered reassurance that as of two weeks prior Khartoum was “quite
safe.”185 The overall effect was that miscommunication greatly affected the cabinet’s,
and especially, the prime minister’s understanding of Gordon’s situation. Thus, holding
firm to the belief that Gordon could come out of Khartoum if he wanted, and
apprehensive about being seen giving ground to the “jingoes,” Gladstone resisted sending
a military expedition into the Sudan.186
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That resolve came in the face of stiff pressure to act. On 25 March, the queen
appealed to Hartington through her private secretary that “Gordon must be trusted and
supported…if not for humanity’s sake, for the honour of the government and the nation
he must not be abandoned.”187 In fact, Hartington had by then been hearing from
Wolseley for nearly seven weeks that a large expedition should be sent to support
Gordon, and by early April a narrow majority of the cabinet, including Dilke and
Chamberlain, had become convinced that action was required. They could not, however,
agree on the size or scope of the relief expedition, and Gladstone and Granville took
advantage of these divisions to postpone any decision into the summer months.188
As new information from Khartoum became scarce, the press and the general
public once again set the pace for government action. Having earlier anticipated that the
government would act to relieve Gordon, newspapers increasingly exerted pressure for
the government to follow through when that support was not forthcoming. A Cairo
correspondent for the Standard reported in early April: “Lord Hartington’s declaration
that General Gordon would receive assistance, should he claim it, has caused some
amusement here. It is well known that General Gordon has already distinctly asked…for
English troops, which request has been ignored.”189 On 8 April, in noting the questions
posed by Lords Napier and Hardwicke in the House of Lords about preparations for a
relief mission of Gordon, the Dundee Courier insisted that “it would be well that the
government could show that they are prepared for such a contingency as the relief of
Gordon and those for whose fate we have made ourselves responsible.”190 Four days
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later, a leading column in the same paper claimed that as Egyptian troops were inherently
unreliable, any relief of Gordon would have to be effected by British troops. With that in
mind, it maintained that Gordon’s reports, which emphasized the security of his position,
were likely not completely accurate because Gordon, as an “enthusiast” to the work he
was undertaking, was likely to “face dangers lightly.” Arguing that the reports from the
Times’s correspondent in Khartorum, Frank Power, were accurately conveying the
seriousness of the situation, it insisted that “the optimist views which have been
continuously pressed…do not accurately outline the situation of Gordon at Khartoum.”
The paper urged that “if we have any responsibility for Gordon’s present position…a
more solicitous and anxious view of the situation by our Government would be justified
than that which they appear yet to have entertained, or than General Gordon has himself
seemed to hold.”191 The Liverpool Mercury, meanwhile, took a more sanguinary tone,
assuring that “the government has done the best that could be done under the
circumstances,” and arguing that “Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues may be confidently
trusted to take all necessary measures for the rescue of General Gordon.”192
Not every paper, however, was convinced that a British relief expedition should
be sent to Khartoum. For instance, Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper acknowledged reports
that the situation in Khartoum had become desperate and that Gordon was attempting to
solicit Turkish support for the garrison by raising funds from English and American
millionaires. Yet it maintained that “even if the English government resolved upon the
relief of Berber and Khartoum, the sending of a British force is next to impossible.”193
To be sure, Reynolds’s Weekly, like many Liberal presses, was averse to decisions which
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they saw as furthering a jingoistic fever and imperialistic encroachment. But that had not
stopped other Liberal papers, such as the aforementioned Liverpool Mercury, from
demanding that the government not abandon Gordon. Given that commentators in other
papers explained that the hostile climate precluded any immediate relief, it may well have
been that Reynolds’s Weekly was assessing the prospect of an expedition
pragmatically.194 Further, the paper excused Gladstone for not responding to the
opposition’s demands for a full explanation of his intentions in Egypt on the grounds that
circumstances on the ground there were changing on a daily basis.195 Having already
argued that a relief expedition was impossible, Reynolds’s subsequently argued that any
military expedition into the Sudan to relieve Gordon meant the reconquest of the Sudan,
which would be an “utterly worthless” expenditure of blood and treasure.196
By the end of April, meanwhile, concerned journalists and members of the public
translated their worry into civic action. Promoters eagerly sought to put together a
volunteer expedition to relieve Gordon, and private citizens who were interested in
volunteering wrote to the press inquiring after the qualifications for service.197 One
concerned citizen suggested to the lord mayor of London, P. N. Fowler, that he should
form a “Mansion House Fund for the Relief of General Gordon.” Publicizing his
response in the Standard, Fowler insisted that as a member of Parliament, he thought that
“ministers ought to undertake the rescue, and both Houses would support them in doing
so.” However, as the lord mayor of London, he said that he could not agree to the
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request, as it would bring him into “a collision with the government.”198 In a letter to the
Times on 6 May a self-identified member of the Caledonian United Service Club offered
that argued that the government was “paralyzed” to send any relief to Gordon for
upwards of five months given the weather conditions in the Sudan. As such, the
Government should make it clear to the “warlike tribes” that if harm should come to
Gordon or the inhabitants of Khartoum that was “not warranted by the usages of war, no
mercy will be shown to the leaders and instigators of such usage when the time arrives
for the British army to advance, which it assuredly will, unless submission be made in the
interval.”199
Following Commons’ Easter recess, Conservatives in the body brought additional
pressure to bear by submitting a resolution of censure against Gladstone’s administration:
That this House regrets that the course pursued by Her Majesty’s government has
not tended to promote the success of General Gordon’s mission, and that even
such steps as are necessary to promote his personal safety are still delayed.200
With the debate over censure advertised well in advance and scheduled to begin on 12
May, the motion encouraged a wellspring of anticipatory public activity. On 8 May a
well-attended meeting was held at St. James Hall in London, under the auspices of the
Patriotic Association, to protest the “abandonment of Gordon.” Denouncing the
government’s conduct for being “devoid of principle, moral courage, and statesmanship,”
Lord Cadogan insisted that “he mistook the character of the English people if it did not
bring down the reprobation and indignation of the whole country.” Condemning
Gladstone’s actions for being “dishonourable to the government and discreditable to the
country,” Henry Chaplin, the Conservative MP for Mid-Lincolnshire, expressed his hope
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that a “feeling would be rapidly evoked which would compel the cowardly and caitiff
crew who guided the helm of state to-day to take immediate action.”201 Two days later,
on 10 May, a group of 3,000 people—a small number of whom were Liberals—gathered
in Manchester, and the organizers of the meeting accused the government of making
“Gordon responsible for his own safety.”202 Appealing to the people to “vindicate the
national honour and the national traditions,” and insisting that the government would be
held accountable for the “liberty, the safety, and the life of General Gordon,” the Hon.
Edward Gibson, member of Parliament for Trinity College, Dublin, advanced a resolution
that a “big expedition would have to be sent to the Sudan,” and it was overwhelmingly
cheered and approved by those in attendance.203 That same day, other public
demonstrations held in Hanley, Darwen, Folkestone, and Shrewsbury produced similar
resolutions that called on the government to relieve Gordon.204
Meanwhile, on 13 May, the House of Commons debated a motion to censure the
Government. In spite of their holding a majority of almost 120 seats, the Liberals
survived narrowly on a vote of 303 to 275. 205 Only days later, the St. James Gazette
reported that the cabinet had resolved to prepare an expedition to Khartoum immediately,
and that it was likely to embark by the end of July. The story was subsequently picked
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up by provincial presses, including the Dundee Courier on 19 May. 206 As we have seen,
Gladstone believed into the early summer that no relief expedition was warranted, a
conclusion that was bolstered by reports sent from Gordon in mid-June (and appearing in
the press in mid- and late-July) indicating that Khartoum remained safe. 207 Indeed, in
early July, the prime minister reassured Sir Henry Gordon that his brother was not in any
immediate danger, and that “whenever and if ever, General Gordon is in danger, the
whole resources of the government will be employed in his cause.”208 Confident that if
messages could get out of Khartoum, then so too could Gordon, Gladstone continuously
maintained that there was no need to extract him.209
At that very time, however, key members of the cabinet forced the premier’s
hand. On 31 July Hartington and the Home Secretary Lord Selborne threatened to resign
if Gladstone did not agree to send out a relief expedition. Appreciating that those
resignations would likely bring down his government, Gladstone presented the Commons
with an appropriations bill on 2 August to fund a relief expedition. Three days later
Parliament overwhelmingly approved the measure. Only a small cadre of members
opposed the bill, and they were led by Henry Labouchere, who insisted that “General
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Gordon had disobeyed his instructions in not quitting Khartoum, and had forfeited all
claims to sympathy and help by his insane desire to ‘smash the Mahdi’.”210
But even while the press welcomed the news that Gladstone had finally decided to
act and eagerly anticipated the rescue of Gordon, they remained deeply concerned. The
Huddersfield Daily Chronicle wrote: “The nation demands that General Gordon shall be
relieved from danger which has for so long threatened him, and much will depend upon
the manner in which the government set to work to effect the desired result…But
although the sum applied for by the government has been willingly granted, it is by no
means clear what course will be adopted for carrying out the end in view.”211 If that
effort should fail to bring Gordon back safely, the Chronicle insisted that the government
would have much to answer for.212 The enormity of the effort to relieve Gordon did not
escape the Morning Post, which anticipated that “it will be necessary to employ a very
numerous force, much greater than could without risk be spared from the present Egypt,
and we may, therefore, expect Mr. Gladstone to prepare the House for the dispatch of
further drafts from either England or India.”213 Indeed, despite Gladstone’s willingness
to move an expedition to save Gordon, the press remained skeptical. Noting that nearly
everyone ridiculed Gladstone’s unwavering insistence that Gordon could withdraw from
Khartoum any time he wished, and recognizing that his position was not likely to change,
the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle offered that perhaps Gordon could set Gladstone
straight upon his return to Britain.214 As it was, Gladstone remained in no hurry to move,
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as a further three weeks passed before Wolseley was officially named the expedition’s
commander on 26 August.215
“AGAINST NATURE AND AGAINST TIME” :
THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION AND THE MAKING OF A MARTYR216

Wolseley was never one to rush into a campaign, and thinking that he still had
plenty of time, he meticulously planned out the expedition to relieve Gordon and to
complete the British withdrawal from the Sudan.217 The strategic problem was how to
get to Khartoum, which lay 1,200 miles from Cairo as the crow flies, but over 2,300
miles as the Nile flows. Even from Wadi Halfa, the most feasible point from which to
launch a relief expedition, Khartoum was still 1,600 miles upriver. The most direct
approach was to strike out across the desert from Suakin to Berber and then proceed up
the Nile to Khartoum, a distance of roughly 830 miles.218 This route had been the one
favored by Major General Sir Evelyn Wood, the first British sirdar (commander in chief
of the Egyptian Army), and General Sir Frederick Stephenson, the commander in chief of
the British occupation forces, who had been strategizing a relief expedition since March
when they became concerned that Gordon might be trapped. To facilitate that endeavor
and to service Britain’s strategic interests in the region, they envisioned building a
railway along the Suakin-Berber route.219
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Wolseley, however, preferred to move up the Nile from Wadi Halfa to
Khartoum.220 Wood and Stephenson had previously ruled out this approach because it
was longer and because the Nile’s cataracts would make it impossible to move up river
by steamer. Wolseley countered that the Nile route, while longer, would be easier and
cheaper. To get around the difficulty of navigating up the Nile, Wolseley planned to use
a fleet of 800 modified whalers that could be rowed upstream and then portaged around
the cataracts by experienced Canadian voyageurs, a method he had used with
considerable success in his 1870 Red River campaign in Canada against the Métis revolt
of Louis Riel. In the end, Wolseley’s powerful sway within the War Office in London as
adjutant general overrode the arguments of Stephenson and others on the ground in
Egypt.221 Wolseley further sought to augment the expedition with a camel corps.
Comprised of men selected from the Guards and Royal Marine Light Infantry, this desert
column would take the more direct overland route and serve as an advanced guard to hold
Khartoum until the rest of the forces arrived. 222
The Nile expedition proved to be costly and, arguably, a failure. It was also to be
Wolseley’s last field command, and to carry out his mission, he relied upon members of
his so-called “ring” and several highly competent junior officers, who would rise later in
their careers to the rank of general officer. Still, the planning and implementation of the
complex operations resulted in a delay of three months before the forces began to move.
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Moreover, even after the expedition pulled out from Wadi Halfa on 6 November,

logistical and environmental complications, professional disagreements among the
officers, and the inferior quality of the voyageurs, meant that the camel corps had only
reached Korti in early December, while the bulk of the expedition lay scattered along the
Nile all the way back to Wadi Halfa.224
A frustrated Wolseley ordered the desert column to strike out towards Metemmeh
on 30 December, in what he confessed in his war journal was “a great leap in the dark.”
225

Supply shortages and two clashes with the Mahdi’s forces slowed their progress and

resulted in the deaths of the column’s commanding officer, Brigadier General Herbert
Stewart, and the second in command, Colonel Frederick Burnaby.226 The column, now
led by its brilliant yet cautious intelligence officer, Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, finally
reached Metemmeh on 21 January, where they met four steamers Gordon had dispatched
from Khartoum to assist in their passage. Instead of proceeding on to Khartoum directly,
however, Wilson chose to regroup and to reconnoiter the surrounding area for three days

223

In the first place, the British Army did not possess the necessary watercrafts that were required. These
would have to be designed, built, and then shipped to the Sudan. Secondly, the 380 Canadian voyageurs
had to be recruited and conveyed to Egypt. While approach across the Bayuda desert cut the entire distance
from Wadi Halfa to Khartoum by half, the camel corps was an entirely new unit for the British army,
requiring specially requisitioned animals and specially trained and outfitted guardsmen and marines.
Wolseley’s idea of a camel corps was received with a great deal of skepticism by the War Office. The
Duke of Cambridge chafed at reform and innovation, and he balked at the idea of forming a composite unit
out of the army’s best units. He ultimately changed his mind, however, when he became convinced that
there simply was not a better way of proceeding. Asher, Khartoum, 93, 189-191; Chevenix-Trench, The
Road to Khartoum, 274-75; Churchill, The River War, 60; Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley, 53, 56, 58, 160;
Preston, In Relief of Gordon, 40-41; Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns, 317.
224
The boats were so strung out on the river that the last whaler did not arrive in Korti until early February.
Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns, 331. Butler later wrote of his frustration at the poor manner in which be
believed his fellow officers, namely Buller and Wolseley, had conducted the campaign. Butler, An
Autobiography, 277-82, 284, 286-92.
225
Wolseley Campaign Diary, 27 December 1884, quoted in Preston, In Relief of Gordon, 100; Royle, The
Egyptian Campaigns, 331-332.
226
Responsibility for these logistical difficulties lay with Buller, whose duties included requisitioning a
sufficient supply of camels for the camel corps and coal for the steamers. Failing in both of these regards,
Buller did succeed in ensuring that there were enough camels to transport his personal supply of wine on
the expedition. Asher, Khartoum, 187, 278.

143
before making his final push. Leaving Metemmeh on 24 January, the column reached
Khartoum on 28 January, thirty-six hours after the city had fallen to the dervishes.227
Wolseley received word of Gordon’s fate on 4 February. Having been
commissioned with the task of extracting Gordon and being expressly ordered not to
extend a campaign against the Mahdi, he now had to wait for word from London about
how to proceed. Gladstone granted him a free hand, and although Wolseley desired to
avenge Gordon, he acknowledged after a couple of weeks that the expedition was in no
condition to wage a full-out campaign against the Mahdi. He therefore ordered the
columns to withdraw on 24 February.228 For several more months the last Egyptian
garrison in the Sudan at Kassala continued to hold out against a Dervish siege, but was
forced to capitulate on 30 July after a twenty month siege.229 With that, Egypt and
Britain had been forced temporarily from the Sudan.
ASSIGNING BLAME AND THE MAKING OF A MARTYR:
THE PUBLIC’S EVALUATION OF THE RELIEF EXPEDITION AND GENERAL GORDON

The appointment of Wolseley had been well received by the press and the general
public, and it instilled a strong sense of confidence that Gordon would be relieved in
time. As the Morning Post reported on 6 August, “Mr. Gladstone has…become alive to
the fact that several months ago certain pledges were given by the government that they
227
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would consider themselves bound to take exceptional measures, if necessary, for the
safety of Gordon.”230 Well-documented by the London and provincial presses, the delays
and set-backs that beset the two columns were well known to the British public. Fears
that Wolseley’s columns would not reach Khartoum in time to save Gordon were
temporarily assuaged, when, in the first week of February, papers such as the Times, the
Cornishman, and the Derby Telegraph erroneously speculated that Colonel Wilson had
been in Khartoum for a number of days.231 These were of course ultimately proven to be
unsubstantiated rumors.232 In the case of Punch, on 7 February the paper grandly but
mistakenly portrayed Wolseley greeting Gordon in Khartoum with the caption “At Last!”
It then corrected its most unseemly error with a depiction of a grieving Britannia outside
the walls of Khartoum with the caption “Too Late!”233
The country descended into mourning with the news that Khartoum had fallen.
The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle observed that “since the arrival of the news of the fall
of Khartoum, but little else has been talked about.”234 Weeks later, on 13 March, crowds
attended memorial services for Gordon in London, Manchester, and Durham.235 Public
dismay at the fall of Khartoum led to speculation about who was accountable for the
disaster. The two names which immediately rose to the surface were Gladstone and
Wolseley. In his defense, Gladstone and his supporters in and outside of Parliament
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attempted to deflect responsibility from the government by blaming the military and
specifically Wolseley. They emphasized that nearly two months passed between the time
of Wolseley’s commission and the point at which the expedition finally began heading up
the Nile. In addition, those who deflected blame from the prime minister also focused on
Wolseley’s insistence to move up the Nile instead of taking the overland approach. For
example, in his contemporary history of the Egyptian campaigns, Royle argued that even
though Wolseley’s force might well have had to fight along the Suakin to Berber to
Khartoum route, that passage would still have been shorter and taken less time than the
longer river route.236 Wolseley and his supporters refuted the charges, and directed the
blame back on Gladstone. If Gladstone had acted promptly, Wolseley argued, the delays
incurred in preparation and in executing the relief notwithstanding, he would have arrived
in Khartoum in plenty of time to save the besieged officer.237
In general, those who had favored sending a relief expedition long before it was
authorized tended to side with Wolseley. In letters to the independent-minded
Huddersfield Daily Chronicle, two troubled citizens eulogized the fallen soldier thusly:
ON HEARING OF GORDON’S DEATH
Brave Gordon—gone—
The Arab spear hath pierced his breast,
And freed his soul; while ever and anon
England asked why her foremost son should rest
Forsaken—pitilessly left to shift as best he might,
What days of toil, what nights of troubled rest
Were his. Khartoum his prison, treachery lurking there,
A multitude to feed. Sustained by prayer
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And faith in God, he need his mighty skill;
Mounting each crested billow as it rose,
Almost like Him who uttered, “Peace be still.”
And twice six months he kept at bay his foes,
With soldiers who had nothing save the name;
Intent to his duty, and the fame
Of his dear country to uphold. Oh shame!
Thrice shame! on those who let him die.
Britannis, blush and weep. That craven policy,
Whispering expense, delay, and peace hypocricy,[sic]
Should sacrifice thy noblest, bravest son.
Go write his epitaph. Say here lies one
Of matchless valour, infinite resource;
A lion’s heart, yet gentle as the wind
Which play’s on summer’s eve; his force
Of mind, sustained by Him, whom well he loved.
And I—you, I!—forsook him, left him e’en to die.
Amid a scene of savage butchery.
W. H. G.238

GORDON
Is this the land of Nelson,
The land of Pitt and Clive,
The land of Cromwell, Raleigh,
Or Palmerston’s Old Hive?...
Praying that they would send him [Gordon]
Only three thousand men,
To unbeleaguered Berber,
To smash the tiger’s den.
But their good faces lengthened,
And their small hearts stood still,
They blankly gazed and blankly said,
“Twill spoil our Budget Bill.”…
When school boys read the story,
The indelible shame
Will fill their souls with loathing,
Their little hearts with flame...
Some glow of pride will mingle
With shams upon each cheek,
238
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And their little hearts will open,
And their little tongues shall speak.
And with their wreaths they’ll crown him,
The hero of Khartoum,
And will throw the names of those men
Into history’s lumber-room.
J. M. R.239
Noting that the continental presses overwhelmingly condemned Gladstone for failing to
act, the Standard argued that the government had had no case against the censure motion
the previous spring.240 On 26 February the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle reminded its
readers of those who had “abandoned Gordon” by listing the local MPs who had sided
with Gladstone during that vote.241 Deriding Gladstone’s failure to act, the public
reversed the acronym of his nickname “Grand Old Man” G.O.M. to read M.O.G.
“Murderer of Gordon.” 242 With criticism against Gladstone mounting, in early June the
Tory opposition moved against the prime minister in opposing his Customs and Inland
Revenue Bill. Although the measure was not a formal vote of censure, as Sir Michael
Hicks-Beach noted, the vote “carried with it the life or death of the government” and had
thus had the effect of a vote of no confidence. On that occasion, Gladstone was
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unexpectedly and narrowly defeated, by a vote of 264 to 252.243 Gladstone duly resigned
on 9 June and Lord Salisbury began the first and shortest of his three governments.244
The public’s fixation with Gordon since Stead’s piece in the Pall Mall Gazette
vaulted the general in death to martyr status. The Leeds Mercury eulogized him thusly,
“that he should have closed his noble life of heroic effort by the martyr’s death will strike
all among us with a sense of fitness.”245 Middlesbrough’s Daily Gazette predicted that
“his country will cherish his memory. His name will live in history; his laurels will not
fade.”246 And the Suffolk Mirror insisted that “Gordon still lives in the hearts of men
throughout the civilised world, and whilst time lasts, he will stand.”247 Likewise, at a
well-attended meeting of the Christian Mission Society in late March, the Earl of Cairns
paid homage to Gordon’s career as a humanitarian and concluded his remarks: “if these
things constituted the true type of a Christian missionary, and if a violent death cheerfully
met and welcomed in the midst of life constituted a martyr’s death, then it was beyond all
doubt that that great and noble hero whose loss England and the world were now
deploring…was both missionary and martyr.”248
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In keeping with a long tradition of recognizing military and imperial heroes, the
country intended to memorialize Gordon. Within weeks of the general’s death, the lord
mayor of London formed a committee of influential persons, including members of the
royal family and government officials.249 After deliberating on the matter for several
weeks, the committee determined to open a school for orphaned boys and raised almost
£16,000 in two months. On 1 May 1886, the Gordon Boys’ Home held its opening
festival.250 Meanwhile, Gordon memorials were placed both in St. Paul’s Cathedral and
at Westminster Abbey. Adorning the cenotaph at St. Paul’s were lines composed
specially by Alfred Lord Tennyson:
Warrior of God, man’s friend, not here below,
But somewhere dead, far in the waste Soudan;
Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know
This earth hath borne no simpler, nobler man.251
In mid-March the citizens of Southampton urged the commissioning of a statue to their
fallen son.252 In April, at the initiation of the Marquis of Huntly, family and members of
clan Gordon eagerly proposed that a Scottish memorial to Gordon be erected in
Aberdeen.253 That same month, the citizens of Liverpool established the Liverpool
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Gordon’s Working Lads Institute.254 In 1888 a contemplative statue of Gordon, was
erected in Trafalgar Square, in the company of two of the country’s other great martyrs,
Admiral Lord Nelson and General Sir Henry Havelock.255 Two years later a statue
depicting Gordon sitting astride a camel was erected outside the regimental headquarters
of the Corps of Royal Engineers in Chatham.256
For several years 26 January did not pass without a newspaper noting that it was
the day on which Gordon had died in Khartoum. In 1888, for instance, the Times claimed
that he was still very much in the hearts and minds of the British public, and the paper
drew a biting contrast between the general sentiment and political actors:
Yesterday many thousands of Englishmen, and those especially who place
patriotism above party, were saddened by the memory of an event scarcely, we
believe, to be paralleled in the annals of the nation…History will judge between
him and those who, for the purpose of an ignoble ambition, gambled with that
noble life. It is rather significant, however, of the levity of modern politics to find
that among all the orators who are deafening the public ear with their speeches
scarcely one was mindful of this solemn anniversary…It would be well, to be
sure, for the Gladstonian party if that oblivion were complete, but notwithstanding
the silence of politicians on both sides, the nation is not wholly forgetful of
Gordon’s devotion and Gordon’s fate.257
On 26 January 1891, a short “in memorium” notice dedicated to Gordon appeared in the
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Times for the last time.258 Even so, Gordon was hardly forgotten. In 1899, in the
aftermath of Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman and in the course of delivering a sermon
on Matthew 20, the Bishop of Peterborough resurrected the memory of Gordon stating:
“Thank God for the Presence in His Church has touched our nation’s life and worked for
righteousness—only the last few years have given us proof of it. The hero of the
people’s hearts has been the man, Charles Gordon, whose heroic death and Christian life
won men’s esteem. It was to honour him that in the very flush of victory our soldiers
bared their heads to join their intercessions—Anglicans, Romans, Presbyterians—and
gave this tribute of their honour to a righteous man.”259 And, in 1933, on the centenary of
Gordon’s birth, memorial services were held at St. Paul’s Cathedral and in Trafalgar
Square.260
Even while the press ceased printing memorial notices, a long-term recognition
and interest in Gordon persisted.261 The degree to which imperialism was a fixture of
Victorian society is evidenced through Victorian popular literature. While that issue will
be examined more substantially in chapter 5, it is nevertheless fitting at this point to
comment briefly on as to how the treatment of Gordon illustrated that wider narrative.
Whereas George Birkbeck Hill’s work on Gordon’s early career in the Sudan failed to
generate or receive much interest before he was reassigned to the Sudan in January 1884,
in the aftermath of Gordon’s death, the work subsequently underwent several editions.262
In addition to the numerous contemporary works about Gordon cited earlier, Colonel
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(later Major General) Sir William F. Butler published a Gordon biography in February
1889 that became a bestseller. It was subsequently reprinted in March 1889, 1891, 1892,
and 1893. After public interest in the Sudan was reinvigorated by Britain’s reentry into
the Sudan in 1896, the work went through additional printings in 1897, 1898, 1899, and
thereafter in 1901, 1903, 1904, 1907, 1913, 1920, and 1921.263 Speaking to the general
proliferation of such works, the Leeds Mercury observed in 1896 that “of the making of
books concerning General Gordon there seems to be no end.”264
Extending beyond works that were solely dedicated to Gordon, other writings
included noticeable references to the imperial martyr. For instance, Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle subtly rounded out the Victorian attributes of his famed detective, Sherlock
Holmes, by mentioning that an engraving of the late general hung on the wall of his
apartments at 221b Baker Street.265 Later when Conan Doyle was forced by popular
demand to resurrect Holmes from an untimely death at Reichenbach Falls and fill in the
missing years, the author wove into the detective’s hiatus a fact-finding mission to
Khartoum on behalf of the Foreign Office.266 Furthermore, the Sudan, Khartoum, and
Gordon also found a place in K. and Hesketh Pritchard’s 1903 serial “By Tammers’
Camp Fire” which appeared in Strand Magazine from June 1903 to November 1904.267
To those ends, the public’s longstanding interest in Gordon and his elevation to martyr
status was certainly cemented by the circumstances of his death and had much to do with
the fact that the public’s connection with Gordon had been established and encouraged by
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the press during the year-long siege. In this way, as John Wolfe demonstrated, Gordon
had much in common with the famed explorer David Livingston, whose exploits, thanks
to the efforts of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, were also fresh in the public’s mind at the
time of his death.268
EPILOGUE: BACK TO SUDAN AND FASHODA

Having expelled Egypt from the Sudan, the Mahdi and his successor the Khalifa
Abdullah ibn Muhammad established and maintained an empire which for thirteen years
dominated the Sudan and its neighbors. From 1885-89 it fought a war against Abyssinia
from which it emerged victorious but severely weakened. At the same time, a dervish
army under Osman Digna advanced into Egyptian territory in an effort to carry out the
Mahdi’s vision of ridding the Nile Delta of Turkish rule.269 Since taking responsibility
for the Egyptian state in 1883, Britain had done much to stabilize and strengthen the
Egyptian army. In one of that force’s first tests, on 17 January 1888 at Handub, a wellseasoned Dervish army overwhelmed the outnumbered force of 500 Sudanese irregulars
led by the governor of Suakin, Colonel Herbert Kitchener. Though his attack was
thwarted, Kitchener’s bravery and example of leadership under fire earned him a great
deal of recognition by the Egyptian government. Twelve months later the Egyptian
army, led by Sirdar Sir Francis Grenfell and Kitchener, who had been recently promoted
to adjutant-general, routed Osman Digna’s besieging army at Suakin. The incident
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further elevated Kitchener’s standing with his superiors, and in 1892 upon Grenfell’s
retirement, Kitchener became the third British officer to hold the title of sirdar.270
At the same time, even as Britain had withdrawn from the Sudan, other European
imperial-minded powers, namely Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, began expressing
interests in extending their control over the region. Italy’s colonial presence in Africa
was dwarfed by its rivals, but its actions proved pivotal in compelling Britain to reenter
the Sudan. The catalyst came in 1896 when Italy, seeking to expand its footprint in the
horn of Africa, invaded Abyssinia. The event proved disastrous for Italy as its army was
destroyed in the Battle of Adowa on 1 March.271
The Tories (led by Lord Salisbury) had returned to power in 1895, with the longheld belief that Egyptian suzerainty over the Sudan had merely been suspended and not
completely relinquished. Concerned that France would make inroads into the Sudan and
thereby threaten Britain’s position in Egypt, the Salisbury government encouraged Egypt
to reenter the Sudan and take back the territories that had been lost in 1885. Now
concerned that Abdullah’s forces would capitalize on Italy’s evident weakness and
expand further into the horn of Africa as well as into Egypt, the British government also
feared that Italy’s defeat in Africa might have dire effects on the power balance in
Europe. Thus armed with geopolitical considerations and a desire to avenge the death of
Gordon, it took little time for Salisbury to respond in the affirmative to Italy’s request for
assistance. Acting through Lord Cromer, the British government pressured the Egyptian
government to send Kitchener and the Egyptian army back into the Sudan.272
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What followed was a methodically executed three-year campaign of conquest up
the Nile River. Kitchener followed the same course that Wolseley had taken thirteen
years earlier, but he did so without relying on boats, following the river’s course on foot.
Heading south out of Wadi Halfa on 15 March 1896, Kitchener’s Anglo-Egyptian army
spent the next two years retaking ground. Then, on 2 September 1898, the subjugation of
the Sudan was all but accomplished when the Sirdar’s force of 25,000 men annihilated
the Khalifa’s army of 52,000 at Omdurman. The following day Kitchener marched into
Khartoum and raised the British flag over the palace once occupied by Gordon.273
With the re-conquest of the Sudan effectively completed, the dervish power
destroyed, and the death of Gordon avenged, Britain had little time to relish its victory.
On 10 July a small French expeditionary force commanded by Colonel Jean-Baptiste
Marchand, having marched across the desert from Gabon, claimed the fort at Fashoda for
France. After his victory at Omdurman, Kitchener headed south to confront Marchand
and arrived at Fashoda on 10 September. For the next six weeks the two great imperial
powers of Britain and France stood on the brink of war as both powers asserted their
claim to Fashoda. For Britain, the position at Fashoda was absolutely critical. If Fashoda
fell into French hands, Britain feared that France would dam up the Nile River and cutoff
the life blood of Egypt. For France, the issue was much more an issue of national pride
and not backing down to British demands. Marchand had marched across the Sudan
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without orders to do so, and in the event of a conflict, his small force would have been no
match for Kitchener’s army. Moreover, France was internally in turmoil over the
Dreyfus Affair, and it had few reliable European allies that could offer assistance in a war
with Britain. Consequently the French government realized it had no choice but to back
down.274
Throughout the late-1890s, echoing their earlier disputes about blame over the fall
of Khartoum and the proper role of empire, Conservative and Liberal presses consistently
engaged the questions of empire and diplomacy. Largely favoring reentering the Sudan
in 1896, Conservative papers such as the Aberdeen Journal emphasized that the dervish
threats to Egypt required Britain to promptly respond militarily, and that there could be
“none of the disastrous delay which took place in the dispatch of the expedition for the
relief of Gordon.” To that end the paper found the views of those opposed to be “narrow,
unpatriotic, and contemptible.275 Moreover the Derby Mercury reminded its readers that
it was the Liberals who were responsible for Gordon’s death and allowing the dervish
power to thrive in the first place. As such, they charged, the opposition was “by no
means fitted…to set up as critics worthy of respect.”276 Noting that the public was
fatigued by war alarms over the past months, the Ipswich Journal nevertheless asserted
that “security for Egypt is a dominant and imperious want, and the English Government
would be well justified to secure it.”277 Ever resistant to imperial interventionism Liberal
papers, such as the Leeds Mercury and North Eastern Gazette remained skeptical and
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were concerned that the “Tory recklessness” had larger ambitions in marching 300 miles
into the Sudan besides merely “warding off attack,” and worried not only about the
operation’s financial cost but the political impact if it provoked French hostility.278
Those concerns and objections notwithstanding, there was universal rejoicing in
the presses over the victory at Omdurman and the final avenging of Gordon. That
celebration was quickly followed by universal concern over the presence of the French at
Fashoda in the autumn of 1898. In addressing that crisis over the following months, the
press and the public, via letters to the editorial pages, consistently maintained that the
French had no claim whatsoever to the region and were thus obligated to withdraw. They
widely insisted that Britain had no interest in going to war, but maintained that if war
came it would be the French who were responsible for initiating hostilities.279 As we
shall see, the press would express a very similar attitude toward the Transvaal crisis the
following summer.
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Figure 2-1 – “At Last,” Punch 7 February 1885, 66.
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Figure 2-2 – “Too Late,” Punch 14 February 1885, 78
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CHAPTER 3:
RENEWED INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 1895-1900:
THE JAMESON RAID AND THE SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR

A great deal has been written about what led to the outbreak of war in southern
Africa in 1899. For the purposes here, there is little need to reexamine exhaustively the
long-term progression towards war. Among the causes cited by British actors were
Uitlander grievances (i.e., that foreigners, mostly of British descent, who resided within
the Boer republics were denied civil rights) and growing fears of German interference in
the region. On the Boer side, the road to war lay in their consistent defense of Boer
independence against what they perceived as untoward advances and interferences by the
British into their internal affairs.1 Moreover, they perceived that these broad underlying
circumstances were abetted by Cecil Rhodes’s naked desire for further wealth and power
and supplemented by a façade of demands for equality. These elements coalesced in
1895 and inaugurated what F.W. Reitz, the president of the Orange Free State, later
denounced as the first of two phases of “capitalistic jingoism” that sought to dismantle
the sovereignty of the Transvaal. The first phase consisted of direct military force. The
second phase entailed the use of strong-arm diplomacy.2
THE JAMESON RAID, 1895-96

That first phase was profoundly marked by the plot of Cecil Rhodes, the prime
minister of the Cape Colony, to eliminate his economic competitors, impede the
expansion of Britain’s imperial rivals, and profit from the rich gold and diamond deposits
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that lay to the north of the Cape.3 Intending to capitalize on the discontent of the
Uitlanders, Rhodes arranged for Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, a long-time friend and
business associate, to invade the Transvaal with a small body of men. They then were to
lead a larger uprising of disgruntled Uitlanders against the Transvaal government. Under
the guise of restoring peace after the chaos of the invasion, Rhodes expected that the high
commissioner of the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, would quickly announce the reannexation of the Transvaal. A bold and blatantly illegal venture, this was not the first
time that Rhodes had taken similar risks.4 The Jameson raid (29 December 1895 – 2
January 1896), however, was a complete and utter failure. The Uitlanders failed to rise
up in support, and the Transvaal government was able to crush Jameson’s force quickly.5
In stark contrast to the way in which it reacted to the annexation of the Transvaal
in 1877, the British government and certain elements of the press responded to the
Jameson raid with a firestorm of criticism. For its part, Parliament launched an intense
investigation into the suspected culpability of the Colonial Office and its secretary,
Joseph Chamberlain, in particular.6 The inquiry found that while Chamberlain had
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certainly been active in fomenting a racial war in South Africa, he had deliberately
sequestered himself from any specific knowledge of the raid, so that he could assert
plausible deniability about the affair.7 The investigation, led by Sir William Harcourt,
also directed criticism at Rhodes for “[bringing] race hatred and distrust into colonial
politics, and lasting discredit abroad on English faith.”8
As formal investigations proceeded, the public asked hard questions about events
in southern Africa in the days immediately following the raid. The Huddersfield Daily
Chronicle printed an article from the Law Journal which insisted that the imperial
government had to bear some responsibility for its subordinate officials, even to the point
of making some compensation in the event that international rights had been violated.9
That Jameson had apparently and brazenly violated the Foreign Enlistments Act—by
committing an act of war upon the peaceful Transvaal—led many national and provincial
papers, Conservative and Liberal alike, to speak out against him. The Bristol Mercury
expressed its sympathy for the Uitlanders, but charged that Jameson’s action was further
evidence of “the dangers of putting the power of government into the hands of a dividend
earning company.” By dragging Great Britain into “what might have remained a purely
local dispute between the Boers and the Uitlanders,” the Mercury argued that the raid had
turned the issue into an international dispute, which only added to the difficulties of the
Foreign Office.10 The paper subsequently insisted that the country had nothing “but
regret that the march should ever have been undertaken, and, perhaps, still more that it
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should have issued in fatal conflict.”11 The Daily News, meanwhile, denounced the
action for transgressing upon the sovereignty afforded to the South African Republic by
the Convention of 1884:
There is no right whatsoever to interfere with the internal affairs of the Transvaal,
and no jurisdiction within its borders. Dr. Jameson would have had no
international right to enter the South African Republic with an armed force, even
if he had received the express authority of the Crown. So far from having any
such authority he disobeyed the direct orders of Her Majesty’s representative, Sir
Hercules Robinson. He made a private raid and he came to speedy grief.12
The Standard insisted that, while the country had the deepest sympathy for the plight of
its countrymen residing abroad, it was as “unpalatable a task” for Englishmen to admit
they were in the wrong and that the raid was “plainly a gross violation of the rights of the
Transvaal republic,” regardless of what prompted Jameson to act. “To condone it—much
less to encourage it,” the paper continued, “would be to make a precedent utterly
inconsistent with the whole course of conduct by which our empire has grown to its
present bulk.”13 Thus, as one military officer feared, “the defeat of Jameson would result
in a loss of British prestige in South Africa.”14
Believing that Jameson’s actions had caused considerable damage to British
prestige and that they offered an opportunity for the Boers to illustrate their magnanimity,
the papers consequently expressed few misgivings about his forthcoming trial . In light
of the serious violations committed by Jameson against the Transvaal, the Dublin-based
Freeman’s Journal complimented the Boers for their actions in releasing him into the
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custody of the British.15 In the mind of concurring papers, such as the Glasgow Herald
and the Standard, there was little doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.16 On the eve of the
trial, the Bristol Mercury insisted that the “facts of the matter were mostly beyond
dispute,” and that the only question that remained for the grand jury to decide was
whether “there was a primâ facie proof that the defendants either ‘engaged, assisted, or
were employed’” in the expedition.17
More importantly, the circumstances of the raid raised questions about the
appropriateness of Britain’s imperial policy. While the Daily News offered that “it was a
fine thing to engage the world in arms,” it maintained that the affair provided “food for
thought to the silly and reckless advocates of war with the Boers at any price.” The paper
concluded that Britain needed to be quite sure that a quarrel was just before it entered into
it.18 Troubled by the inconsistency of Chamberlain’s policies, H. Seton-Karr, a
Conservative MP, as well as a former explorer and army officer, wrote to the Times and
called for a clearer explanation of Britain’s official policy toward the Transvaal. He
noted that on the one hand, Chamberlain’s denunciation of Jameson was a sign that the
British government rejected any interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. Yet
if the Boer state was incapable of effective governance, then “abstract justice [demanded]
that the British government should see the matter through.”19
Britons were also quite aware of the broader geo-political ramifications that
emerged in the wake of Jameson’s raid. Indeed this was one reason why the
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aforementioned correspondent did not favor a military policy. A localized war against
the Boers could quickly become a much broader war involving black Africans.20 Beyond
the regional questions, the congratulatory telegram sent by Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II
to the Boers for their successful repulsion of Jameson’s invasion also raised considerable
concerns in Britain.21 The Daily News hoped that the kaiser’s telegram would give those
who favored a war with the Boers some pause:
There is nothing hostile to this country in the emperor’s words. But they must
impress upon some minds which sorely need the impression that the
encouragement of filibusters is playing with edged tools.22
There were also some who believed that Chamberlain would be justified to intervene on
behalf of the Uitlanders because they assumed that German support of the Boers was a
certainty. For instance, “The Man on the Street” insisted in a letter to the Times that the
question of such interference transcended the Transvaal and involved the whole of South
Africa:
The six years of this ministry will see South Africa either completely BritishIndependent or German-protected Dutch, and the action of the next six weeks
will decide which.23
At the same time, the Bristol Mercury reminded its readers that although “Dr. Jameson
had undoubtedly compromised the British name” and had thus raised the jingo spirit of
rival powers, such hostility and jealousy “must not be taken as the deliberate expression
of the German public sentiment toward this country when the excitement is over.” The
Mercury continued:
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We must remember that our success as a colonising power is highly exasperating
both to Germany and France, and this last exploit must look to them like a daring
and unscrupulous attempt to add to our empire. Foreign powers must act through
diplomatic channels, and by that time all that is to be known will be known, while
France will not aid the self-glorification of Kaiser Wilhelm even to stab perfidious
Albion.24
Public opinion shapers were not, however, unified in their condemnation of
Jameson, as many Conservative and Liberal papers rose to his defense. Decrying the
attacks on Jameson, the Aberdeen Weekly Journal, the Dundee Courier, and the Morning
Post expressed their dismay at the failure of his “gallant” action and their expectation
that, when the facts became fully known, he would be exonerated of any wrongdoing.25
Reprinting the comments of E. P. Mathers, an individual the papers identified as an
authority on South African affairs, the Aberdeen Weekly Journal and the Morning Post
seemingly concurred with his assessment that Jameson’s actions were no more an act of
war than the invitation of the Uitlanders had been.26 Similarly, the Pall Mall Gazette
initially characterized the raid as an “intolerable remedy” for the Boers’ intolerable
treatment of the Uitlanders and as a “hopeless act of audacity.” The paper also insisted
that the criminal case against Jameson was far from settled.27
Further, Jameson’s defenders elevated a number of other potential scapegoats.
Noting how Chamberlain had effectively distanced himself from the “ill-fated
expedition,” the Dundee Courier criticized him for not doing more to fulfill his obligation
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to defend the interests of the Uitlanders.28 A similar argument was issued by E. B. IwanMueller, a Unionist journalist, who criticized those who favored conciliating the Boers.29
He wrote that the Uitlanders had exercised every legal means of appealing their unequal
and unconstitutional position in the Transvaal and had been all but abandoned by their
suzerain power, the British government. Outnumbering the Boers as they did, but with
no political recourse of their own, the Uitlanders had no choice but to seek extraconstitutional means to ensure the equality promised to them by the Pretoria and London
conventions.30 Equally, the Aberdeen Mercury and Dundee Courier claimed that
Jameson had not acted rashly, but humanely and patriotically. As such, they attributed
the incursion to the tyrannical rule of the Transvaal government and its president, Paul
Kruger, for refusing to treat the Uitlanders justly.31
Emphasizing Jameson’s heroism, the Aberdeen Journal drew upon the provincial
sentimentalities of its readership. It argued that Jameson was guilty of nothing save
“having acted on the generous impulse of a brave and patriotic Scotchman,” and it
regretted the “almost unanimous chorus of condemnation of his action.” The Journal
noted that “some English papers [were] so unpatriotic as to suggest vindictively that the
Boers would be doing a just act of retribution if they hung [Jameson] from the nearest
tree.”32 Casting a favorable light upon Jameson’s “quasi-triumphant” traversal of
Mediterranean ports on his way back to Britain, the Pall Mall Gazette compared his
reception and burgeoning celebrity to that of the tragic “Bonnie Prince Charlie.” The
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paper congratulated the “dashing Scotchman” for embodying British bravery at a time
when “everybody seemed to go for us, and the British public were dying to get hold of
someone whom they might back against the world.”33 These efforts to shape public
opinion notwithstanding, the vast majority of public discourse opposed Jameson’s
unilateral violation of the Transvaal’s sovereignty. In contrast to the quiet acquiescence
to the annexation of the Transvaal—preceded as it was by the implied threat of
intervention at the time of Shepstone’s mission—many papers condemned Jameson’s
actions in 1896. To be sure, in the years since 1877, a sizeable pro-Boer contingent had
built up in Britain.34 But even papers such as the Daily Post and the Standard, which
disagreed on Britain’s responsibility to the Uitlanders and the franchise question, equally
condemned Jameson’s raid into the Transvaal.35
To a degree, the early expectations of papers such as the Pall Mall Gazette that
Jameson’s actions would prove justified carried over into his trial. Formally charged in
July 1896 for having violated the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 by engaging “in the
preparation of a military expedition to proceed against the dominions of a friendly state,”
Jameson and five of his officers were acquitted by a jury that clearly sympathized with
their motives.36 In the end, Sir John Willoughby, the military commander of the raid, and
Jameson were sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment. Jameson himself, however,
only served four months of that sentence due to ill health, and he was thus available to
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testify before the Parliament’s select committee on the raid. The other key participants
were given sentences of five to seven months.37
Following the trial, Parliamentary conducted its own inquiry into the matter.
Established on 27 January 1897 and lasting until July, the Select Committee on British
South Africa was chaired by William Jackson (MP for Leeds North) and included several
prominent current, former, and future government officials, such as Joseph Chamberlain,
Sir William Harcourt, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as
well as imperial critics such as Henry Labouchère.38 Witness testimonies before the
committee provide some insight into what they had assumed British sensibilities to be
regarding the use of overt military force to advance political interests. Testifying before
the committee, Jameson asserted that “had [he] been successful he should have been
forgiven.”39 A few months later, Samuel Pope, QC, who represented Rhodes before that
same committee, likewise maintained that a successful outcome would have vindicated
Jameson’s rash and foolish actions. He claimed that Britain would have taken full
advantage of the enterprise and would not have condemned it or his client.40
The circumstances and issues surrounding the raid remained before the public,
thanks in part to reports and leading articles about the committee hearings. While the
gallery was mainly filled by members of Parliament and not the general public, the
37
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Hampshire Telegraph insisted that there nevertheless was “great public interest” in the
proceedings.”41 And the testimonies of notable witnesses, such as Rhodes and Jameson,
drew attention to Uitlander grievances. For instance, in covering Rhodes’s testimony, the
Hampshire Telegraph mentioned the rising discontent regarding the “restrictions upon
the people, the corrupt administration of the government, and the denial of civil rights to
the population.”42 Later, when William P. Schreiner testified on 26 March, the Aberdeen
Journal keyed in on his statements regarding English parents being prohibited by
Transvaal law from educating their children in the English language.43
The select committee issued its findings on 13 July. They included a strong
censure of Rhodes for using his various positions in South Africa to advance revolution
in the Transvaal and for deceiving the high commissioner of South Africa as to those
intentions. At the same time it exonerated the Colonial Office of being complicit in the
raid. Meanwhile, Labouchere issued a minority report, which insisted that an insufficient
amount of information was available to warrant such an indictment against Rhodes.44
These reports were duly summarized and released in the nation’s press both on the
national and local levels.
The committee’s conclusions inspired commentary on their key points. Lord
George Hamilton, for instance, expressed satisfaction that Chamberlain and the Colonial
Office had been absolved “from the base and unfounded charges of complicity…which
his [Chamberlain’s] enemies had so industriously flung at him.” 45 Others, including a
41
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commentator to the Dundee Courier and the editors of the Leicester Chronicle, decried
that the committee refusal to punish Rhodes for his culpability in what had been a “vulgar
conspiracy, an outrage upon international comity, engendered, subsidised, and stimulated
by men who ought to have known better, and did know better…who, in excess of illbegotten zeal, so far forgot themselves as to countenance a scheme which might have
dragged the nation into a disastrous war, for which there would not have been a shadow
of an excuse on our part.”46 Another commentator insisted in a letter to the Times that for
the sake of British honor and the dignity of Parliament, it was imperative for the people
to “absolutely dissociate ourselves from anything like approval or condonation [sic] of
Mr. Rhodes’s actions in connexion [sic] with the Jameson Raid.”47 To that end, he
completely rejected Chamberlain’s insistence that Rhodes’s honor remained intact:
To justify the means by the end seems to me ridiculous jesuitry unworthy of the
House of Commons. I yield to no man in my approval of the end which Mr.
Rhodes had in view if I am correct in assuming that the end was the creation of a
United South Africa under a British flag, and I yield to no man in my
condemnation of the means employed if I am justified in accepting the decision of
the committee as to those means.
Grave breaches of duty, deceiving an official chief, hoodwinking colleagues,
leading astray subordinates, and inducing men in a position of trust to become
guilty of “grave derelictions of duty”—are these findings which in no way affect
the personal honour of an English gentleman? If so, we must have either changed
our language or our character.48
As was the case in the aftermath of Gordon’s death, a multitude of pamphlets and
books hit the market in the wake of the raid and the committee of enquiry.49 Among
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those was Iwan-Mueller’s 1902 work, Lord Milner and South Africa, which addressed
wider Anglo-Boer relations, including the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, and
explored the relationship between extra-constitutional actions and British public opinion.
The author drew upon instances in which the course of history had previously excused
belligerent action. These included Lord Byron’s participation in the Greek war of
independence in 1824, Garibaldi’s invasion of Sicily in 1860, and, more distantly but
nevertheless poignantly, Parliament’s assistance of William of Orange in deposing James
II. For Iwan-Mueller, the critical difference between such examples and Jameson’s
actions lay in the fact that, whereas those instances were ultimately successful, the raid
had failed. Ignoring the illegality of the action, Iwan-Mueller thus insisted that “it was
the folly of the raid and not its immorality which ought to have been bemoaned,” and that
“the vital mistake made by the majority of Englishmen was the confusion of folly with
wrong-doing.”50
Iwan-Mueller’s conclusion seems off-base for several reasons. In the first place,
the success or failure of the raid made no apparent difference to the Colonial Office
because it ordered Jameson to withdraw before the matter had been militarily decided,
and the British public had almost no time to react to the raid without being aware that the
effort had failed. Thus, instead of being guided by the success of military action, it is
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more likely that British animosity toward Jameson was influenced by deep-seeded
concerns for British prestige and the irreproachableness of Britain’s national character.
As things stood in the mid-1890s, the British public, though perhaps sympathetic toward
the Uitlanders, was not yet convinced that the franchise question warranted extreme
military measures. They were also made aware that Rhodes had ordered Jameson not to
invade in the first place, and that Chamberlain had likewise ordered Jameson to withdraw
after he had breached the border. All of this worked against Jameson in the eyes of the
public, whose full attention was directed towards the blatant illegality of the raid.
Concurrent with the sitting of the select committee, South African correspondents
for British papers kept the Uitlander issue before the public, making it more likely that
the franchise question eventually would take on greater importance. For instance, writing
more than a year after the raid, a Times reporter submitted that the English settlers were
convinced that the “only hope for the settlement of differences and for a restoration of
confidence was for the British government to ‘have it out’ with the Transvaal, to insist by
force that the British subjects should be treated as liberally in the Transvaal as the Dutch
are treated in the Cape Colony.”51 The correspondent went on to insist that there was no
doubt that Britain had the “power” to force the Transvaal to comply. British territory
surrounded the Transvaal. Britain had greater wealth and larger numbers of men for the
prosecution of a war. In weighing the question of whether Britain should use the power it
had at its disposal, the correspondent concluded that a complete hands-off policy was
impossible, asserting that the inability for the Boers to govern the territory called for a
response. It would only encourage them to reject further British paramountcy in South
Africa and further destabilize the region not to intercede. At the same time, he argued
51
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that Britain had a moral obligation to look after the political and social well-being of the
Transvaal. Instead of war and the subjugation of the Boers, the correspondent insisted
that the better policy was to sway Boer opinion toward accepting British principles
concerning the development of South Africa. Only then, with the full weight of “Dutch
opinion” against them, he argued, would those Boers who stood in the way of progress
give way.52 Although such sentiments had no demonstrable impact on policy in the
immediate aftermath of Jameson’s failed raid, they would gain greater currency in the
run-up to the Second Anglo-Boer War.
“TRICKY DIPLOMACY,” “TURNING THE SCREW,” AND PUBLIC OPINION:
53
THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND ANGLO-BOER WAR IN 1899

For Boers such as Jan Smuts, state attorney general of the Transvaal (1898-1899),
the Jameson Raid was “the real beginning of the [Second Anglo-Boer] war” because it
revealed Britain’s intent to completely absorb the Transvaal.54 In the face of such a
threat, Boer nationalist sentiments heightened to the point that many in the Transvaal
believed that any attempt by the British to ameliorate the conditions for the Uitlanders
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was a direct assault on the sovereignty they had been granted by the Pretoria and London
conventions.55
Although the raid raised questions about the means by which Britain pursued its
imperial aims, the long-term goal of British expansionists to severely reduce if not
completely eliminate the independence of the Transvaal remained unchanged. As Henry
Labouchère reflected later, the only adjustment in policy was the means to achieve the
government’s designs: military force was exchanged for “tricky diplomacy.”56 That
effort was immediately preceded by the issuance of the so-called Second Uitlander
Petition in early May 1899, a document that was signed by upwards of 21,000 British
residents and demanded that non-Boer residents of the Transvaal immediately be granted
the same franchise rights and representation in the Volksraad as the burghers enjoyed.57
Over the course of the summer of 1899 Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner
(governor of the Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa) outwardly
demonstrated a sincere interest in compromise, but in truth they had no such intentions.
In what Milner called “the great game for the mastery in South Africa,” they believed that
the Transvaal could not be allowed to continue to suppress English subjects, even if
preventing that suppression meant war.58 In many of his communications with officials
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in London and at the Cape, Milner insisted that he did not want to aggravate the situation
unduly, and that if war came, it would “not come from any spirit of jingoism in me.”59
At the same time, he believed that the Transvaal would back down when faced with the
prospect of war. But, even if the crisis resulted in war, Milner maintained that it would
be better to fight the Transvaal in 1899 than to wait five or ten years, when the Boers
would certainly be “stronger and more hostile than ever.60
Indeed, Milner had sought to shape opinion against the Boers since his arrival at
the Cape. As early as February 1898, he had actively worked to turn Britain toward what
he called the “right views.” He encouraged the printing of inflammatory articles in South
African papers, such as the Cape Argus, the Cape Times, the Star (Johannesburg), and the
Transvaal Leader (Johannesburg), knowing that they would be reprinted by the national
and provincial papers back in Britain. Consequently, by the summer of 1899 the public
had become more aware of the plight of the Uitlanders and more committed to upholding
Britain’s prestige as the paramount power in South Africa.61
Pakenham has made a strong circumstantial case that the governor intended to
annex the Transvaal and to have himself installed as the overlord of a new crown colony,
knowing full well that it would require a war to achieve this end.62 Chamberlain, on the
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other hand, would have been satisfied just to see the Transvaal government accede to
British demands for an extension of franchise rights. But while their personal goals
differed, the tactics by which they worked remained largely the same: a progressive
tightening of diplomatic pressure that would force Kruger to comply or to react with war.
Either way, Britain would effectively dominate the Transvaal’s internal affairs through
external influence or through reabsorption and direct governance.63
The result was that, as negotiations over Uitlander rights progressed throughout
1899, Kruger’s government increasingly found itself backed into a corner with few
options. Each time Kruger made a small concession, Milner and Chamberlain added new
demands that would extend Britain’s suzerain rights and powers even further.64 If it
accepted Chamberlain’s demands, the Transvaal effectively would have to concede the
nation’s sovereignty. But to reject Britain’s demands outright in all likelihood meant
war.65 Faced with this predicament in mid-August, the Boers made a final bid to disarm
the situation when they offered to expand the Uitlander franchise and Volksraad
representation on the condition that Britain agreed:
a) Not to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic
b) Not to further insist on the assertion of suzerainty
c) To arbitration (excluding a foreign presence other than the Orange Free
State).66
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Milner and Chamberlain considered these conditions to be direct challenges to Britain’s
position as the paramount power in South Africa and to the empire’s right to interfere in
the internal affairs of the Transvaal.67
Meanwhile, as early as June Milner and Wolseley (who had been the governor of
Natal in 1877 and who was serving in the War Office as commander in chief of the forces
in 1899) began pressing the cabinet to send 35,000 troops to South Africa. Wolseley
maintained that such a move would cause the Transvaal to think twice about a war and
quell a war scare.68 While Milner concurred with Wolseley that such a move was
necessary for security and that the threat of military force would further compel the
Transvaal to capitulate, he did not shirk from the prospect of war. In the event that such
pressures provoked the Transvaal into an act of aggression against Natal or the Cape,
Britain could easily claim that the Boers had instigated the war.69 Seeing that the
Transvaal had given ground, Milner communicated to Chamberlain on 16 August that the
whole matter rested on “staying power” and Britain’s determination not “to weaken,” but
to “go on steadily turning the screw.”70 To that end, sensing that diplomatic pressure had
pushed the Transvaal as far as it could without the British army on its border, Milner
called for military reinforcements.
The position at present seems to me a threatening one, as we are face to face with
the question of our right to put things straight in the T.V.—our virtual nominal
suzerainty—and, on this, agreement is, I believe, impossible without war; or at
least the verge of war; —an army in S.A.71
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Chamberlain, who had been concerned in early August that indefinite negotiations would
cause Britain’s casus belli to slip away, likewise came to believe by the end of August
that the British position was now considerably strengthened.72 This did not necessarily
mean a war was inevitable, since he believed that the Boers still might yield.
Nevertheless, he communicated to Milner on 23 August that he was going to initiate
plans to send an initial 10,000 troops to South Africa, a force he believed would be
sufficient until a full army corps could be deployed to the region for the purpose of
achieving a “complete solution.”73 Two weeks later, the cabinet authorized
Chamberlain’s request for troops.
Milner and Wolseley were certainly not alone in their inclination toward a
tangible threat of war to force Kruger’s hand.74 As early as 25 June, Lord Selborne, the
under-secretary to the colonies, wrote to Milner:
The idea of war with the S.A.R. is very distasteful to most people. Consequently,
the cabinet have undoubtedly had to modify the pace that they contemplated
moving at immediately after the Bloemfontein Conference … [Kruger] will never
yield until he feels the muzzle of the pistol on his forehead, or that the surest way
to avoid war is to prepare openly for war … We have entered a lane, you have
entered a lane, the Cabinet has entered a lane, the country has entered a lane,
where no turning back is possible without humiliation or disaster. We must
eventually force the door at the other end, by peaceful pressure if possible, but if
necessary by war.75
Likewise, Sir Edward Hamilton, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, noted in his
diary on 30 July that, while nobody in Britain wanted war, he believed that some
“military demonstration” might prove necessary “before Kruger comes to terms.”76
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Even so, other well-positioned officials took a far less belligerent stance. While
ultimately in agreement that Britain could not back down in the face of Boer rejection of
British suzerainty, Hicks-Beach, then chancellor of the exchequer, argued for caution as
war clouds darkened at the end of August. Eluding cabinet responsibility for stoking the
prospects of war, he hoped that “Milner and the Uitlanders [would] not be allowed to
drag [Britain] into war.”77 Prime Minister Salisbury, concerned about Milner’s
purposeful intent to “turn the screw,” feared that the Boers would go to war instead of
capitulating and that such a war would be highly unpopular in Britain.78 Although Arthur
Balfour, the first lord of the Treasury and leader of the House of Commons, personally
considered the Transvaal to be a sovereign foreign state, he consented to sending
reinforcements to the Cape after becoming convinced that a mobilization of troops would
not necessarily lead to war.79 Similarly, Sir William Harcourt, the leader of the
opposition, was convinced that “the real policy of the government [was] to bluff Kruger,”
and that the issue would ultimately not come to war.80 Throughout the summer,
Secretary of State for War Lansdowne, and Lt. General William Butler (Commander-inChief of British forces in South Africa) had stood opposed to Milner’s and Wolseley’s
requests for reinforcements because of the massive costs associated with such a
mobilization and because they feared that such action might provoke a war rather than
prevent one.81
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Indeed Butler’s experiences throughout the spring and summer of 1899 illuminate
much about the links between South African business interests and those within the
British government pressing for concessions from the Boers. Charged with the defense
of the British colonies in South Africa, Butler criticized officials within the War Office
who he believed desired to provoke a war at a time when imperial defenses in the region
were completely unsatisfactory. Further, Butler worried openly that a war between the
“white races” would prove disastrous to southern Africa’s social fabric.82 As late as May
1899, he insisted that the Boers might be cajoled into implementing reforms if they could
be convinced that Britain had no intention of assaulting the independence of the
Transvaal. To Butler, the “real danger lay in the occult influences at work, backed by
enormous means and quite without conscience, to produce war in South Africa for selfish
ends.”83 However, his superiors in the War Office and Milner at the Cape admonished
him for transgressing into political matters that they believed did not concern him. Public
opinion also strongly turned against Butler as the summer progressed. The result was
that he lost whatever influence he might have had in deterring a war, and he was
ultimately recalled from South Africa.84
The cabinet as a whole did recognize that any military mobilization had to be
accompanied by an ultimatum, and that Britons generally would not support a move
toward war on the basis of the franchise question alone, unless all diplomatic measures
had presumably been exhausted.85 Thus, Chamberlain and Salisbury began crafting an
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ultimatum to the Transvaal government which, as Kruger’s advisors feared, would have
gone a long way toward destroying what sovereignty the Transvaal enjoyed under the
terms of the London Conference of 1884.86 However, the promulgation of this message
was unintentionally preempted by Kruger, who issued his own ultimatum to Britain on 10
October, with a 48-hour deadline attached. In that ultimatum Kruger did not specifically
address the contentious issues of the Uitlander franchise, or the larger question of
Britain’s suzerainty and its corollary (the right of interference), which had occupied the
attentions of the two governments. Rather, it was a direct response to Britain’s decision
to mobilize. It demanded that Britain agree to:
1. arbitration on “all points of difference”;
2. withdraw British troops from the border;
3. withdraw all British reinforcements that had arrived in South Africa after 1
June;
4. send no further troops, and those presently en route were not to be landed
anywhere in South Africa.87
Foreshadowing the thinking of the kaiser and his generals in 1914, Kruger believed that
the mobilization of the British army meant war. The mobilization of 10,000 British
troops on 8 September had effectively nailed the door shut on diplomacy, if it had not
previously been closed.88 Coming to the conclusion that nothing short of war would stop

86

The British ultimatum called for the Boers to: 1) repeal all legislation enacted since 1881 which
discriminated against Uitlanders, 2) grant full municipal rights to the mining districts, 3) guarantee the
independence of the Courts of Justice, 4) remove all religious requirements for civil service, 5) accept a
Tribunal of Arbitration to settle questions pertaining to the Convention, 6) grant most favored nation rights
to Britain in all matters commercial or otherwise which affects British interests or the position of its
subjects, white or black, 7) agree to a program “for the reduction of excessive armaments of the South
African Republic.” Ethel Drus, “Select Documents from the Chamberlain Papers concerning AngloTransvaal Relations, 1896-1899,” Bulletin of Historical Research 27 (1954): 182-86.
87
Further Correspondence Relating to Political Affairs in the South African Republic C. 9530 (1899), 67.
88
In the case of Germany, the perception that “mobilization meant war” was linked to the fact that the
mobilization of the German army, which would be ordered in reaction to a precautionary Russian
mobilization, was necessarily coupled with an immediate invasion of Belgium and France. On that
occasion there was no lag time for further diplomacy to take place. For a discussion on the pre-1914
understanding of “mobilization means war,” see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 3
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprint New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 105-108.

183
Britain from imposing on their sovereignty, the Boers realized that to preserve their
independence they had to seize the initiative.89
At the onset of the dispute the British public had remained generally disinclined
to go to war with the Transvaal solely over the issue of franchise rights. Yet, as the
diplomatic conversation turned to the broader issue of British suzerainty in early
September, Chamberlain observed that public opinion had turned.90 Writing to Milner on
2 September, Chamberlain expressed his confidence that if it came to war, although a
sizeable minority of the public would be most unwilling, “we shall be sufficiently
supported.”91 Toward that end, Chamberlain insisted that the diplomatic game had to be
played “selon les règles” [according to the rules]. Before Britain could ask more from
the Transvaal, it had “to first exhaust proposals on the franchise issue.” At the same time,
he believed that no ultimatum could be issued until at the very least a contingent force
had been deployed to the Cape, which could hold the position until a full complement of
troops could be delivered.92
For its part, throughout the spring and early summer the British public was, as
Chamberlain had recognized, widely opposed to going to war with the Boers solely to
ensure Uitlander franchise rights. While it is arguable that most were not well versed in
the intricacies of the diplomatic positions staked out by the respective governments in the
late spring and early summer of 1899, the provincial press still provided considerable
coverage and commentary about the ongoing diplomacy. As the Conservative-minded
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Gloucester Standard observed when troops were being deployed in July 1899 to reinforce
the British position at the Cape:
Undoubtedly, outside the mining interests and the friends of the comparatively
few families settled in the Transvaal, there is no disposition on the part of the
public to wrestle with Kruger's puzzles, to analyse the points of difference
between his concessions and Sir A. Milner's demands. Still less is there a war of
feeling about. An armed expedition to the Transvaal would not, we fully believe,
be popular just now.93
The paper asserted that it was dangerous to assume that the British public would be
forever detached from the matter, and maintained that “a single turn in events, an insult to
the British flag, a reverse of arms, might set the current the other way in a moment.”94
Clearly aware of the situation itself and the broader implications for British imperial
prestige, the paper anticipated:
One morning…they may perceive that which is quite clear to the government, that
much more is at stake than the conversion of Kruger to the cause of the
Outlanders. Are we to admit that the Rand shall be the paramount power in South
Africa? If so, then we need not prolong the struggle. We may just as well haul
down the British flag. And in that case, what would Queensland, which has
offered troops for service in the Transvaal, in the event of hostilities, think, with
the rest of the empire.95
Only two weeks later, the same paper reported that the negotiations in South
Africa were followed with interest: “public opinion [was] in a rather optimistic mood in
regard to the Transvaal of late, and perhaps that hopeful view was supported by the
carefully-worded statement of the colonial secretary a few days since when he announced
the receipt of a telegram showing that the Volksraad of the South African Republic had
adopted a seven years' retrospective franchise for the Uitlanders.”96
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That interest became even more apparent when the matter ceased being just about
the specific rights of the Uitlanders and became focused on the standing and prestige of
Britain and its empire as a whole. Commenting on Kruger’s attempt to compromise on
the franchise issue in July, the Gloucester Standard maintained:
Either Britain is to govern in South Africa or the Boer. To do nothing and to
admit defeat would be to court another Majuba Hill—a moral Majuba, as a special
correspondent puts it.97
Likewise, the West Briton and Cornwall Advertiser insisted that the Boer promise of
granting all whites in the Transvaal an equal share in political right and liberties, “should
at length, if only in a qualified fashion, be fulfilled.” The Advertiser continued:
That is the conclusion at which Sir Alfred Milner and the bulk of the people in
South Africa generally have arrived, and in which they are supported by the
imperial government. The issue, let it be once more explained, is not only for the
procuring of the franchise for a few thousand Englishmen in the Transvaal; but as
to our future paramountcy in South Africa. Nothing can be more certain than that
our yielding now would deal a damaging blow and possibly an irrevocable blow
to our prestige.98
The Liberal-minded Fife Free Press editorialized a month later that while the Boer
government had indeed already made some concessions concerning the Uitlander
franchise, still more action was needed from Kruger before the matter could be
considered closed. Firmly declaring its desire for peace, the Free Press enthusiastically
reported that statements by Chamberlain and the queen, along with the deployment of the
10,000 reinforcements to Natal, were effectively cornering Kruger into a position from
which he would be forced to comply with British demands. When faced with the
prospect that “war [would] mean nothing less for [the Boers] than the removal of the
republic from the map of South Africa,” the Free Press was firmly convinced that the
97
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Boers would come to see the reason of conceding to Britain’s demands instead of losing
their entire country.99 Later still, in mid-September, the Independent Evesham Journal
similarly emphasized:
The British terms are just and equitable in themselves, and their being so, and the
avoidance of any expressions calculated to exasperate the existing feeling, must
strengthen the government by enlisting the moral support for a large mass of
responsible and thoughtful men, whose reluctance to countenance war except as
the last resource and under irresistible pressure earns for them the scorn of the
raving jingoes who would light-heartedly enter upon a race war without serious
thought of the awful and far-reaching consequences.100
While doubting whether the Boer reply would in itself relieve the tensions between the
two countries, the journal nevertheless held out hope that an agreeable resolution would
soon be forthcoming.101
London and provincial papers had, therefore, noted the deployment of troops that
took place alongside the diplomatic effort, but they expressed little concern that such
action might precipitate a conflict. One commentator wrote to the Times, that in the
event that Kruger’s proposals proved to be insufficient and unsatisfactory, “strong
reinforcements of our troops in South Africa should be sent out as an indication that we
are not resorting to a council of the South African states in order to shelve our
responsibilities, but merely to make certain that our cause is just and approved by those
of whose interest we are guardians.”102 Likewise speaking about the need to be ever
prepared, the Gloucester Standard opined:
The exodus of the British soldiers for special service in South Africa goes on
apace, though we are officially assured that nothing more is being done in this
direction than to make assurance that the military equipment at the Cape and the
auxiliary stations shall be sufficient to meet any possible emergency. It is to be
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hoped that there will be no necessity for active operations in the field; but the War
Office motto would seem to be, in this direction at any rate, “Ready, aye
ready.”103
A month later, the Times asserted that the deployment of additional troops to South
Africa had already had an effect on Pretoria.
The threats of the Boers have been open and undisguised, as our correspondent
tells us, but little more will be heard from them when it is known that the British
forces in the colony are so strong that a raid would meet with an unpleasantly
warm reception…Pretoria will, in the end, think twice and thrice before they risk
their property, their liberty, and their political privileges in a hopeless struggle
with the paramount power.104
Statements such as these strongly suggest that few had reservations about the use of
coercive military force so long as it aided in eliciting the desired response from the
Transvaal.
The tenor of commentary changed, however, when Kruger denied British
suzerainty in early September. The Morning Post did not believe war to be imminent;
rather, it argued that, due to Chamberlain’s steadfastness, the Boer government would be
compelled to retract his denial not merely with words but with action.105 British
newspapers from across the political spectrum expressed the belief that the Boer
Government should and eventually would accede to British demands before it came to
war. To that end, Conservative and Liberal papers alike, widely argued that should war
come with the Transvaal, it would be due to the recalcitrance of Kruger and the eagerness
of his administration for war.106
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News of the Boer ultimatum elicited a range of responses from the British press
including “derision, delight, dismay—and indifference.” London papers used words such
as “preposterous” and “extravagant farce” to describe the Boer ultimatum.107 For
instance, the Times expected that the public would receive the news that the “petty
republic” had taken the “infatuated step of dispatching such a document” with profound
regret.108

More emphatically, the Morning Post noted, Kruger’s open rejection of

British suzerainty effectively galvanized public opinion:
When Mr. Kruger made his empty boast about British suzerainty he probably did
not see that he was at the same time bidding good-bye to his favourite theme of
arbitration. By his own foolishness he has given away the situation. People who
felt lukewarm on the Uitlander franchise and the dynamite monopoly are up in
arms the moment it comes to an independent Transvaal. Even the bondsmen must
now desert the Kruger cause if they wish this country to believe in their
protestations, for both Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Schneider have declared in favour of
British supremacy in South Africa.109
And, as Pakenham has pointed out, most editorials echoed the position of the Daily
Telegraph:

Of course there can be only one answer for this grotesque challenge…Mr Kruger
has asked for war, and war he must have.110
When the Transvaal was first annexed some Britons defended the Boers’ right to
domestic sovereignty. The pro-Boer lobby would gain considerable momentum when,
after the summer of 1900, the war deteriorated into a guerrilla struggle, and the British
government used objectionable tactics, such as concentration camps, in an effort to curtail
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and hinder the Boer forces.111 Even before that point, however, key members of
Parliament and pacifist groups spoke out against the legitimacy of the war. For instance,
in late-September Lord Rathmore wrote a lengthy review of Britain’s imperial policy
toward the Transvaal from 1877 to 1899 and concluded prophetically that a future war
would devolve from a shooting war into a disastrous guerilla war. In thus questioning the
legitimacy of the position which Britain had staked out, he wrote:
I see many things against us; but, if in addition, the God of battles deems not our
cause a righteous one, the war that we are entering upon with so light a heart may
bring sorrow and loss untold to our fair Christian land.
The Boers are not a lovable people; somewhat naturally they hate us; but still
for all that, though their country is rich in mines, and a vineyard to be coveted, it
is questionable whether our motives are perfectly pure, and our conduct righteous
in making war upon them.112
In addition, peace societies, some members of the Liberal Party, elements of the labor
movement and religious nonconformists, such as the Quakers, actively petitioned the
British government between June and October 1899 both in letter and in public meetings.
After the war started, anti-war agitation coalesced into a variety of anti-war
organizations, which included the Transvaal Committee, the South African Conciliation
Committee, and the Stop-the-War Committee.113
Within the relatively small bloc of pro-Boers, Irish nationalists had long been
particularly sympathetic with the Boer cause, seeing in the Boers a people who had
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mutual frustrations with the overbearing power of Britain. Opposition to the Jameson
raid afforded a rallying point for nationalist Irish MPs, who had been torn apart since the
Parnell split in the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1890.114 As Anglo-Boer relations
descended into war, Michael Davitt, MP for South Mayo, along with other Irish
nationalists such as Arthur Griffith, Maud Gonne, and W.B. Yeats, strenuously objected
and on 1 October convened a sizeable public meeting to contest the war.115 On 17
October John Dillon (MP for East Mayo), offered an amendment to the Commons’s
response to the queen’s speech in which he moved that the government acknowledge that
the war was caused by unlawful interference on the part of Britain into the internal affairs
of the Transvaal, and that the dispute between the two countries be settled through
arbitration.116 Supporting Dillon’s motion, Davitt emphasized the hypocrisy of the
British government’s defense of Roman Catholic rights in the Transvaal while denying
Catholics the same rights in Ireland. Moreover, he declared:
As I have the honour to represent a constituency which was the first in Ireland to
condemn the war policy of the colonial secretary, I support the amendment of my
hon. friend [sic]. Upon the war which that policy has provoked the whole world
outside of jingo circles and stock-jobbing rings cries “shame,” and I am proud of
the fact that Ireland’s voice is raised in that indignant chorus of condemnation. It
is a war without one single redeeming feature, a war of a giant against a dwarf, a
war which, no matter what its ending may be, will bring neither credit nor glory
nor prestige to this great British Empire.117
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Supported mostly by members of the various Irish nationalist factions and a few Liberals,
the motion was, nevertheless, overwhelmingly defeated by Unionists and Conservatives
by a vote of 54 “Ayes” to 322 “Noes”.118 On 26 October, in a further act of protest
against what he considered to be “the greatest infamy of the nineteenth century,” Davitt
resigned his seat in the Commons and subsequently worked to generate Continental
support for the Boer cause.119 In the spring of 1900 he proceeded to South Africa, where
he followed the Boer armies as a correspondent for the New York American Journal and
the Dublin Freeman’s Journal. Later that year he returned to London where he wrote a
history of the war from the Boer perspective.120
Tangible indications of the public’s interest in the run-up to the war, either in
favor of or against the conflict, can be found in the numerous public meetings that sprang
up all around Britain. On 24 September a small pro-Boer rally in Trafalgar Square was
reportedly overrun by a crowd of 30,000 “jingoes,” who rallied in favor of Chamberlain
and the government. Singing patriotic songs such as “Rule Britannia” and “The Soldiers
of the Queen,” and waving the Union Jack and royal standard, the crowd drowned out the
keynote speaker, Dr. Gavin Brown Clark (Liberal MP for Caithness), with accusations of
treason and challenges to his being able to call himself an “Englishman.”121 On 1
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October, there was the aforementioned rally in Dublin.122 Another rally opposing the war
occurred in Swindon on 8 October and was also disrupted by supporters of the
government, who then proceeded to hold their own rally. The following day in Sheffield
there was a “remarkable patriotic feeling” at a public meeting, at which “a resolution was
carried heartily supporting the Government in their Transvaal policy.”123 At public
meetings held on 1 November in Wick and Thurso, towns that lay within Clark’s own
Caithness constituency, the attendees unanimously passed resolutions to express their
“great dissatisfaction and strong disapproval of the action of Dr. Clark, MP for the
county, with reference to the present crisis in the Transvaal.”124 Two weeks later,
Aberdeen’s Weekly Free Press reported that even Clark’s most enthusiastic supporters
along the East Coast had turned against him and passed a similar resolution condemning
his position:
That no language can adequately express the feelings of contempt with which this
meeting holds the recent unpatriotic attitude of Dr. Clark, MP, toward the
government and the nation at a time when the enemies of the country are invading
our territory, our countrymen ruined and fleeing for refuge from the hands of the
oppressor, and that we take this opportunity of dissociating ourselves from such
disloyal conduct.125
As often as British newspapers had expressed a desire for a peaceful resolution of
the imbroglio, they widely held that neither Britain’s honor nor its imperial holdings
could be sacrificed at any price. Although the government had effectively forced the
Boers into a political corner, its spokesmen portrayed—and the papers and public readily
accepted—that the war was a defensive conflict because the Boer government was the
first to issue an ultimatum. It was thus Britain’s duty to prosecute the war to the fullest
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extent. The question no longer was simply about the Uitlanders’ franchise. The Second
Anglo-Boer War would determine whether the Transvaal would establish itself as a fully
independent state, or whether Britain would finally establish itself as the sole imperial
power in South Africa. If the Transvaal succeeded, Britons widely believed this would
lead to the decline of the empire – something which could not be allowed to happen. On
the other hand, a British victory brought with it great economic and humanitarian
promise. As Dr. James Stewart, a moderator of the General Assembly of the Free Church
of Scotland and a resident of Lovedale, South Africa, noted in a letter to the Earl of
Moray:
There is a great future for the African continent. Its mineral and other wealth has,
as yet, only been guessed at. What is needed for the opening up of that continent
is reliable information, just government, and a Christian civilization, or the
application of the teachings of Jesus Christ. The present war, which has darkened
so many homes, is, strange to say, a part of the process and a part of the heavy
price which has to be paid for that great end. It is in this light that the present war
should be regarded, and no one need have any compunction or any doubts as to its
necessity and justice. Little or nothing of a permanent kind can be done to
develop the continent on just lines so long as essentially unjust and obstructive
forces of government block the way. It is the same process as began in Egypt
nineteen years ago, was necessary at Omdurman and Khartoum two years ago,
and has now travelled south to Ladysmith and elsewhere; and that just because
none of these three forms of government would act otherwise than for the benefit
of a few at the expense of the many.126
With the stakes thus set, the majority opinion of the public was that there was little room
for those who held a position short of fully supporting the war effort and the intended
aims of the government. Regardless of their abhorrence for another war with in South
Africa, once the Transvaal issued its ultimatum, the ensuing war became one that the vast
majority believed Britain must win to uphold its national honor.
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OPENING SHOTS, BLACK WEEK, AND MAFEKING NIGHT

As they had in prior conflicts, war correspondents kept the reading public well
informed about events in South Africa. Regimental departures appeared in the presses
and maps (a staple of British war correspondence) accompanied the reports which
emerged from the front. In October and November the news that poured into Britain was
anything but encouraging, and it was not long before lengthy casualty lists filled the
columns of the national and provincial papers. Despite Britons’ belief in their own
military superiority, the Boers took the initiative as they had in 1880 and had the upper
hand in the early going of the conflict. Unlike in the previous war, the Transvaal was
supported in its struggle by the Orange Free State, which saw that its future survival hung
in the balance.
The war officially began on 12 October 1899 when the Boer ultimatum expired.
Within forty-eight hours Britain began losing contact with its forces on the Transvaal
border. On 14 October Boer forces laid siege to the border towns of Kimberley and
Mafeking, with garrisons of 2,600 and 1,000 men respectively. The next week saw a
furious invasion, as the aged Commandant-General Piet Joubert led 21,000 Transvaalers
and Orange Free Staters south past the old 1881 battlefields of Laing’s Nek, Ingogo, and
Majuba Hill, and flooded into northern Natal. Despite temporarily repulsing the Boers at
Dundee and Elandslaagt, the British fell back toward Ladysmith, where General George
White’s force of 12,000 likewise became besieged on 29 October.127
The British public quickly became intensely interested in the war. George Sturt
recorded in his journal on 24 October:
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Behind the boy who brought his bundle of evening papers into Frank’s shop, there
followed thick, until the shop was crowded, men eager for war news. For so long
they had been waiting about, with nothing to do, expectant of the stimulus, and
desiring something truly stirring. They would like a bloody battle twice a day, so
that breakfast and supper might have a relish, and ennui be chased away.128
Responding to the clamor for war news, the Conservative Daily Mail, which had been
founded by Lord Northcliffe in 1896, quickly rose to being the best-selling daily
newspaper. Joining the Mail in covering the war, other leading papers, such as the Daily
Telegraph, and the Morning Post, as well as illustrated weeklies, such as the Graphic and
the Illustrated London News, sent correspondents and artists to report on events. Even
the Manchester Guardian, which was one of the few papers to continue to oppose the war
openly, sent a correspondent to the scene of the war. War news, especially when it came
from a paper’s own correspondent, was good for business.129
The growth of the Daily Mail at this time was part of the burgeoning of adult,
educational, and juvenile literature markets that had emerged since the late 1870s. Much
of this fare was devoted to imperial messaging. Arguably motivated by both a keen
interest to meet public demand for imperial news as well as to drive public opinion, the
central themes of those media were British self-confidence and the safety of the
empire.130 As Jacqueline Beaumont, a historian of British journalism and the colonial
wars, points out, the hundreds of war correspondents who found their way to South
Africa demonstratively reflected the growth of the press and the level of public interest in
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imperial matters. Many of those correspondents, such as Lionel James, established their
careers in covering the war.131 To be sure, there was a very good reason why the Boer
War captivated the public. More than merely being the latest in a long series of imperial
crises, the set-backs in the early stages of the conflict warranted deep public concern as
this war proved to be the greatest challenge to the empire arguably since the Crimean
War.132
Indeed, by early November the public’s initial haughtiness was already beginning
to wane. Describing the scene in London to Milner, Miss Bertha Synge wrote on 3
November:
Our days are spent reading our papers—ever clamouring for more, our nights in
dreaming of all that is and is to be. In my lifetime, the state of tension is unique.
The war affects all, rich and poor alike. All have friends and relations in it and it
is no exaggeration to say we are all plunged in gloom…I shall never forget last
Tuesday in London, when the news of the missing battalion arrived around
midday. Picture the newsboys at the corners…shouting “Terrible Reverses of
British Troops—Loss of 2,000.” Imagine the rush for papers as we all stood
about the streets—regardless of all appearances, reading the telegrams with
breathless anxiety. Carriages stopped at the corners for papers to be bought—bus
conductors rushed with handfuls of pennies as deputation for their passengers.
There was a perfect sea of newspapers and anxious faces behind—intense gravity
prevailed…People walked along speaking in whispers and muttering, while ever
echoed round the shrill and awful cry of “Terrible Reverses of British Troops.”
…The War Officer is besieged—no one goes to the theatres—concert rooms are
empty—new books fall flat—nothing is spoken save the war.133
With the British regaining some of their footing in the third week of the month, Lt.
General Redvers Buller, the commander of British forces at the Cape, divided his 47,000
men into three groups and planned a massive three-pronged counter-offensive to break
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through the Boer defenses and to relieve the beleaguered British garrisons at Kimberley
and Ladysmith.134 He sent 20,000 men west under Lord Methuen to retake Kimberley.
With a much smaller force, Major Generals William Gatacre and John French were to
repulse the Boer incursion in the midlands of the Cape Colony. Retaining 20,000 under
his personal command, Buller intended to relieve Ladysmith. 135 Initially the operation
went well. In the west, Lord Methuen’s 1st Division succeeded in driving the Boers back
to the Modder River. On 28 November they then successfully maneuvered
Commandant-General De la Rey and Piet Cronje’s 3,000 commandos out of the
defensive position they had taken up despite suffering significant losses in the process.136
The strategic success at Modder River notwithstanding, the ratio of the comparative troop
strengths and the casualty numbers would become characteristic of the early phase of the
war. In the east, the arrival of British reinforcements, along with the presence of Buller’s
own column of approximately 21,000 men, had convinced Joubert to fall back to Colenso
and focus on the siege of Ladysmith instead of pressing still further south toward
Durban.137
Then, between 10 and 15 December, in what came to be known throughout
Britain as “Black Week,” the offensive turned catastrophic. In the midlands on 10
December, despite enjoying a two to one numerical superiority, Gatacre’s 3rd Division
was utterly routed at Stormberg.138 The following day, Lord Methuen intended to follow
up his earlier success at Modder River, and, with the aid of reinforcements from the 3rd
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Highland Brigade, he struck with 13,000 men at De la Rey’s new position at
Magersfontein Hill, which was held by fewer than 5,000 commandos. The Boer forces
easily repulsed Methuen’s attack, inflicting almost nine hundred casualties while
sustaining fewer than two hundred and fifty.139 The most grievous blow came four days
later in the east when Buller’s own column, which had swelled to 23,000 men, attempted
to break through General Louis Botha’s force of 5,000 at Colenso.140 Here, as at
Stormberg and Magersfontein previously, though severely outnumbered, the Boers
enjoyed a decisive advantage in position and made full use of it.141 When the fighting
subsided, the British had sustained as many as 1,500 casualties and lost ten pieces of
artillery, while the Boers had at most thirty-three casualties.142 Among the British who
fell was Field-Marshal Lord Roberts’s only son, Lieutenant Freddy Roberts, who was
mortally wounded in an attempt to save several British guns from being captured.143
Being used to the relatively short wars which had generally produced favorable
outcomes with comparatively few casualties, the British government and public were
completely stunned by the news of this string of British defeats. In the first place, the
casualties sustained in those fights were uncharacteristic for the British army. While they
did not rise to the level seen during the Napoleonic or Crimean wars, they were a stark
contrast to the greater pattern of battles fought against native opponents during Victoria’s
139
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colonial wars. In those encounters the British were frequently outnumbered but almost
routinely had suffered casualties of only a few dozen.144
Despite Britain’s previous difficulty fighting the Boers, the public entered the war
with utter contempt for their opponents’ capabilities. H. Spenser Wilkinson recalled later
that the public almost universally had believed that “a war with the Transvaal would be a
small affair, resembling the autumn manoeuvres [sic] and lasting a few weeks.”145 To be
sure, the British military had suffered other ignominious disasters at places such as
Isandhlwana (Zulu War) and Maiwand (Second Afghan War). While tragic, those
instances could be rationalized by the public on the grounds that their forces had been
vastly outnumbered by the enemy. That the British enjoyed sizeable numerical
superiorities at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso only made the defeats coming
within days of each other all the more shocking and humiliating. Chamberlain, in
speaking before a concerned student body at Dublin’s Trinity College, referred to the
events of Black Week as “the darkest hour.”146 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle called the week
“the blackest one known during our generation and the most disastrous for British arms
which has occurred during this century.”147 The effect of Black Week was such that J. L.
Garvin maintained some thirty-five years later that “our national life and thought never
fully recovered” from the shock of Black Week.148
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Finding it difficult to fathom how they could have been so easily repulsed,
British officers and war correspondents frequently over-approximated the size of the
Boer forces and the number of casualties the British forces had inflicted. For instance,
the Hampshire Telegraph reported that at Magersfontein the Boers likely had 12,000 men
and that there were “heavy casualties on both sides.”149 According to a Press Association
report of the same battle which was carried in the Bristol Mercury, “the entire
Scandinavian contingent had been destroyed,” and the Boers had lost more than 700 men.
Wounded Boers told the reporter that “the destruction wrought by the naval gun was
enormous…All confess they suffered the greatest loss they have yet had during the
war.”150 A reporter for the Times insisted “the loss of the enemy in mounted infantry was
heavy.”151 Calling Magersfontein the “most desperate” battle fought thus far, the
editorial staff of the Derby Mercury drew some comfort from the knowledge that the
British artillery, though not destroying the “fine nerve” of the Boers, had “inflicted havoc
amongst the enemy” as it “killed and wounded hundreds of them.”152 A correspondent
for the Central News, whose reports appeared in the Mercury, recorded that “all [were]
agreed that the total number of Boer losses [at Magersfontein] were over two thousand
killed and wounded,” thus over-estimating by a factor of ten.153 As news trickled in from
Colenso, rumors abounded in Bristol that Buller had succeeded in capturing 10,000
Boers.154 In issuing their official reports two months later, British commanders continued
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to assert that they had been confronted with much larger forces than they had anticipated.
Indeed, the estimated size of the Boer forces had actually grown since the initial reports.
Methuen’s report on Magersfontein, published in the London Gazette and carried by
many provincial papers, maintained that there “must have been at least 16,000 Boers in
front of him.”155 Buller reported after Colenso, that he thought “the force opposed to us
must altogether have equaled our own!”156
Amid reports of overall losses, British newspapers featured biographical sketches
of prominent casualties. The Daily News called the loss of Wauchope “irreparable” and
gave a lengthy biographical account of his military service in the Ashanti Wars in 1874
and his role in the expedition to save Gordon in 1885.157

In Scotland news of his death

was met with “deep regret.” In Edinburgh, for instance, the news “caused a feeling of
distress and almost consternation,” to the point that the South Edinburgh Liberal
Association adjourned after adopting a resolution of “deep and heartfelt sympathy with
Mrs. Wauchope.”158
Black Week also caused Britons to re-evaluate their impression of the Boers.
Noting the public’s tendency to exaggerate the relative magnitude of the British losses,
the Glasgow Herald offered a Social Darwinist rationalization when it asserted that the
public could not compare this enemy to other recent foes. The Herald maintained that
the Boers were “not barbarians like the Ashantis or Zulus, nor half-civilised and halfarmed tribes like the Pathans of our North-West Indian frontier, or the dervish[e]s of the
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Sudan…They possess all the intelligence of Europeans, and, what is more important, they
have the advice of skilled strategists to aid them, and a full supply of the newest and most
perfect missile-weapon.”159 Insisting that it was more appropriate to compare the
engagements to those fought with European opponents, the Herald thus assured its
readers that there was no reason to be pessimistic. Likewise, dispensing with the notion
that the Boers were anything but capable adversaries, the Manchester Times maintained
that “truly they have nothing to learn from either German or French tutors.”160
In his history of the war, Conan Doyle insisted that Black Week inflicted “an
incalculable” blow to British prestige, and this conclusion is borne out through a review
of the contemporary press.161 For example, the Daily News claimed that Methuen’s
defeat at Magersfontein, coming as it did on the heels of Gatacre’s repulse from
Stormberg, had led to great anxiety about the British position in South Africa.162
Similarly, the Press Association observed that “an air of gloom deeper than any since the
opening of the war…pervaded the War Office,” and the Aberdeen Journal maintained
that the reverse of Methurn at Magersfontein, “following so closely after General
Gatacre’s reverse, at Stormberg, produced a more dispiriting effect than the casualty of
any engagement.”163 After calling Gatacre’s defeat at Stormberg “humiliating” in a 14
December editorial, the Liverpool Mercury subsequently noted that the “serious reverse”
suffered by Buller at Colenso “differed only in coming upon the public as an absolute
surprise.” Whereas Methuen and Gatacre had only divisions at their disposal and “were
operating against enemies who were probably as strong numerically as themselves,” the
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paper insisted that everyone had expected that Buller, “at the head of the main army,”
would “produce decisive results.”164
Even though the Christmas season of 1899 was understandably gloomy, the
papers emphasized that the situation was not completely hopeless. Britons emerged from
Black Week more unified and determined than ever in favor of the war. Conan Doyle
observed that after Black Week the Boers were no longer the piteous underdogs upon
whom Britain had forced a war, and that peace meetings risked incurring a public riot in
opposition.165 The Glasgow Herald was amazed that partisans would continue to refute
the necessity of the war:
Can any sane man regret that we have fallen upon a time so opportune in the
politics of the world for a trial of strength with this great military power which we
have discovered to be capable of disputing our hold of South Africa? Every
Krupp or Creusot that has rolled out of the Pretoria armoury has dinned into our
ears the lesson that we should be thankful for the failure of our diplomacy, and for
the international situation which has permitted us to throw our full military
strength against a foe who has proved to us that he must be annihilated as a
military power if the British flag is to wave over any spot from Cape Town to the
Zambesi.166
The Daily News anticipated that “this fresh check to the British arms will only increase
the determination of the British people to see the thing through,” and that with the “very
existence of the British Empire at stake,” the war had to be pressed “until the British flag
flies from Johannesburg and Pretoria—places which will be reached via
Bloemfontein.”167 Detailing the reverse of Methuen at Magersfontein, the Liverpool
Mercury called upon the British public to persevere:
All the fortitude on which the people of this country pride themselves will be
required to enable us to face the situation with patience and with a fair allowance
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for the difficulties that have led to the present crisis in the campaign against the
Transvaal…For the soldiers no praise can be too high. It is evident from their
whole demeanor under trying and dispiriting circumstances that they remain
undaunted and eager for the fight. They have had to suffer a repulse. The bravest
troops are open to a temporary rebuff. But their morale is, obviously,
unshaken.168
Public support had so shifted in favor of the war that Conan Doyle recorded that even
“the only London daily which had opposed the war, though very ably edited, was
overborne by the general sentiment and compelled to change its line.”169
Notwithstanding support for the troops, newspaper editorial staffs had few qualms
about attacking the government for its handling of the war effort.170 Thus, the Daily
News warned the government after Magersfontein that future setbacks would not be
readily tolerated by the public:
British ministries which faltered and paltered with great emergencies have often
found the country behind them in a different sense—the sense which Tennyson
intended when he wrote: “You, you, if you shall fail to understand What England
is . . if you should only compass her disgrace. . . . the wild mob’s million feet Will
kick you from your place.”171
Such criticism, however, did not initially extend to the performance of the military. For
example, the Liverpool Mercury insisted that the reverse at Stormberg was not Gatacre’s
fault, but that “he was placed in a situation…in which he was merely a sheep for the
slaughter.”172 Meanwhile, after Colenso, the Glasgow Herald called upon the public “to
keep its head and trust the great soldier who commands Natal to repair his loss.”173 The
public’s confidence in the military and its expectation that the government would respond
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appropriately to the turn of events was bolstered with the announcement that Buller was
to be replaced as commander in chief by Lord Roberts, who was to have as his chief of
staff the much younger Kitchener of Omdurman fame.174 Observing that their
appointments were greeted with “universal satisfaction,” the Liverpool Mercury asserted
that their past resourcefulness justified “the country in forming the highest expectations
of the effect which their advent will produce upon the course of events in South
Africa.”175
Before Roberts arrived, however, Buller launched one further attempt at breaking
through to Ladysmith in order to redeem his reputation. Much like Colley’s ill-fated
operation at Majuba Hill in 1881, the resulting battle atop Spion Kop (24-25 January
1899) was another ignoble British defeat.176 After the arrival of Roberts in early
February a series of British victories in quick succession turned the tide of war. In the
west, French broke through and relieved Cecil Rhodes and the British garrison in
Kimberley on 15 February. On 18 February French forced Cronje and his commandos to
surrender at Paardeberg. Ten days later, Buller, whom Roberts had retained as a field
commander, finally succeeded in relieving Ladysmith, and on 13 March Bloemfontein,
the capital of the Orange Free State, fell. After taking time to secure the southeast part of
the country, British forces renewed their northward march on 4 May. Two weeks later
British forces breached the last line of Boer defenses and relieved the very much
beleaguered forces under Colonel Robert Baden-Powell at Mafeking on 17 May.
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Johannesburg then fell on 31 May, and Roberts captured Pretoria five days after that.
Over the next several months the last vestiges of organized Boer resistance were
systematically hunted down, and on 26 October, the Transvaal was formally annexed.
Afterward, the war descended into nearly two years of tedious and costly guerrilla
warfare.177
The conditions within Mafeking had become appalling over the course of the 197day siege. Food was scarce and strictly rationed, with Baden-Powell ultimately diverting
part of the rations from blacks to the white garrison.178 The details of the conditions
within Mafeking were unknown to the British public, but news of the relief of the city
caused an outburst of celebrations all across Britain nonetheless. Writing to Milner,
James Rendel reflected that when London heard the news, it was “mad with joy,…people
were shouting, cheering, and singing in the streets in the High Street for half the night,
and the scene at [the] Mansion House was quite extraordinary.”179 London’s Daily News
reported that the news quickly spread from the city to the West End and resulted in the
“wildest enthusiasm.”180
Noting that the “unparalleled demonstrations” did not cease until daybreak
Saturday morning, the Times speculated that Sunday would only be an intermission and
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not the end to the exuberance.181 Of the celebration itself, the paper reported that on
Saturday, “by common consent a public holiday had arranged itself, nemine
contradicente.” At 10 am on Saturday a crowd had begun to gather around the Mansion
House and from noon to 3 pm throngs of people packed the area “singing, cheering, and
throwing their hats in the air.” At the same time, the celebrations did not emerge
uniformly:
Westward the scene was less noisy, but not less remarkable. The striking feature
of the proceedings was not enthusiasm, not excitement, and certainly not passion.
It was the sense that however extravagant this conduct might have been at any
other time, it was perfectly proper now in harmony with the spirit of the hour.
White-haired old ladies, betraying no sign of emotion, were to be seen inspecting
the shop windows of Holborn carrying a large Union Jack in each hand, and
young women had the colours pinned across from shoulder to shoulder.182
Poor children dressed in rags formed small regiments and marched in columns of fours
up and down the street, and there was hardly anyone who did not display some form of
the Union Jack either on their person or on their carriages. Such displays
notwithstanding, the Times insisted that the “real celebrations of Mafeking Day did not
occur in Mayfield.” The real celebrations emerged in the City up to the Strand and
Trafalgar Square, in the suburbs, and in Whitechapel, Bloomsbury, Cambden-town, and
Southwark. “It was here,” the Times wrote, “that scenes were witnessed which have
never been seen before in the history of the country:
Perhaps a Roman triumph was something like this; yet there has been no triumph
of war, and there was no vaulting over a defeated enemy; only the universal
181
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spontaneous rejoicing at the happy end of the long seige of a little town of no
strategic significance. Women and boys were more demonstrative than many of
the men. Well-dressed young women of usually proper demeanor traversed the
roadways arm-in-arm, six abreast, carrying flags, and occasionally bursting into
song. Ear-splitting sounds issued from every sort of raucous instrument, and
noises which would have been offensive at any other time were quite agreeable to
all concerned…Gutter children not satisfied with their performance on impromptu
kettledrums, commandeered long broom-handles, to which they attached cloths
and constructed a clever imitation of an ambulance corps, finishing the picture by
laying the smallest of their number in the ready-made hammock and carrying him
through the streets.183
Outside Hyde Park, the home of Mrs. Baden-Powell, mother of the hero of Mafeking,
was another center of public attention. Crowds decorated it with Union Jacks and a
picture of the colonel, which was framed by newspaper bills which read “Three Cheers
for Baden-Powell” and a banner with the word “Mafeking.” In the Thames, British ships
docked from the Tower eastward were dressed. Amid this release of pent up emotion, the
Times reported that such celebrations belonged entirely to the general public and were
devoid of any official display of celebration, as “Whitehall displayed never a flag.”184
In Oxford, where the “glad tidings” arrived around 10:15 pm on Friday night, a
large crowd gathered in the city center within the hour and engaged in singing patriotic
hymns, carrying soldiers about on their shoulders, and bonfires and fireworks were set
alight outside Exeter College and at numerous other locations around the city.185 In
Bristol the celebration took on a more formal tone, as a “monster demonstration”
numbering in the thousands turned out to support the lord mayor in doing honor to the
“invincible Baden-Powell.” In a tribute that the Bristol Mercury said could only be
compared with a visit from the queen,
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The whole city gave itself up to rejoicing, and right heartily did it go through with
it. There was necessarily very little time for arranging a programme, but what
mattered that when everybody meant taking part, and was determined to do his or
her share in fittingly celebrating the freedom of the heroes of Mafeking.
Enthusiasm ran high on Friday night, but it was really only a rehearsal for the next
day. The deep feelings of pride and patriotism aroused by such a rare event in
British history could not be spent in a few hours. People woke up on Saturday
morning—in many cases after a very short night’s rest, and the bright sunshine
enhanced the gladness which reigned everywhere. Flags were flying on all sides,
and church bells rang merrily. Being Saturday most of the shops opened as usual,
but as a rule business was at a standstill. Purchases were confined chiefly to flags
and other decorative material.186
Scenes in Scotland were equally stirring. In Edinburgh, news of the relief of
Mafeking was highlighted by a massive torchlight procession which marched from the
Royal Mile across Waverly Bridge through the commercial district of Princes and George
St. and concluded in the Castle Esplanade.187 In Kirkaldy, the occasion was marked by
the ringing of the town and church bells.
There was an unprecedented demand for flags, and before nine o’clock all dealers
were sold out, while coloured ribbons and other fabrics suitable for decorations
were also quite unobtainable. By breakfast every shop on High Street was
bedecked with flags and streamers.188
Throughout the day the streets were filled with dancing and pipe music, and the
celebratory revelry continued well into the night, with the town council contributing to
the festivities by spending £20 on fireworks. To a certain extent, in Scotland such
displays took on a decidedly provincial bent. One banner was “displayed in the shape of
an old tunic from the Cameron Highlanders,” and another, being owned by the Gallstown
Apron Society, was styled after a banner flown by Scottish soldiers at Flodden which
bore the motto: “Fear God, honour the King with a long life and prosperous reign.”189
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Not only did such celebratory expressions persist beyond the weekend of 18-21
May, but they were not limited to the major metropolitan districts. Donald Hodge, who
was five years old in May 1900, recalled in a 1995 interview that in his village of East
Peckham in Kent:
We had a day's holiday from school, and the village celebrated it in due style.
Some of the village men had old tire bells which they set alight, and poked them
down the village street with poles.190
Moreover, the general public was well aware that their local celebrations were part of a
much larger national and indeed imperial phenomenon, as London and provincial papers
alike noted their breadth and scope. For instance, the Hampshire Telegraph reported that
the jubilations were seen in “distant colonies, as well as in the smallest villages of the
land.”191 More demonstrably, in an extra-large edition for 26 May, the Graphic
highlighted the celebratory displays that had erupted across London, in Portsmouth,
Glasgow, Liverpool, Hampstead, and Godalming.192 As details of the sieges became
more fully known, at least for some the war had a sobering effect. Rachel Cadbury, who
was about six years old when the Boer war broke out and had been born into a wealthy
Quaker family, recalled later her reaction to details of the siege of Ladysmith: “If war
makes people eat rats, I am not for war.”193
The exuberances surrounding Mafeking Night have traditionally been seen as
spontaneous and a quintessential example of mass imperial support and pride in the
empire. Paula Krebs, however, has challenged this interpretation by emphasizing the
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significant role played by the press in encouraging the public toward that reaction. Her
overall assessment of the events of Mafeking Night was that they were as much a
demonstration of the power and ability of the press to influence the public and drive it
toward a desired goal, as they were an outpouring of public support for imperialism from
within the general populace and across the social spectrum.194 For instance, she points
out that the relief of Mafeking rose to such an importance in the eyes of the Daily
Express that it printed the first ever across-the-page headline by a London newspaper.195
Moreover, as Jacqueline Beaumont’s study on the press coverage of the sieges has
demonstrated, any manipulation of the public by the British press was in part due to the
material being fed to them by the correspondents on the ground in South Africa. In
particular, in converging on Mafeking at the onset of the war, it was the correspondents
who were responsible for focusing the attention of the press, and by extension the
country, specifically onto Mafeking and its beleaguered commander at the expense of the
other besieged towns.196 When vetted information was not readily available due to
censorship or other reasons, in reviewing surviving reporters notebooks, and news
accounts, Beaumont and Krebs have persuasively argued that the public interest in the
sieges around Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith, made it easy for the correspondents
and their papers to sensationalize reports from the South Africa and to “invent” news by
speculating and reporting rumors and half-truths. As, Beaumont has pointed out, on
occasion this entailed the false reporting from the front of “brilliant victories involving
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massive Boer losses, which later had to be retracted.” Moreover, the dearth of hard
information pertaining to the besieged towns only heightened public anxiety and interest
in the sieges.197
A NEW STYLE OF WARFARE AND PUBLIC OPINION, JUNE 1900-1902

As the British offensive under Roberts slowly but surely forced the collapse of
formal Boer resistance, the press and the public believed that the end of the war was in
sight. Indeed, Conan Doyle concluded his narrative history of the Great Boer War with
the fall of Pretoria. Even as the war with the Transvaal government came to a close over
the summer of 1900, recalcitrant Boer commanders such as Christiaan de Wet were
moving combat in a new direction via guerrilla campaigning. Consequently, although
Kruger went into exile and Britain formally annexed the Transvaal in October, the war
itself would not officially end until the final surrender terms were signed on 31 May
1902.
The later portion of the war stands beyond the chronological scope of the present
study, and has been the subject of several outstanding investigations. Nonethless, a brief
overview of a few of their conclusions is warranted. In studying the war correspondents
in the Boer War, Raymond Sibbald has observed that the press’s and the public’s
attachment to the war noticeably declined as the war descended into a guerilla conflict.
In the first place, papers such as the Times had seemingly grown bored with the war, as
the outbreak and drama of the Boxer Rebellion and the siege of the foreign legations
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supplanted and pushed the Boer War “from the forefront of the public consciousness.”198
Maintaining positive public interest in the Boer War was made all the more difficult as
the British government sanctioned measures, such as the construction of concentration
camps and the internment of Boer civilian women and children, in order to reign in the
defiant commandos. Many, however, considered these measures to be morally
questionable and to conflict with Britain’s time-honored traditions of “peace, good
government, and the indivisible world rights of Englishmen.”199 The public’s access to
information about such practices was also impeded by Kitchener’s decision to impose
greater censorship on the press in order to demoralize the Boers.200 But even when
information was available, many papers seemingly preferred to ignore the objectionable
measures as much as possible. For instance, while humanitarians such as Emily
Hobhouse and Millicent Garrett Fawcett attempted to raise public awareness of the harsh
realities of life within the concentration camps, the Times was largely disinclined to
address the camps and did so only begrudgingly.201
It is with some reluctance that we revert once more to the controversy of
concentration camps for Boer refugees, which has been revived in the last few
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days by the letters which have been sent from South Africa since the arrival in
that country of Miss Hobhouse’s “Report.” But in view of the misunderstanding
as to the whole situation in South Africa which seem to possess the minds of Boer
sympathizers in this country and elsewhere it is necessary to set forth once again
the true aspect of the case, which have been too much obscured by mistaken
sentimentalism and by an astonishing incapacity or unwillingness to recognize the
necessities imposed by the peculiar character of the war in its recent stage.202
In this instance, the Times insisted naively that the camps had largely been necessitated in
order to provide effectively for the humanitarian needs of the Boer civilians who had
been abandoned by the Boer commandoes.203 In fact, the Times only grudgingly
addressed these controversial tools of war. For instance, on 31 October the paper
acknowledged that it would not be publishing a leading article about the justifiability of
the camps. It would instead present letters representing both sides on the question and
thus allow its readers to make up their own minds as to which position was more
convincing.204 But while the volume of war coverage declined in the summer of 1900,
this should not be seen as a sign that the press or the general public were necessarily
losing interest in imperial matters as a whole. Instead, as Sibbald points out, in the
summer of 1900 the public merely turned from the war in South Africa with a new
international crisis—the Boxer Rebellion and the siege of the foreign legations in
Peking.205
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CONCLUSION

The coverage of imperial politics by London and provincial papers between 1877
and 1900 strongly suggests that the British public was not only well-versed in the issues
pertaining to the country’s presence in the Cape to Cairo corridor, but that it was well
aware of the debates concerning imperial policies during that period. Moreover, the
public formed its own opinions about such matters and voiced them accordingly. While
that voice may have been less pronounced at times when the empire was not imperiled,
such relative quiet does not mean that the people had no opinion. As we have seen, the
newspapers did register their indulgence to the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 and
their opposition to those who would stand in the way of the imperial civilizing process.
But as the proclamation did not immediately result in a war or other serious calamity, the
public’s engagement in the matter can be easily overlooked.
Quite naturally, it was in times of crisis that public opinion became the most
vocal. As divergent (and closely held) ideological positions were brought to bear, the
public digested the situations. With conflicts of various sizes continuously popping up
throughout the 1870s, ʼ80s, and ʼ90s throughout the empire, there were plenty of
opportunities for the public to demonstrate its engagement in imperial matters. To that
end, public opinion was often fractured as political parties and the provincial press
debated the merits of supporting or resisting imperial interventionism. Although
imperialism proved to be a highly divisive issue, both within Parliament and among the
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general public, those experiences also served to bind the nation together through the
collective experience of demonstration and debate.
In examining the public expressions concerning the imperial conflicts which
emerged between 1870 and 1900 in the Cape to Cairo corridor, it becomes clear that the
degree to which the British press voiced its approval of a given military action depended
largely upon how well the arguments for such intervention could be justified. Moreover,
we see that such justifications had less to do with economic opportunism, and more to do
with the advancement of civilization, the preservation of British honor, the projected cost
of the enterprise (both in blood and capital), and the pursuit of imperial security, both at
the regional and the global levels.
In the case of the annexation of the Transvaal, Carnarvon justified his actions on
the grounds that such an action would lead to greater security for the Cape Colony and
improve the civilization of the natives. Given that the Boers proved incapable of
mounting an effective defense, the British public largely acquiesced to the action with
little opposition whatsoever, despite the questionable legality of Shepstone’s action. It
was only with the outbreak of the Zulu and the First Anglo-Boer wars that the public
began to reconsider seriously the action orchestrated by Carnarvon and Shepstone.
In turning the focus northward to the British presence in Egypt and Sudan, we
have seen that similar issues again drove the public discussion. Wavering on whether its
presence in Egypt was worth the financial and military investment, public sentiment
became galvanized, but only to the point of relieving Gordon as a matter of national pride
and honor. It was only after thirteen years of observing Mahdist rule in the Sudan that
the British public—as differentiated from military commanders—became convinced that

217
for reasons of imperial and international security British rule in the Sudan was preferable.
Likewise, although the public was divided over the issue of whether or not to intervene in
the domestic affairs of the Transvaal in the late 1890s, after the British government was
able to redirect the focus from Jameson’s illegal interference to the defense of British
honor in the face of Kruger’s intransigence, the majority of Britons—with the notable
exception of a vocal pro-Boer lobby—united in favor of the war. That unity would break
down in the war’s latter stages.
In the present review, the most explicit instances of public engagement occurred
when popular sentiment factored in Gladstone’s decision to take action to save Gordon,
and during the celebratory reactions to the relief of Mafeking. In regards to the latter,
there is much to be said for Krebs’s analysis and interpretation of that event. And while
the public jubilation may not have been “spontaneous” in the sense that the press had
drawn the public into the sieges in such a way as to foster an enthusiastic response to
their relief the newspapers did not send the people into the streets. Although informed by
the press, the public celebrations themselves were not manufactured by the press.
Additionally and in looking beyond Mafeking Night, the press was not wholly
responsible for manufacturing interest in the war, as the public took some ownership of
its fascination in the war. For instance, although the demonstrations following the relief
of Mafeking focused largely on Baden-Powell, the predominant hero of the working class
remained, as George Sturt noted in his journal, Sir Redvers Buller, despite his failures to
turn the war during Black Week and afterward at Spion Kop:
At 11 o’clock my men left off work, and could scarce wait to take their wages, in
their eagerness to be off to Aldershot in time for the public reception of General
Buller.
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Of all the men in the Transaal War, not even excepting Baden-Powell, General
Buller is the favourite among our working men. Their regard for him is almost
passionate, in its jealousy for his honour. They are determined that from them he
shall have justice, whoever else may belittle him…the working class see a
resemblance between Buller’s fate and their own. At any rate he is their hero: not
Roberts. And so Farnham town is half empty today: even the fair looks a sort of
desert. The men have tramped off devotedly, to pay their tribute of admiration
where they think it due. It is but one more of many instances that the War has
afforded, that our working people are hungry, starving, for a stimulus to their
imaginations, to their emotion.206
In following the war as a child, Donald Hodge, the son of a wheelwright, was also an
enthusiast for Buller but for a more personal reason:
One of the generals, who was operating in South Africa at that time, was General
Sir Redvers Buller and his birthday coincided with mine. So he was, if not my
hero, a center of my interest in the Boer War.207
Such hero worship was not entirely self-motivated. Nor was it the sole province of the
music halls, for as we shall see more fully in chapter five, the celebration of the British
military as a symbol of the empire was deliberately encouraged by grammar schools and
the press in an effort to instill imperialism and nationalism into the public’s
consciousness.
At the same time, the public displays on Mafeking Night did not suddenly emerge
in the vacuum of the Second Anglo-Boer War. Rather, in taking a longer-term view of
the press’s attention to imperial matters in southern and northern Africa, one sees that
frequent attention to imperial affairs had cultivated a public interest for at least thirty
years. Moreover, that interest was interwoven into a greater framework of public concern
for and interest in the British military, both as an extension of British imperial politics
and as the quintessential symbol of the British empire. Just as Krebs and Beaumont note
how the half-pennies and mainstream presses did much to foster an intimate connection
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between the British home front and the besieged garrison at Mafeking, we have seen over
the course of the last three chapters that further attempts were made at engendering the
connection between soldiers and citizens. To varying degrees, this was done by the
mainstream presses, but certainly by illustrated presses, such as the Graphic and Penny
Illustrated Paper. Among the most prominent of these, as Robert MacDonald has shown,
was arguably that which surrounded General Charles Gordon for his stand at
Khartoum.208 But as we have seen, it could also easily include Wolseley, who was
affectionately referred to by the country as “Our General,” and, to a much lesser degree,
afforded to the slain at Isandhlwana and the survivors at Rourke’s Drift.
In taking into account the broad spectrum of press coverage and the public’s
awareness of imperial affairs in the Cape to Cairo corridor, Mafeking Night should thus
be seen as a culmination of public interest in imperial matters, especially those involving
the military. As we shall see in the next two chapters, the public’s engagement in the
politics of imperial interventionism transcended political questions about events on the
imperial periphery and involved a concern for the place of the military establishment in
British society. Since at least the 1850s, the public was well aware of the impact of
imperial interventionism on the military and the consequential need to reform its
institutions. As we will see, the content of the press and popular culture also suggests
that imperial and military issues were becoming distinctly engrained, both on the national
and the provincial level.
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PART II
MILITARY-CIVIL RELATIONS AND POPULAR CULTURE
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CHAPTER 4:
IMPERIAL AWARENESS AND MILITARY REFORM: 1856-1900

Public discussions about military institutions, which were critical components of
interventionist ambitions, offer yet another window into conceptions of Britain as an
imperial power. Scholars have frequently emphasized the detachment of the British
public from its armed forces. Noting the paradoxical nature of that detachment, Gwyn
Harries-Jenkins has contended that, while the public collectively celebrated the military’s
victories and mourned its defeats, that interest did not translate into concern for the
military’s well-being. This apparent detachment was also noted by Cecil Norton in the
Commons on 5 February 1904 when he stated:
Over and over again when attempting to improve Army conditions they had had
to speak to a practically empty House, empty press gallery, and unsympathetic
public, and his sympathies had been altogether with the gentleman who had had
the misfortune to be in charge of the War Office.1
The public’s apparent disengagement from military issues also factored into Bernard
Porter’s assertion that the repercussions of the empire did not “necessarily [affect]
Britons’ ways of thinking.”2 Pointing to the Second Boer War as an example, he insisted
that imperial circumstances, beyond offering a warning of future dangers, factored little
into the calls for military reform.3 The supposed separation of the British public from the
military has also been used to advance the argument that Britain, in contrast to Germany,
was a non-militaristic society.4 But an examination of the national and provincial
newspapers, as well as of more general interest magazines, demonstrates that discussions
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about military matters and reform efforts received extensive coverage, calling into
question assertions that the public remained oblivious to those issues.
In pursing this inquiry, I have made the deliberate decision to focus specifically
on matters pertaining to the British army. This is not to minimize the place of the Royal
Navy in matters pertaining to imperial and national defense. The primacy of the navy in
imperial and domestic defense was made abundantly clear in an 1867 Blackwood’s
Edinburgh Magazine article entitled “Our Naval Defences: Where Are We Now?”.5
However, as suggested by a piece in the London Society just six years later, the public
was equally aware of the pressures on the army and the need to implement consequential
reforms in that branch of service:
In these days of Woolwich Infants, Bismarcks, and Affghan [sic] Boundary
Questions, we are compelled to take more than a passing interest in the efficiency
of the British Army.6
Moreover, given that it was the army that bore the brunt of the fighting in the theatres
discussed in the previous chapters, it is logical to focus on that branch of the service to
tease out links between the military and imperial affairs.
In fact, in the four decades after the Crimean War, army reforms received
widespread coverage in the national and provincial presses. The British Library has
digitized more than fifty newspapers in print during those years, and a cursory review of
that collection demonstrates that they carried almost four thousand articles containing the
narrow phrase “army reform.” Broken down by decade, the majority, some 2034 articles,
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appeared between 1871 and 1880, years during which Secretary of State for War Edward
Cardwell worked to reorganize the army. 7 In the Times, which has been digitized
separately, hundreds of articles, letters to the editor, and editorials on army conditions
and army reform likewise appeared in print between 1856 and 1899. Such articles
addressed, among other things, the readiness of the army, army organization, military
spending, and marksmanship. Not limiting their attention to reform issues, the national
and provincial press also consistently covered more mundane military matters such as
promotions, military reviews, and technological advances with military importance, and
the results of inter-regimental shooting competitions, including those held annually on the
outskirts of London in conjunction with the National Rifle Association.8 This coverage
was provided not only by syndicated columns from the London Gazette, the official
journal of the government, but by locally driven pieces as well. The latter quite naturally
paid particularly close attention to developments of significance in the papers’
distribution areas, but they also included matters that transcended a narrow geographical
focus.9
Another examination of the articles catalogued through the Periodicals Archive
Online produced similar results, as hundreds of articles concerning contemporary army
matters appeared in magazines and journals between 1856 and 1899. The overwhelming
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majority of these articles appeared in the Spectator. Not surprisingly, other publications
of note included those with an editorial focus on military issues such as the Journal of the
Royal United Services Institution, but more general interest publications, such as the
Society of Arts Magazine, Macmillan’s Magazine, and Contemporary Review, also
carried relevant material. Beyond the purview of that select index of periodicals, other
periodicals of general and popular interest—including Fraser’s Magazine for Town and
Country, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, and Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine—devoted
space to a wide range of military and defense matters.10 If, therefore, the public was
indeed disinterested in the military, it was not due to a lack of coverage in the leading
newspapers and magazines of the day. Of course, press attention to military matters and
the empire, does not necessarily signify that the public was actively invested in those
discussions. But the volume of coverage indicates that the British public either chose
deliberately to ignore the material and refrained from engaging it on an individual level,
or that the public was not as ignorant about the goings on in the military as Porter, and
others have maintained. Indeed it is quite probable that the press was devoting
substantial coverage to such matters in response to popular demand.
Given the expansive nature of civil-military relations in the late nineteenth
century, the present chapter focuses on a specific question: the extent to which imperial
concerns entered into the public discussion on the need to reform the regimental system
of the British Army. The next chapter will explore how the military, as a symbol of the
10
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British Empire more generally, became manifest in Anglo-Scottish popular culture.
Aside from merely assessing the presence of imperial issues within British society,
attention to the relative success of the Cardwell-Childers reforms serves as a window on
distinct inflections of Britishness, as English and Scottish subjects expressed
overlapping—if differing—conceptions of their roles as members of the wider empire.
In the early twentieth century, historians such as John Morley, J.W. Fortescue, E.
L. Woodward, R. C. K. Ensor, G. M. Trevelyan, and David Thomson, argued that Britons
became aware of the need to reform their military after studying Continental wars,
including the crushing defeat of France by Prussia in 1871.11 More recently, Thomas F.
Gallagher, Brian Bond, and David French have placed greater emphasis on two other
factors that drove home the need for army reform, i.e., Britain’s first-hand imperial
experiences and the emerging inadequacies and limitations of the regimental system that
became evident in the 1850s and 1860s.12 While the present author is sympathetic to that
latter view, the specific prompts leading government officials to enact reform is a
secondary concern here. Instead, I seek to use an examination of the popular magazines
and news presses from 1870-1899 to demonstrate that the British public was cognizant of
both the full range of imperial, continental, and political concerns that called into
question the effectiveness and efficiency of the country’s imperial defenses and of the
consequent need to enact corrective reforms.
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THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND ARMY REFORM, 1856-1871
Prior to Cardwell’s reorganization of the military in 1871, the Crown forces
consisted of four major bodies: the Regular Army, the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the
Volunteer Forces, all of which were filled with volunteers. To be sure, press gangs at
various times resorted to compulsory practices and contrivances to “encourage”
individuals to take the king’s shilling; those instances notwithstanding, as a matter of
tradition—and after 1852 as codified law—the British military was firmly grounded on
the principle that military service should be voluntary.13 In 1866-67 the Regular Army
stood at roughly185,000 men divided into 31 regiments of Guards and Line Cavalry, 113
regiments of Foot Guards and Line Infantry, and 2 Corps regiments of Royal Artillery
and Royal Engineers. Within their respective branches, Guards and Line regiments were
then arranged according to a hierarchical order of prestige based on longevity of service
and subdivided into battalions. For the infantry, the King’s Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade
contained four battalions. The Foot Guards Regiments and the first twenty-five Line
Regiments were comprised of two battalions, and the remaining Regiments embodied
only one. Enlistment in the Regular Army obligated a man to 10 years of service, but
enlistees had the option of serving a further eleven years and receiving a pension.
Regular Army regiments could be posted overseas at any time. In keeping with the
longstanding practice, a soldier could not be transferred to a different regiment without
his consent. Consequently, there was very little cross-over of non-commissioned and
commissioned officers between regiments, and when it came to handing out promotions,
13
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non-commissioned and commissioned officers were almost always promoted up through
the ranks of the regiment to which they were originally assigned. Taking into account
that a great many commissions were purchased and not earned meritoriously, the quality
of the officers from one regiment to the next could be uneven. Thus, in addition to the
challenge of filling out the ranks of the army with willing volunteers, the regimental
system itself was rife with weaknesses.14
The regiments of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer Forces supplemented the
Regular Army. The Militia served primarily as a home defense unit, and as such it could
not be compelled to serve overseas. Between 1752 and the mid-1800s, it experienced a
number of transformations in terms of recruitment and length of service, such that in
1866-67, the Militia had a strength of some 115,000, organized into 125 infantry
battalions and 31 artillery units, the latter of which were relegated to coastal defense.15
Recruitment was handled strictly on a county basis through the use of paid bounties,
although the government reserved the right to use compulsion in the event of a national
emergency. Serving enlistments of five years, Militia members underwent several
months of initial training, after which their regiments were required to report annually for
a few weeks of refresher training. Organizationally distinct from the Militia, but
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operating under essentially the same principles, the Yeomanry in 1866-67 provided a
reserve cavalry force of 49 corps, numbering about 14,000 men.16
Last in terms of prestige came the Volunteer Forces, which had fallen into
abeyance after the conclusion of the Peninsular War in 1814. The government
resurrected the Volunteers in 1859 amid mounting military and public fears of an
impending invasion by Napoleon III’s Second Empire.17 Providing a secondary level of
home defense, the Volunteers in 1866-67 numbered roughly 140,000 riflemen, 32,000
gunners, 4,800 engineers, and 1,200 light cavalry and mounted rifles. Like the Militia,
the Volunteers were recruited on a county or local basis, a feature that had organizational
implications: the recruits drawn from the country’s more populated urban centers formed
86 fully manned “consolidated” battalions, while Volunteer leaders placed those from the
more thinly populated rural areas into 134 “administrative” battalions. Targeting married
individuals who could not afford to leave their places of employment for even the
relatively short time required by the Militia, the Volunteer force required evening training
sessions and a couple of weeks of training each year.18 By the 1870s, the Volunteers
numbered some 200,000, which included a sizeable working-class component. This
feature, Cunningham rightfully insisted, could not be ignored and required the older
preconceptions about Victorian society and the patriotism of the working-class to be
revisited. The existence of the Volunteer Force, in such substantial numbers, did not go
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unnoticed by newspapers such as the Illustrated London News, which insisted that its
growth was a testament to the public’s awareness and dedication to national defense.19
This then was the organizational structure of the British Army at the onset of a
renewed age of imperialist ambition during the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The wellrecognized and touted strength of the system was that the long terms of service of the
Regular Army combined with the solidarity and insularity of the regiments to create a
highly experienced military with a deep-rooted sense of esprit de corps. Military
commanders regarded these elements as crucial components of any effective military
force.20
Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, however, a number of weaknesses and
inadequacies of the regimental system became apparent and raised concerns in relation to
the actions of Continental powers. The military’s poor performance in the Crimean War
and slow response to the Sepoy Rebellion, and the country’s inability to engage the issue
of German unification exacerbated existing concerns about Britain’s readiness to respond
overseas, including especially the need for an effective reserve system that could
supplement the Regular Army when it went abroad.21 The disastrous charge of the Light
Brigade at Balaclava dramatically demonstrated that the practice of purchasing
commissions rather than promotion on the basis of merit could have fateful consequences
on the battlefield.22
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While the discussion regarding national defense and the need for military reform
had begun as early as 1852 and had occurred primarily within military circles, numerous
articles and reviews in popular publications enabled interested general readers to remain
abreast of those discussions.23 In 1857 the Literary Gazette reviewed General Henry
Wyndham’s recently published pamphlet “The Army and the Militia: a Letter” that
maintained there was a need to abolish purchase and award commissions based on
merit.24 That same year in July, Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country thought it
prudent to provide its readers with a “brief historical sketch of the problems plaguing the
militia system.”25 As a “nursery for army,” the Militia had been woefully ill prepared to
lend its support to the forces fighting in the Crimea when called upon. While the
Continent’s reliance on conscription had no place in Britain, the author believed that the
Swiss model of drilling the Militia in the towns and villages, instead of in regional
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depots, would likewise engender greater military spirit among the British populace, and
“secure a sufficient force to defend our shores.”26
That Britain’s performance in the Crimean War illuminated the need to reform
was also not lost upon the conscientious press and general public. During the war, the
connection had been made in two February 1855 editorials in the Conservative Aberdeen
Journal, which boasted of the advancements already being undertaken by Lord Panmure,
and opined that “no man living had done more to reform the British army than [Lord
Panmure] the present war minister.”27 Proof of this claim included the improvements to
the transport services and commissariat services, the appointment of a chief of the staff to
oversee the efficiency of the service, the call for an official inquiry into the state of the
army in the Crimea, and of the recent discussion in parliament about shortening the terms
of service. That same month, however, “A Retired Officer” wrote to the Daily News
maintaining that, while the organization of the British Army was superior to that of the
French, the forces were undermined by the practice of purchase. It “saps the very vitals
of the service, stagnates its blood, paralyzes its limbs, degenerates and degrades its mind,
and fills it with corruption.”28 Less than a month later, “A Foreign Observer,” also
writing to the Daily News, strongly disputed the soundness of the organization of the
British Army:
I can of course only smile when it is imagined that great improvements in this
branch can be made by Palmerston, Panmure, and others. All these do not see
where the fault lies. It is in the constitution, in the infatuation of your own
perfection, in the slavery to fashion, in the want of nerve and intelligence in the

26

Ibid.,
Aberdeen Journal, 21 February 1855, 8; 23 February 1855, 8. Fox Maule-Ramsay, the second Baron
Panmure and eleventh earl of Dalhousie, served as Secretary of State for War Minister from 1846-52, and
then again from 1855-58. DNB, 13:85.
28
Daily News (London), 23 February 1855, 2.
27

233
aristocracy, and in the general disorganization of the higher authorities, in all that
relates to the army, and in the army itself.29
Moreover the writer firmly doubted that any significant military reform could be enacted
while the government was in the hands of Palmerston and Panmure. The “Observer”
blamed the Duke of Wellington for neglecting to reform the system and keeping the army
as an “aristocratic institution for younger sons of nobility,” which he then did not
properly train. The aristocracy, he argued, had proven “itself inadequate in the army,
imbecile in parliament, infatuated in ordinary life, and it will now show itself incapable to
save the country from loss of dishonor.”30
Having been aroused by events in the Crimean War, the press continued to wade
into the issue of military reform. Writing to the Daily News, on 12 March 1857, one T.
M. W. commended the government’s taking up the matter of low pay for enlisted men,
but he deplored its inattentiveness to the “niggardly” pay for officers that had remained
unchanged since the Restoration. This oversight, he maintained, compounded the
worrisome state of the officer corps, which did not know whether they would have a
pension or advancement. If remedied, however, the reforms would “increase the
popularity of the military with the working classes.”31 Marveling that the “random
manner in which the British army has hitherto been officered,” had “not become a
reproach instead of one of the glories of the country,” the editors of the Scotsman argued
that there was some value in striking a balance between those who saw reform as
offensive and those who welcomed it. To that end, they agreed with the position
advanced by Lord Stanley that the practice of purchase should remain, but that some
29
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commissions should be available for merit. In this fashion the officer corps would be
protected from being wholly overwhelmed by bookworms, and those who lacked the
vigor for military service.32 Musing on the decision by the Duke of Cambridge, the
commander in chief, to turn the senior department at Woolwich into a staff college in the
winter of 1858, and anticipating future advantageous reforms, the editors of the Bristol
Mercury specifically noted that the grumbling and debate over army reform likely would
have continued for decades had the Crimean War not occurred. That war had made it
clear that going forward the military was to be much more than merely a force to silence
the annual threats to domestic tranquility, but would be “the right arm of national
security.”33
In the decade following the Crimean War, these collective concerns led to a
number of uncoordinated and ultimately ineffective attempts at reforming the army. In
1857, a parliamentary investigation recommended abolishing purchase and instituting
meritorious promotions, but Parliament took no deliberate action at the time.34 Incentive
for military reform was reignited after Prussia’s shockingly efficient victory over Austria
in 1866. Weighing in on issues surrounding military recruitment that November, the Pall
Mall Gazette saw the debate over conscription as an example of the “political impotence”
which had plagued Britain. It argued the country risked showing signs of “conscious
weakness and cowardice” by preferring to make minute policy changes rather than
tackling the broader questions.35 While not fully endorsing conscription, the Gazette
maintained that it would do much to raise the “moral tone not only of the army but of the
32
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nation at large.”36 In light of the Continental developments, numerous military officers,
such as Lt. Colonel T. St. Leger Alcock, argued that there was a need for the British
Militia and Regular Army to account for the power of this new Continental force and to
reform the nation’s national defenses accordingly.37 Fraser’s Magazine likewise
revisited the problems plaguing the British military in a five-part series that ran between
December 1866 and August 1867.38 In so doing, the anonymous author honed in on the
short supply of recruits, which in his opinion was due to “the scandalous system of
recruiting and the falling behind of the soldiers’ condition in comparison with that of his
fellows of the same rank of life outside the army.” Recruitment would continue to be a
problem, he insisted “till we make the soldier’s position so valuable that without cheating
or cajoling, men of the right stamp will voluntarily apply to be enlisted faster than
vacancies occur.” The solution was to raise the soldier’s status, improve their physical
condition, and give them “more mental and moral freedom, and greater opportunities for
distinction.”39
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In that environment Parliament passed the Army Reserve Act of 1867, which
established a two-tiered reserve system that was meant to establish a total force of
80,000.40 The initiative, however, utterly failed to produce the forecasted number of
enlistments, largely because the meager enlistment bounties simply could not compete
with civilian wage rates and were thus insufficient to offset the unpopularity of foreign
deployment.41 This failure did not go unnoticed by the public. Bemoaning the fractious
and unprofessional nature of the British Army in comparison to the cohesion of the Royal
Navy, “Centurion” reasoned in a letter to the Scotsman in November 1869 that because
the various branches of the service were not trained together, they lacked uniformity.
There were also “too many club-room generals who are a dead loss,” and the “truehearted duty officer” did not receive the encouragement or pay due to him. At the same
time, the author insisted that despite being awash in a mass of confusion, as it had been
during the Crimean War, the country lacked “a military chaos, out of which a Carnot or
Stein would speedily evolve an efficient system of national defence.”42
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IMPERIAL WARS AND MILITARY REFORM

Thus, despite their efforts, by the end of the 1860s advocates of reform, who—for
more than a decade—had raised alarms about its performance in the Crimean War and
who feared the potential threats of imperial France and, increasingly, the emerging
Prussian-dominated German state, remained concerned about the condition of the British
Army. Numerous factors continued to inhibit the army from tapping into support from
middle-class Britons. Among the most salient were the lengthy terms of service required
and the real prospect of overseas deployments, but a further issue discussed widely was a
weakening connection between the civilian population and the military. The result was
that, as C. E. Trevelyan colorfully claimed in 1871, the Regular Army was drawn from
“the froth and the dregs” of British society. The “froth” consisted of the aristocratic
officer corps, while the “dregs” from the lowest rungs of society filled out the rank and
file.43 The deplorable performance of volunteer forces at the onset of the American Civil
War compared to that of the Prussian conscripts in the initial phases of the German Wars
of Unification caused still more questioning of the volunteer-based British regimental
system. Administratively, the nation’s finances also were severely strained by the costs
associated with sustaining a pension program for retired noncommissioned and
commissioned officers who had served for 21 years. Next to the national debt, the Army
and Ordnance expenditures were the largest part of the budget between 1864 and 1869,
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exceeding Royal Navy expenditures by £4 million. The bulk of these expenditures went
to service the pension program.44
Assuming control of the War Office in 1868, Edward Cardwell threw himself into
addressing these concerns by pushing through a series of acts and Royal Warrants toward
that end.45 The Army Enlistment Act of 1870 reduced terms of service from twenty years
to twelve, six years in the Regular Army and six years in a newly organized reserve.46 In
addition to creating a much needed veteran reserve, Cardwell also believed that the
measure would prove an incentive to a “new class of recruit…entirely different from that
which was now entering the army largely with a view to an eventual pension.”47
Consequently, the act sought to decrease the financial strain on the annual budget
incurred by the pension payments. Further, with the passage of the Regulation of the
Forces Act of 1871, Cardwell sought to improve the image of the army by allowing
soldiers of bad character to be discharged.48 That same year, after much controversy,
Cardwell eliminated the coveted privilege of purchase with a Royal Warrant.49
The culmination of Cardwell’s efforts, however, was inspired by organizational
elements from the Prussian Army. The broad reorganization further facilitated short

44

French, Military Identities, 12-13.
Cardwell was aided in this task by a team of progressive officers, whose names would become
inseparable from Victoria’s Little Wars of the nineteenth century. These officers included Colonel (later
Field Marshal Viscount) Garnet Wolseley, Captain (later Earl Cromer) Evelyn Baring, Captain (later Sir
Edward Bulwer, Captain (later General Sir) Henry Brackenbury, Captain (later Major General Sir) George
Colley, Captain (later Major General Sir) John Frederick Maurice. Some of these had served together with
Wolseley as a part of the Red River Expedition in 1870. Reunited by Wolseley in 1873, the group saw
action in West Africa against the Ashanti. Remaining associated thereafter, these officers comprised the
core of the so called “Ashanti” or “Wolseley Ring” of officers. Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and
Present (London: Methuen, 1914), 220-21; Field Marshall Viscount Garnet Wolseley, The Story of a
Soldier’s Life, vol. 2 (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1903), 255-56.
46
Army Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 67.
47
Wheeler, The War Office, 215-16.
48
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 86.
49
Arvel B. Erickson, “Abolition of Purchase in the British Army,” Military Affairs 23 (Summer, 1959), 6576.
45

239
service recruitments and brought the Regular Army, Reserve, Militia and Volunteer
Forces under the Crown.50 The result was the Military Forces Localization Act of 1872,
which was augmented by General Order 32 of the War Office the following year.51
According to the scheme, there were to be 66 recruiting districts, largely drawn along
county lines. Within each district, a pair of Regular Army battalions was to be linked
together with two Militia battalions and the Volunteer Forces therein as an administrative
brigade and serviced by a “Brigade depot.”52 The Brigade depot was to then serve as the
recruiting center for the district and also function as a barracks for the Regular Army
battalions and the Militia when the latter reported for training. One intention for linking
battalions was to encourage inter-battalion camaraderie; as such, the plan also allowed
officers and men of linked battalions to be interchanged with no cost to the individual.
At the same time, however, battalions were to retain their individual number and
identity.53
The Cardwell Reforms proved to be only the first in a series of ongoing reform
efforts. The imperial experiences of the 1870s in western and southern Africa, as well as
in Afghanistan, highlighted the continuing problem of lack of preparedness in Army
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battalions, which were losing their battle-hardened veterans due to the expiration of their
terms of service and becoming increasingly comprised of young and unseasoned shortservice recruits.54 Coordinating the ties between Regular Army and Militia regiments
also proved problematic, as evidenced in 1879 when, during the Zulu War, the vacancies
that were created in British barracks by the departure of Regular troops were not filled by
Militia regiments as Cardwell had envisioned.
The practical problems associated with incompletely fusing the paired battalions
together lingered until Secretary of State for War Hugh Childers completed the
integration process in 1881.55 As a disciple of Cardwell, Childers, however, first had to
reject the conclusions of a parliamentary commission that had recommended undoing the
scheme entirely. 56 Instead, he proposed reforms which he thought would improve
recruitment, professionalism and coordination. He called for the age of enlistment to be
raised from 18 to 19, with the expectation that it would subsequently be raised to 20.
Although he kept the terms of service at twelve years, he addressed the question of
professionalism by increasing the time spent in the Regulars from six to seven years, and
reducing the Reserve commitment to five years. All men liable for service in India would
be required to serve eight years, after which they would serve four years in the Reserves.
Childers formalized the connections between the Regular Army, Militia, and Volunteer
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regiments by transforming those bodies into regiments comprised of four battalions, with
two “line” battalions and two “militia” battalions. The numerical system of organizing
regiments was to be abolished and thereafter the regiments were referred to either by the
county affiliation or other regimental moniker of the senior battalion. The primary
exemption was that four line battalions of the King’s Rifle Corps would remain intact.57
For example, under the Cardwell reforms the 29th (Worchester) Regiment of Foot had
been linked to the 38th (Herefordshire) Regiment of Foot. Under the Childers reforms,
which were finalized on 1 July 1881 with the issuance of General Order 70, the regiments
were reconstituted as the 1 and 2 Battalions of the North Staffordshire Regiment. At the
same time, regimental ornamentations were redesigned to reflect the union of the two
regiments and their respective traditions. In this regard, special considerations were
extended to some of the Scottish regiments; namely, the number of kilted regiments was
increased from five to nine.58
Still later, Wolseley, as adjutant-general of the forces (1885-1890), was especially
outspoken on the need to modernize equipment and arms, and in 1890, the Hartington
Commission recommended that the position of commander-in-chief of the forces be
replaced with a general staff which would be tasked with planning military operations
and preparing the army for war.59 These efforts were effectively blocked by the the Duke
of Cambridge, whose outlook toward the military had a staunchly pre-industrial bias.60
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With Britain’s experiences in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) still fresh, two
secretaries of state for war, St. John Brodrick and H.O. Arnold-Forster, tried
unsuccessfully to overhaul the command and organizational structure. Ultimately, Lord
Haldane succeeded in carrying forward a reform program in 1909, just five years before
the Great War broke out, placing military matters at the forefront of governmental
attention.61
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN MILITARY REFORM, 1871-1881

Although the fear of a French invasion all but disappeared with the demise of the
Second French Empire, continental and imperial developments kept the question of army
reorganization and imperial defense in the public eye. Indeed, as the Aberdeen Journal
noted in 1881, the public had been engaged in the issue of army reorganization for over
fifty years.62 Ten years earlier, reacting to Cardwell’s plans in the politically charged
environment of the Franco-Prussian War, the Bradford Observer, asserted that:
The existing army organization is hedged in and fortified by innumerable
privileges, and abuses strong with the strength of antiquity. But the events of the
war have so aroused public opinion that the government had no alternative save
Hartington Commission, because he desired the position and responsibilities of C-in-C of the Forces for
himself, and thus did not move to enact them when he took over as C-in-C of the Forces in 1890.
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to grapple with this difficult question. And not even the most ardent enemy of
bloated armaments will regret this, when he has mastered the leading features of
the bold and comprehensive scheme of military reorganization which Mr.
Cardwell unfolded to the House of Commons last night.63
The paper optimistically reported that forthcoming reforms would be more expansive
than had been previously anticipated.64 For the Birmingham Daily Post the key issue of
the reform effort was not whether or how the Militia should be expanded. In its opinion,
those issues were being duly addressed. Instead, a lingering and much overlooked
concern was that the Militia needed to be effectively armed, supported, and officered:
If the 120,000 men were called out to take the field, not a single battery would be
ready to accompany them; nor could they reckon upon supply services of any
kind, except in so far as assistance could be spared from the establishments
provided for the Regular Forces…Consequently, to render our Militia effective,
we should require at the least forty more batteries of field artillery, with other
supports in proportion.
The truth is that in the Militia we have literally not taken a single step
beyond enrolling the men in regiments and putting rifles in their hands. We say
nothing about the difficulty respecting officers, because we hope that may be
found to disappear in proportion as the Militia becomes a real army.65
Four years later, however, the lack of progress remained troubling. The London
correspondent for the Bradford Observer expressed its regret that the patronizing
comments made by the Duke of Cambridge at a public dinner on behalf of army reform
would lead to nothing upon his return to the Horse Guards:
That this is so is the unanimous verdict of every one, civilian or military man,
who has attempted to obtain the duke’s help to lift the army question out of the rut
into which it has fallen. The truth is that His Royal Highness, the commander in
chief of the forces, loves red tape, pipe-clay and routine as only a German, who
has never been scared by Moltke or Blumenthal can love them. He hates any
change which will in the least disturb the peaceful system of seniority by which to
govern and promote requires but the diligence of an ordinary clerk.66
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That the army was in desperate need of reform and could ill afford to permit any
disorganization was also not lost upon the Bristol Mercury:
The state of Europe is at present full of dangers to the maintenance of peace, and
it is impossible to deny that events may arise which may force us to consider the
condition of our armaments. Next year, moreover, the first batch of soldiers
enlisted for short service will be entitled to the discharge…and nearly 30,000
fresh recruits—or about double the number previously needed—will henceforth
be required annually to maintain the forces at their present strength. If the War
office has hitherto found it almost impossible to get more than 17,000 men yearly,
it is obvious that the task of obtaining 30,000 is likely to prove insuperable.67
While the Mercury observed that the War Office had not neglected the needs of Her
Majesty’s forces, it insisted that more needed to be done to address “the economical [sic]
and social advance of the forces that has taken place of late years in the condition of the
working classes generally.”68 Speaking at a public gathering about the present standing
of the army in Manchester on 10 January 1876, John Holms, a Liberal MP for Hackney
and a leading advocate for reform, expounded on the “muddle and mess” concerning the
realization of the process:
As regards mere numbers, this scheme will involve an increase of one-fifth of our
regular army and it will more than double our militia. Now, what prospect have
we of obtaining this large additional number of men?...But let us grant that the
men can be got. I will show that this scheme of mobilization is no more than a
delusion and a sham. Three-fourths of these army corps are to be composed of
militia, which are thrown about in the most grotesque manner, as if to make
annual trainings in the army impossible, and to ensure the wildest confusion in
case of invasion…Are we to understand that the War Department seriously intend
that all these regiments of militia from the extreme corners of Scotland and
Ireland are to travel to Dorking and back, 1000 miles each every year, for their
annual training? If so, what a scandalous waste of time and money this must
involve…Could you image a schoolboy concocting a scheme of mobilization
more silly or more absurd?69
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Three years later, in February 1879, when the Duke of Cambridge reviewed the
six regiments being deployed to fight in the Zulu War the occasion offered a poignant
illustration of the army’s continued ill-preparedness.

According to the Times, men who

had been moved from one regiment to another in order to fill out that regiment’s ranks
remained in their old uniforms. The effect was that many of the 91st Highlanders had not
yet been issued their customary trews. Aware that the lack of uniformity did more than
just create a less-than-smart appearance, the Times vocalized what many throughout the
country likely thought about Britain’s military readiness. It granted that a redistribution
of troops to handle the Ashanti War in 1874 was perhaps to be expected and tolerable,
coming as it did on the heels of the so-called “Short-Service Act” of 1870. Now, almost
nine years after that legislation, it asserted that “we have a right to expect that a certain
proportion of our troops should be maintained effective for active service, so when a
sudden call is made we shall not be compelled to adopt the shifty expedient of begging
draughts from every regiment in the United Kingdom in order to dispatch a half-dozen
infantry regiments out of the country.”70
MILITARY REFORM AND PUBLIC REACTION TO MAJUBA HILL
AND THE ANGLO-BOER WAR (1880-1881)

We have already seen in chapter one that the Anglo-Boer War of 1880-81
affected the public’s outlook toward Britain’s colonial presence in the African subcontinent. In addition to raising questions about Britain’s imperial policies, the war also
amplified awareness of several lingering weaknesses in the army. The first of these was
rash overconfidence. Following the defeats at Laing’s Nek and Ingogo respectively, the
Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post editorialized that Colley had made a mistake similar to the
70
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one the army had made against the Zulus. He was guilty of fatally “despising a foe who
can keep him chained to one spot, and kill or disable half of his troops whenever he
commences action.”71 The Western Mail arrived at a similar conclusion after surveying
Colley’s recent campaigns in the wake of Majuba Hill. In an editorial entitled, “What
Our Military Disasters Teach,” the writer mused that overconfidence alone did not
account for recent failings. Britain’s forces had been outnumbered and suffered from
poor generalship, but the army was no stranger to such circumstances and had usually
prevailed despite them. The deeper truth, the Mail insisted, was based on years of
fighting against outgunned foes, and it made the argument in racialized terms: Colley’s
poor tactical decisions had been induced by “long years of easy victories over savages
and Orientals.” These had consequently led to a general “deprecation of the enemy” and
an overconfidence in the army’s ability to “undertake operations with insufficient
numbers.”72 That being said, given the fact that the army was engaged with the “best
marksmen in the world,” the Mail expressed confidence in the British soldier, insisting:
The conduct of our troops appears to have been all that could be desired, and
provided they are only properly handled, we have little to fear for the future. But
we cannot afford any more mistakes.73
Other newspapers were not so optimistic about the overall performance and
management of the army. Even before Majuba Hill, where the accuracy of Boer
marksmanship was put on full display, the author of the “What the World Says” column
for the Hull Packet noted the sharp distinction between the British and Boer abilities and
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wondered why the army did not draw together its best sharpshooters to meet the Boers.74
Continuing in his observations, he fully recognized that “an old military power was being
taught a lesson by a despised and presumably inferior foe.” Quoting from the testimonies
of soldiers in the field in South Africa, he wondered that the British soldier had not
deserted because of their inferior equipment:
The muzzle-loaders are simply a disgrace to the government; it is sheer murder to
send men into the field with such… a newspaper would keep out more wet than
the [tents, waterproofs, and uniforms]…the top-boots are already done for; and
the men receive no pay since they were called out.75
In the aftermath of Majuba Hill, such criticisms spread throughout the national
and provincial press. In an editorial entitled “Lessons the Boers Taught Us,” Reynolds’s
Weekly Newspaper asserted that the blame did not reside with the individual soldier.
Rather, it condemned the Duke of Cambridge and “those terrible barrack-square warriors
with whom he is surrounded” for being “utterly destitute of the elementary requirements
of warfare and even of the commonest of common sense.”76 Contrasting inept British
training practices to those of the Boers and Germans, Reynolds’s insisted that it was
imperative that all British soldiers be effectively taught how to shoot, but held out little
hope that any soldier’s skill would improve so long as “royal dukes and brainless
aristocrats [were] permitted to chalk out his course for him.”77
The deplorable performance of the British solider in the field quite naturally drew
the attention of military personnel. “A. N. S. M.,” a self-described “old volunteer,”
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concluded that if soldiers spent as much time in learning how to shoot as they did on
goose-stepping and “other absurdities,” the performance of the army would be very
different.
How is it possible for mere lads,—callants—who have hardly ever used a rifle to
meet in skirmishing such death-shots as the Boers, who have been trained to
firearms from their very childhood? They cannot do it—no, nor never will!78
A. N. S. M.’s letter to the Glasgow Herald elicited a response from another “Volunteer”
who likewise asserted that the British army should not become engaged on the Boers’
terms.
The only thing is to take advantage of our superior resources, and provide each
man in the skirmish line with, say, a hand grenade…I see no use of opening up
the ‘goose-step and other absurdities’ at present.79
Responding to a similar column in the Times, which insisted that Britain could make no
graver mistake than to suppose that its troops required less training in shooting than those
of continental powers, a military respondent expressed his hope that “our authorities have
been awakened to the defects in this, now the most important position of the soldier’s
drill.”80
As we have seen, the reform of British marksmanship was not readily
forthcoming. The public had to wait for “Our Only General” (Wolseley) to be named
adjutant-general in April 1882 for specific training reforms. His appointment to that
position came as no surprise to anyone. Indeed, anticipating this action, the Pall Mall
Gazette editorialized in November 1881 that his appointment would be a necessary
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consequence of “the current state of the army.”81 At a celebratory dinner for naval and
military officers of the Egyptian campaign, Wolseley admitted that his attention to
military reforms had been delayed by his presence in Egypt. He noted that there was
much one could learn from that recent campaign, as it was the first in a quarter of a
century that Britain had fought against an “army who was armed and disciplined
according to modern ideas.” While he could assure the public that the military had
performed admirably and that the reforms already enacted had “made it the finest in the
world,” preliminary steps were already under way to increase the efficiency of the
services.82 The news that Wolseley had issued a syllabus for musketry training, which
would be required of all ranks and officers, and which would include oral as well as
practical examinations, was reported by provincial papers such as the Aberdeen
Journal.83
The list of grievances pertaining to the performance of the army, however, was
not limited to poor marksmanship. Reporting on the Army and Navy Gazette’s recent
assessment of the performance at Majuba Hill, the Bristol Mercury seemingly concurred
with the conclusion of its contemporary that British troops had ceased to be hardened
soldiers and instead were performing as “boy-regiments.” Accusing the authorities of
“deliberately slaying esprit d’ corps, so that there is no moral influence to unite in a solid
whole the stray and individually inferior atoms [of] which it is composed,” the author
saw this as proof of the “evil results of Cardwellianism.”84 The defenders at Majuba
were not entirely undeserving of criticism. But the criticism was especially biting,
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considering that among those at Majuba Hill were three companies of Gordon
Highlanders, a unit that was regarded as being among the country’s best troops having
been hardened by the wars in Afghanistan, the criticism was especially biting.85
PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE CHILDERS REFORMS
Nevertheless, the announcement of Childers’s reform program in March 1881
elicited a hostile response from the military community, which made its objections
widely known. The Army and Navy Gazette charged that they would lead to the
“demolishing of the British Army.”86 Localization had failed in the past, and the Gazette
was confident that it would prove to be an equal failure in the future. Moreover, in the
paper’s opinion, the character of the scheme was “a pale copy of the organization of the
German army.”87 Writing to the Morning Post, in what was probably an attempt to curry
public sympathy for himself and to rally opposition against Childers, “A Major-General”
sorrowfully claimed that his ability to achieve further promotion was being blocked and
that his sizeable annum of over £1100 was to be reduced to £700.88
Yet such lamentations apparently made little impact on politicians. As the Liberal
Pall Mall Gazette noted:
Ministers and committees of all parties have agreed to the principle of short
service with the colours and the formation of a reserve; and the slight change by
Mr. Childers, for the sake of economy in relieving India, affirms the principle.89

85

In his analysis of the battle, Oliver Ransford insisted that once Colley’s poor decisions had committed the
British to a position with inherent weaknesses, the British defenders had fared no worse than any other unit
in the army. Ransford, The Battle of Majuba Hill, 118-119.
86
Army and Navy Gazette, June 1881, quoted in Pall Mall Gazette, 25 June 1881, 3.
87
Army and Navy Gazette, January 1881, quoted in Pall Mall Gazette, 28 January 1881, 3.
88
Morning Post (London), 17 March 1881, 6. Such accounts found little sympathy in the press. Well
aware that such consequences were due to occur, the Daily Telegraph nevertheless held that “something of
the kind is imperatively demanded under the altered conditions of service since 1870.” Daily Telegraph
(London), 4 March 1881, 9.
89
Pall Mall Gazette, 4 March 1881, 10.

251
The Conservative Aberdeen Weekly Journal concurred and wrote that “among rational
and well-disposed members of the legislature there will be little demur to their
acceptance,” and that “there should be slight difficulty in overcoming all opposition to
the proposals.” 90 Recognizing the scheme’s popularity in Parliament, the Army and Navy
Gazette admitted that for those who opposed the measure, their only hope lay in the
continued uncertainty of the Gladstone administration and that upon being replaced by a
Conservative, the next administration would then restore the “impaired efficiency and
tarnished reputation of the British Army.”91
The press, both Liberal and Conservative, also generally approved of the scheme
in principle if not in its details. The Pall Mall Gazette agreed with Childers that “the old
system of long service in the army was dying out for want of recruits, while more than
enough than are required can be got by short recruitment,” and decried the Airey
commission’s conclusions as being completely warrantless because Cardwell’s scheme
had never been given an adequate chance to succeed.92 The Bristol Mercury
congratulated Childers for having “the mind of a true reformer” and for “steering a
middle course between long-service and short-service:
Upon the whole, Mr. Childers’s proposals must, we think, commend themselves
to the common-sense of the nation. The civilian mind is, of course, not able to
comprehend the length and breadth of the right hon. gentlemen’s scheme; but
there is a wise moderation about it which everyone can understand. The army is
not an institution upon which to try rash experiments; and Mr. Childers has
entered upon his task with no revolutionary spirit…The proposed changes could
not have come a moment too soon, and could not have been prudently delayed.93
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The Aberdeen Journal insisted that the reforms were “important and well-judged
changes,” which would immediately “enhance the comfort and efficiency of the men who
fight our battles, and afford an additional guarantee for the loyalty and affection of our
time-expired soldiers—a most valuable element in every civic community.”94
The Daily Telegraph analyzed the proposal and dismissed the accusations of long-service
advocates that short-service had proven its inadequacies on the battlefields of
Isandhlwana, Maiwand, and Laing’s Nek. Instead, the paper emphasized that Wolseley
had the utmost confidence in the men who had served under him, and “found young
troops equal to the work he has required of them, and that he is ready to go anywhere and
do anything with them.”95
Despite seeing the reforms as “a move in the right direction,” some papers, from
both ends of the political spectrum, remained skeptical that they would achieve their
stated goals. Taking a decidedly Liberal view, the Birmingham Daily Post questioned
Childers’s insistence that reform was necessary, since the apparent problems of previous
years stemmed from imperial conflicts that should have been avoided in the first place.
“The strong case against the Conservative ministry,” the paper argued,
was that the wars and expeditions in which they had involved the country were
without exception avoidable and unnecessary. That the contests in which we are
now engaged are unavoidable is true in a limited sense only, so far as they are
compulsory and unwelcome inheritance of previous bad policy; but Mr. Childers
or any other minister would seek in vain for popular sympathy or encouragement
in any justification of the origin of the wars of late years, or any plea of their
necessity.96
The Times, meanwhile, approved of Childers’s proposals but insisted that the real matter
at hand was in their implementation:
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In design the changes may be pronounced worthy of approval; but to a certain
extent, it is upon the loyal and thorough spirit in which they are to be carried out
by the military authorities that the satisfactory realization of last night’s
programme must depend.97
The Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper, which approved especially of the decision to
abolish flogging, was concerned that the measures did not go far enough to provide
sufficient financial incentives to encourage enlistment.98 Drawing upon a report
published by the independent-minded Statist, an article in the Conservative Belfast NewsLetter similarly argued that they were “entirely inadequate, and barely [touched] the
surface of the defects of the existing system.”99 In its opinion, Childers made no attempt
to “add materially to [the army’s] strength,” and thus it remained “absurdly small for the
duties it is called to perform.”100 For proof of this, the News-Letter insisted the public
needed to look no further than Childers’s decision to increase the eligible age of service
to nineteen, and the lack of sufficient inducements to ensure that the requisite number of
recruits enlisted. At the same time, the News-Letter believed that the Regular Army
needed to be expanded by a corps, and that further reforms should be implemented in
order to improve the battle efficiency of the army, such as marksmanship. Moreover, in
response to Childers’s “decision that the country would bear the expense of such
expansion,” the paper declared that it “did not believe one word of it.”101
Notwithstanding the possibility that Conservatives may have been inclined to oppose
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Childers’s scheme for political reasons and to win political points, that both Conservative
and Liberal papers voiced similar reservations about Childers’s scheme and argued that
the reforms did not go far enough, suggests that partisan politics may not have been the
primary motivation for the press’s skepticism and criticism.
The reorganization of the army created some tensions within the military, as
junior battalions became fully amalgamated with senior ones. One private of the 73rd
(Highland Light Infantry) Regiment lamented that as a Londoner he did not wish to have
his regiment joined with the 42nd (Black Watch) Highlanders, simply because he objected
to being forced to wear a kilt, and a sergeant in the 69th Regiment declared that “we hate
the 41st already because we are joined to them.”102
The loss of military tradition was a particular concern in Scotland, where the issue
was not only important within the military community, but also among the general
public. Prior to the presentation of Childers’s scheme, rumors abounded that the
Highland regiments—in addition to losing their regimental number and moniker—would
be forced to exchange their traditional tartans for a newly designed and issued
“government” tartan. Taking the lead in opposing this measure, the Gaelic Society wrote
to the queen on 9 February 1881. Claiming to speak on behalf of the army and of the
country, the Society petitioned:
We the undersigned believing that we represent the national feeling of Scotland
humbly petition that the tartan dress hitherto worn by the various Highland
regiments as distinctive of the districts in which they were raised and in which
dress they have fought with honour and glory in every part of the globe be not
changed believing that such distinctive tartans add to the esprit de corps and that
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such changes as are contemplated are contrary to the instincts of every true
Highlander.103
Two weeks later Mr. Frasier-Macintosh, one of the Society’s leading members, inquired
of Childers whether a change of regimental tartans was being considered. Childers’s
response was that while any such change would only occur after full consideration,
pragmatism and cost-effectiveness necessitated changes.104 When pressed further as to
whether such changes would be brought before the House for debate, Childers replied
that he hoped the explanations for the combining of two regiments would be sufficient
and “would not render a lengthened debate on Tartans necessary.”105 Believing such a
response to be completely unsatisfactory, the Society continued its efforts to impede the
changes. They were joined in this endeavor by civilian Highlanders who compiled a
petition containing over 16,000 signatures in just five days, which included “his Royal
Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, 66 other Scottish noblemen, a large number of
members of parliament, the provosts and chief magistrates of 124 cities and towns in
Scotland and upwards of 50 associations and societies of Highlanders in Scotland and
England.”106
Such a development also did not escape the scrutiny of the Scottish press. On 15
February 1881, the Glasgow Herald maintained that “the strength of an army lies in such
traditions as much as in its rifles and bayonets”:
Take away the bagpipes and the tartan and you unnerve the right arm of the
Highland regiment. These things are to the Scotch soldier—be his native place
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north or south of Tay—the emblems of all the gallant past, whose honour is in his
keeping.107
On 22 February the Conservative Aberdeen Journal charged that the elimination of the
traditional military tartans in favor of a single government tartan would be a direct assault
on military morale.108 Condemning the war minister for regarding the kilt “simply as a
dress of cloth having curiously coloured squares,” and for not having any appreciation for
the sentiments of the Highland soldier, the Journal went a step further by using the issue
to illuminate the “despotism” of the Liberal Party:
It is strange indeed to notice how despotic Liberalism invariably is when strong,
compared to the reviled Conservatism, which is tenacious of old customs and old
sentiments and of the rights even of the humblest. The tyranny of the party comes
out in unexpected ways, just as it has done in the tartan question at present…In
short a Liberal with a majority at his back thinks he can do anything. What is
tartan that the Treasury should be bothered with varieties of it? or that clerks and
storekeepers should have the “sweet simplicity” of wholesale entries in their
books interfered with? It was acting on theories of this sort which led the nation
to be disgusted with the previous Liberal administration, and it is not to be
wondered at that already in Scotland the attempt to “simplify” our army uniforms
by abolishing all tartans but one has arrayed men of all parties against the
proposal.109
The Glasgow Herald also expressed concerns about the apparent lack of attention
to the regimental histories. In particular, it worried that the Childers reforms would unite
the 26th Cameronians and 79th Cameron Highlanders for the sole reason that they both
had Clan Cameron roots. Although it admitted that to the uninformed observer such a
union would be only natural, the Herald insisted that “a more ludicrous travesty could not
be found.” It asserted that every Scottish school boy knew that the Cameron Highlanders
traced their lineage back to Jacobite Camerons, who had sustained 800 casualties at
Killicrankie in following their chief Lochiel, the “Bonnie” Dundee, and the Stuart cause.
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The lowlander Cameronians, on the other hand, had proven their loyalty to King William
III at Dunkeld in 1689, a battle, which, as the paper reminded its readers, was equally as
devastating to Highlanders as was the Battle of Culloden in 1746. Despondent that the
War Office was apparently not taking such issues into consideration, the Herald was
nevertheless optimistic that the queen would not adopt any measure that would “do
violence to the feelings of her Scottish soldiers.”110
Much to the satisfaction of the Gaelic Society and the Scottish public, when the
formal plan was presented in early March as a part of the Army Estimates, their earlier
apprehensions proved to be wholly unfounded. The amalgamated Highland regiments
were formed from units which had agreed to become joined and to share a tartan that
drew upon a shared heritage. In the case of the Argyll and Sutherlanders, which had been
formed from the 91st (Argyllshire) and 93rd (Sutherlandshire) regiments, the tartan chosen
was closely associated with the region from which those battalions recruited and more
accurately reflected the regiment’s Campbell heritage than had the former tartan worn by
the 91st.111
At the same time, Scotland’s military heritage was further enlivened in another
way. In 1809, believing that the kilt was distasteful among Lowlanders and detrimental
to recruiting, six out of the eleven “Highlander” regiments were de-kilted and ordered to
adopt the breaches worn by the rest of the British army.112 This essentially stripped them
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of their Highland identity.113 Since then, these regiments sought to regain their Highland
identity, but only did so in a piecemeal and partially successful fashion.114 It was only in
1881 with the Childers’s Reforms that these regiments more fully regained their lost
identity, as the number of kilted battalions was expanded from five to nine. In turn, the
financial cost associated with this change of uniform was mitigated by replacing the
costly Highlander headdress, which “had no national origin,” with the “true national
head-dress—the bonnet.”115
The Scottish public was likewise pleased that the rumors that a Jacobite
Highlander regiment was to be joined with a Lowlander and Covenanter regiment were
also false. Recognizing that under the Cardwell Reforms, the lowlander and Covenanter
26th (Cameronian) Regiment had been linked to the Highlander 74th Regiment, the War
Office committee subsequently joined the Cameronians with the 90th (Perthshire
Volunteers) Regiment to form the 1 and 2/Scotch Rifles. Meanwhile, the Cameron
Highlanders, refusing to adorn the tartan of the 42nd Black Watch Regiment, were
returned to their original 1750 status as an unlinked single battalion regiment.116
The specific handling of the Highland regiments in regards to organization and
dress is not insignificant, as it speaks to a number of key questions regarding the
relationships between the military, government, and the public. In the first place, it
113
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illustrates the close ties that existed between the military and civilian communities. It
exemplifies that the Scottish public was concerned that the central administration would
effect changes that would diminish local symbols of those connections. It further shows
that the central administration recognized such ties, took such concerns seriously, and
worked to enhance those ties while still reforming the army.
IMPERIAL AWARENESS AND THE “NATION AT ARMS”

Alongside these sometimes heated discussions about how to realign the army,
intellectuals and politicians also raised questions intermittently about whether Britain
should implement some form of conscription and universal military training. The belief
that the public should receive some military training if not be compelled into armed
service had been advocated as early as the 1850s. Indeed by the end of the 1850s,
individual headmasters began adopting military drill exercises in public schools, and a
new organization, the National Rifle Association, formed for the “encouragement of the
Volunteers rifle corps and the promotion of rifle shooting throughout Great Britain.”117
Such developments caused William Ewart, a Liberal from Dumfries, to inquire in
February 1860 whether Palmerston’s government had the power to implement such
measures universally throughout the country’s schools. The government responded that
it had no such power, and that decisions relating to curriculum choices resided in the
“local committees.”118
Subsequently, some members of Parliament, intellectuals, and military officials
endorsed the benefits of military drill and insisted that it should be more widely
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incorporated into the country’s schools. Addressing the National Association for the
Promotion of the Social Sciences in 1870, Lyon Playfair, a former chemistry professor at
the University of Edinburgh and at that time a Liberal MP for the Universities of
Edinburgh and St. Andrews, maintained:
School drill in military and naval exercises, besides their educational value in
discipline and united action, sow the seed of the national strength in an
economical way.119
In 1875, in the wake of Cardwell’s reforms, the earls of Lauderdale and Richmond joined
the Marquess of Landsdowne in a discussion in the House of Lords about military
capabilities. They expressed specific concerns about the physical fitness and military
preparedness of young Britons and advocated drill as the “best form of gymnastics.”
Lauderdale maintained, for instance, that it would most certainly prepare the nation’s
young men for military service by instilling the “ideas of order, regularity, and discipline
without which it was difficult to obtain fully-qualified soldiers and sailors.”120 He
continued:
If boys were to undergo a simple system of military training, the country would
have a better class of men. There was nothing boys liked best than playing at
soldiers and sailors, and the effect of military drill in schools was to promote
order, regularity, and cleanliness among boys.121
More than a decade later, Wolseley addressed a Birmingham audience about the
threats facing the Empire and the condition of its defenses. And he declared his full
support for universal military training:
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We are too easy to believe that as in past centuries so we should in the future have
ample time provided for us to enable us to create an army and navy when danger
comes upon us…I earnestly pray that you will take home this one great fact—that
you have looming over you at this moment a heavy war-cloud which threatens
Europe as a nation…It is not that we wish for the professional enjoyment of
seeing large armies and navies that we ask the military forces increased. It is
because we know how terrible and dreadful are its consequences, that we ask you
to make this increase…I wish you to understand I am not advocating universal
military service on military grounds, I am advocating universal military discipline
and training on physical grounds, and therefore on essentially national grounds.122
Wolesley was, in fact, a recent convert to the idea of conscription, but in addition to the
purely military benefits of such a system, he spoke to the broader social and physical
benefits that would accrue from its adoption:
Those who would otherwise have grown up in unwholesome homes to be
weaklings, poor, miserable creatures, with narrow chests and undeveloped
muscles, leave their barracks, as I have said, healthy, well-developed men, sound
in body, and fit to stand the physical strain of modern existence under its most
trying conditions, and above all things, calculated to be useful members of society
for the rest of their lives…The young man passes his two years in acquiring habits
of attention, of order, and above all things, in acquiring that respect for law and
order, which is the outcome of obedience to superiors, and of that practical
training of the temper which obedience necessarily brings with it. (Cheers.)123
During the 1880s and 1890s, such issues continued to be raised as the British
military was engaged in various spheres throughout the empire. As we have seen, from
1882-1885 Britain was involved in Egypt and the Sudan. Thereafter, in the context of its
imperial rivalry with France in South East Asia, Britain was at war in Burma from 1885-
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1887.124 In 1893 a brief war broke out between Cecil Rhodes’s British South African
Company and the Matabele in South Africa. Britain fought a third war against the
Ashanti in West Africa from 1893-1894 to establish its dominance in the area and to
guard against German encroachment from Togo. In 1898 concerns for the beleaguered
position of the Italian colony of Eritrea at the hands of the Mahdiya spurred Britain to
once again enter the Sudan. And only weeks after the Mahdists were crushed at
Omdurman, Britain found itself nearly at war with France over the strategically important
fort at the headwaters of the Nile at Fashoda. Throughout those years there were
numerous other expeditions as well.
Still, with the prominent exception of the Second Anglo-Boer War, these events
did not directly lead to another push to overhaul the British military because the army
handled these challenges without any major mishap. True, Wolseley’s relief force
arrived too late to save Gordon at Khartoum. Its tardiness notwithstanding, the rescue
force nevertheless performed admirably. Although seriously tested and delayed, the
camel corps had pressed on to Khartoum. Moreover, despite Gladstone’s attempts to
blame Wolseley for the failure to rescue Gordon, others blamed Gladstone for a
vacillating policy and for delaying the army’s departure.
But if the public was somewhat lulled by the commonplace nature of Britain’s
“little” imperial wars in these years, as Farwell has maintained—the broader geo-political
developments focused attention frequently on matters pertaining to imperial defense.
That environment became ever more dangerous. Britain’s longstanding imperial
dominance in Africa was incrementally threatened, directly and indirectly, as the major
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powers of Europe scrambled to carve up resource-rich tracts for themselves, and the
empty spaces between imperial boundaries disappeared. In addition, whereas France and
Russia had been Britain’s chief imperial rivals throughout much of nineteenth century, in
the latter quarter of the nineteenth century an industrially and commercially powerful
imperial Germany was rapidly presenting itself as a serious threat to Britain. Under
Kaiser Wilhelm II, who sought international recognition of Germany as a world power,
the seriousness of the German threat increased all the more with the commencement of
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s plan to create a so-called “Risk Navy” in 1897.
Despite the performance of the British military in the “small” wars of the 1880s
and 1890s, therefore, alarmists saw the rise of Germany and the changing geo-political
environment as having monumental ramifications. Throughout the nineteenth century
imperial rivalries, such as that which existed between Britain and Russia, had mostly
provoked conflicts between European states and indigenous communities as the powers
jockeyed for spheres of influence. The key exception to this was, of course, the Crimean
War. But with the imperial holdings of the Great Powers coming into much closer
proximity, the likelihood that a major war would directly involve the major powers and
their colonies was believed to be increasingly likely.125
In this environment a number of paramilitary youth organizations arose as
products of disparate public interests—empire, national defense, and the humanitarian
reformation of British society, the last of which was particularly an interest of the middle
class. The first such organization was the Boys’ Brigade. Established in 1883 by
William Alexander Smith, the Boys’ Brigade was intended to rectify the declining
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attendance in church-related activities and to counter the perceived rampant hooliganism
of working-class youths. In order to attract interest and maintain order, Smith
deliberately utilized military themes, such as company organizations, military drill
instruction, military-style uniforms, parades, and marching bands, in addition to Sunday
Bible classes. Aside from being influenced by popular interests in the military, Smith’s
choice to incorporate military motifs in his organization was almost certainly due to his
own involvement in a Glasgow Volunteer Regiment, the 1st Lanarkshire Regiment.126
Other religious-based organizations soon followed: Gordon’s Boys Brigade (1885),
formed in honor of the General Charles Gordon who died defending Khartoum earlier
that same year; the Church Lads Brigade (CLB) and the London Diocese Church Lads
Brigade (1891); the Jewish Lads Brigade (1895); the Catholic Boy’s Brigade (1896); and
the Church Nursing and Ambulance Brigade (1901).127
The first wholly secular youth organization appeared in 1899 when Lord Meath
established the Lad’s Drill Association for the expressed purpose of arousing “the British
nation to the serious nature of the problem of imperial defence.”128 By 1911 the military
component and function of the Boys’ Brigade and Church Lads Brigade were recognized
by Lord Haldane in the War Office, who extended to both organizations offers to become
incorporated into Britain’s Territorial Cadet Force. While the Boys’ Brigade declined the
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offer, due in part to Smith’s influence in maintaining the organization’s character as a
predominantly religious organization, the CLB readily accepted. It subsequently became
specifically linked to the King’s Royal Rifle Corps and a strong supporter of compulsory
military service legislation.129
In the competitive international environment at the turn of the twentieth century,
imperial alarmists such as Sir Charles Dilke and Spenser Wilkinson encouraged the
formation of the Navy League in 1894. And shortly after, George Shee and the fourth
Duke of Wellington established the National Service League (NSL) in 1902.130 To be
sure, as Porter has noted, active participation in such organizations was very much a
middle class activity, given the prohibitive costs and time involved.131 Nevertheless, the
pageantry of these groups, such as the celebration of Trafalgar Day with the full
participation of the Navy League after 1894, was conducted in full sight of the public and
was duly reported by the press.132 To that end, membership and active participation in
organizations of that type were only one, albeit a very visible, sign of the public’s interest
in matters pertaining to imperial defense.
At the same time, as organizations like the NSL pressed for the introduction of
universal military service and encouraged the nation to become a “Nation at Arms,” they
raised serious questions that transcended issues of military preparedness and challenged
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Britain’s time-honored tradition of maintaining a volunteer-based army.133 They thus
called for a complete rethinking of the relationship between the public and the state,
which continued into the years of the Great War. As parliament debated whether to pass
conscription legislation in January 1916, Sir John Simon asked his colleagues if they
were “prepared to begin an immense change in our society?”134 He was joined in this
regard by Sir William Byles who likewise queried, “If we surrender our liberties, if we
Germanise our institutions, will the war be worth winning?”135
It is beyond the scope of this study to delve into the culture of Britain in the early
twentieth century, but with such vital transformational questions at stake, it seems
unlikely that Britons would be largely disengaged from such issues in the years leading
up to 1914 as Porter contends. An examination of the public discourse in regards to
conscription throughout the mid- to late-nineteenth century strongly suggests that the
public was not disengaged from the propagandizing efforts of alarmists to sway opinion
in the years preceding the First World War. As E. S. Beesly remarked before the 1892
annual meeting of the Positivist Society, the general public both recognized imperial
dangers and remained opposed to conscription:
A war with one of the Great Powers to-day would throw us into the most terrible
disasters. Our vast empire not only did not give us strength, but was the cause for
our weakness. Our army was in India; for the purpose of defending this island we
might just as well have no army at all, and keep the money in our pockets. We
had three choices before us; we must either have twice as large of an army, or we
must forgo our empire, or we must be content to run a constant risk of ruin which
might come upon us at any time in two or three weeks. The masses would not
have conscription; the classes would not have the restriction of the empire;
therefore we must have the constant risk of disaster.136
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That the imperial alarmists were not speaking to a pliant audience, but one that had a
mind of its own and thoughtfully rejected such measures, becomes apparent in surveying
the reception that conscription and compulsory military training received in the
provincial presses over the course of the mid- to late-nineteenth century.
Responding to the attempt to create a ballot system in accordance with the Militia
Act of 1852, Liberals such as Sir Frederick Peel, William Cardwell, Henry Rich, and
William Williams viewed that provision to be akin to “conscription.” As such, they
maintained that it “should not be endured by the people of the country.”137 Insisting that
he was more attuned to the sentiments of the industrious class than anyone else, Samuel
Morton Peto, a Radical, assured his fellow members that they “regarded the ballot with
great jealousy and dislike.”138 In addition to members of Parliament speaking on their
behalf, members of the general public clearly engaged in the debate. Not only were the
parliamentary debates routinely covered by the provincial presses, but the public
participated in numerous meetings devoted to the subject. These included gatherings at
Bristol on 24 February and 13 April 1852, in Manchester on 11 March, in Marylebone on
13 April, and in Liverpool on 21 April. And the press covered all of these events in
detail.139 For instance, at the Marylebone meeting, which featured Richard Cobden as a
keynote speaker, the attendees resoundingly passed a petition in favor of two resolutions
which denounced the bill as “oppressive to all classes of the community and injurious to
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morals of the people,” and which deemed it as an unnecessary and “serious evil.”140 At
Manchester, meanwhile, the public’s disapproval of the ballot measure resulted in a
petition that was submitted to Parliament containing 30,000 signatures.141
Fears that the government might implement conscription were heightened as
advocates began emphasizing that the general public should receive some elementary
military training in order to remedy the nation’s unpreparedness. Such alarms were
raised in 1875 amid rumors that Disraeli’s government intended to introduce legislation
in the forthcoming session that would render all able-bodied men between the ages of 18
and 40 into military service in order to resolve the ongoing recruiting problems. While
acknowledging that conscription would certainly correct the errors of Britain’s reliance
on volunteers, the Ipswich Journal maintained that such a system was wrought with
shortcomings of its own. It would assault the nation’s productivity and would not, in and
of itself, sustain military efficiency. Finally, it constituted “a grave menace to the
prestige of England.”142 On 1 June 1875 the Council for the Working Man’s Peace
Association issued a warning in the Glasgow Herald which reminded all working men of
the United Kingdom of what the “infamous institution” of conscription meant. It entailed
the “immorality of barrack life, the liability of foreign service in deadly climates, the
slavish subordination of the soldiers to his officer, [and] the possibility of being called on
to fight in quarrels in which you have no interest whatsoever.” Conscription was, the
Association concluded, “the deadly foe of industry, morality, peace, and liberty.”143 The
Northern Echo likewise expressed its hope that “Englishmen still detest[ed] the principle
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of compulsory military service; and that conscription is now, as of yore, a word at which
every English heart revolts.”144
Although some, such as Wolseley, insisted that universal military training was not
conscription, the general public remained unconvinced. In December 1872, Lloyd’s
Weekly Newspaper responded to the calls by Lord Elcho and the National Rifle
Association for universal military training to resolve the nation’s military unpreparedness
by warning that such measures were nothing more than a deliberate step towards
conscription.145 The link between military drill in schools and conscription was also
addressed in a Penny Illustrated Press illustration which depicted Wolseley speaking at
the Birmingham town hall while ranks of school boys carrying rifles and exercising on
gymnastic apparatuses appeared in the background. It was captioned:
Lord Wolseley ‘hopes the day is not far distant when every school in the country
will have a gymnasium attached’…Lord Wolseley Favoring Conscription in
Birmingham.146
The intended meaning of the Penny Illustrated Paper could not be clearer. While
Wolseley talked of gymnasiums, the implication and inference was that such activities
were necessarily meant to prepare the country at large for military service and,
ultimately, conscription.
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Despite the assertions by advocates of compulsory military training or service, the
public remained vocally opposed to it. The Leeds Mercury argued in an 1886 editorial
that it was premature to consider requiring military training because “the manhood of
Great Britain” had never shrunk from military service when “the conditions of a political
crisis proved that the use of the armed hand might be necessary to protect those things the
man and the patriot holds most dear.”147 Although the Ipswich Journal contended in
1888 that Britain ought not “allow our defenses to become less efficient than those of
other nations,” it insisted that “Englishmen would certainly object to see this country take
an ostentatious part in the now too favourite international game of brag.” “Any great
addition to our already costly armaments,” the paper concluded, “would certainly create
an outcry against extravagant expenditure.”148 Responding to Wolseley’s call for
universal military training in Birmingham less than a month before, and to an even more
recent statement by Lord Goschen that “the patriotism of the country…would not refuse
any necessary demand” for military expenditures to put “the defenses in a proper
condition,” many of Birmingham’s citizens convened on 18 February 1889 to protest “a
proposal for an enormous increase in military and naval expenditure and the imposition
of forced military service.”149 The chairman of the meeting, Alderman W. H. Hart,
insisted that military expenditures had only led to the great loss of life over the past fifty
years, and to treaties that could have been signed without such costs. He maintained that
the greater danger to the country was “from the social conditions of many thousands of
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the people in the large towns.”150 Less than a week later a similarly well-attended
meeting in Leeds passed a resolution expressing its
disapproval of compulsion in military service, believing it has seriously burdened
the nations of the European continent, and is opposed to the liberties and the
feelings of the British people.151
In passing a second resolution against the “raising of war scares,” the attendees deemed
that the current level of military expenditure was sufficient and condemned the proposed
increases as being unnecessary.152
Nevertheless, as two letters to the Morning Post published on the same day in
1890 suggest, the debate about conscription remained part of the public discourse. In the
first, the pseudonymous writer “Non Sibi Sed Patriae” asked why, since the country
already had compulsory education, it should not then require the men of the country to
serve universally in a National Home Defense Corps.153 In the second, Lt. Colonel
Aubrey Maude insisted that the military had to recruit men of better character who would
then stay in the colors instead of leaving the service at the first possibility.154 Seven years
later, a correspondent named Woolmer White wrote to the same paper, contending that
“most satisfactory solution” to the question of conscription “would be for every man, say
between the ages of 18 and 25, to be compelled to drill for two hours weekly, allowing
him the choice of four days, which he would not be allowed to alter without proper
notice.”155
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Consequently, the public generally saw conscription as unwarranted, though there
were those who recognized that some measure of military reform was warranted. In this
latter group was General J. H. Gascoigne, who wrote in the Morning Post in 1893 that
conscription was entirely out of the question “except in the case of a threatened
invasion.” It would be much more effective, he maintained, to expand the Militia by
means of a ballot to 500,000 men for the purpose of home defense.156 With an editorial
entitled “An Alternative to Conscription” in 1898, the Pall Mall Gazette announced its
support for Secretary of War Arnold-Forster’s proposal to increase the pay of enlisted
personnel and to allow reservists to serve, at their request, in the line battalions of the
regiment.157 Later that same year, the Aberdeen Journal acknowledged that voluntary
enlistments were not meeting expectations, but it concluded that circumstances still had
not yet reached the point at which a drastic measure like conscription was needed. This
was not a denial of the dangers threatening the empire; of those, the paper insisted it was
well aware. Rather, volunteerism had not been utilized to its fullest potential. In the first
place, more could be done to exploit the “martial spirit” of Scotland which had
contributed so much to the empire, but had recently not fully contributed its share to the
army. In addition, it argued that the attention lavished on recruiting in London had
overshadowed recruiting opportunities in the smaller towns and villages throughout
England.158
For still others, the matter of conscription was seen as an extension of the pursuit
of ill-conceived imperial policies. In September 1895, shortly after Lord Salisbury
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formed his third administration, the leading article in the Leeds Mercury responded to
Joseph Chamberlain’s indication that conscription might be considered with the warning
that:
Nothing is easier or more childish than to treat such possibilities with levity. The
military party in this country is tremendously powerful and after the recent Tory
victory at the polls it may lose its head completely.159
The leader writer went on to remark sarcastically that, “Certainly the sort of
foreign policy illustrated by the retention of Chitral will ultimately need the conscription
and will double the national debt. Imperial lying and stealing is a very costly business, as
all history proves.”160 Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper echoed these sentiments when, in
March 1898, a leading article lamented the imperial policies of the “Big Englanders” of
the 1880s and 1890s. By expanding the empire and Britain’s military responsibilities in
Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean and pursuing an “insane policy” toward Ireland, their
actions had increased international threats, frightfully elevated war expenditures, made
the poor still poorer with taxation, and drifted the country toward conscription.161
The public’s standoffishness on the issues of conscription and compulsory
military training can be extrapolated from the number of schools that adopted drill by the
turn of the century. Penn has calculated that in 1899 only about one-third of the nearly
31,200 elementary departments had introduced some form of drill into the curriculum.
Of these, only 2,659 (just over 8.5 percent) had chosen to implement military drill. The
rest resorted to various programs of physical education.162 Although individual members
of Parliament and others continued to press for compulsion until and even after the
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outbreak of war in 1914, the National Board of Education effectively closed the door on
the debate in 1914 when it determined that “ordinary” drill, consisting of calisthenics,
was the preferred method to be taught in school.163
Given the public’s long-standing attention to military reform efforts, it is almost
certain that the public remained engaged in the reforms that emerged in the wake of the
Second Anglo-Boer War, which culminated with the issuance of Haldane’s
reorganization of the army and War Office in 1909. Moreover, a cursory review of the
British government’s and the public’s reaction to the outbreak of war in 1914 is further
suggestive of public awareness. In the first place, in 1914 even the British government
was stunned by Kitchener’s prediction that the European war would last far longer than
the presumed couple of months, and that it would necessitate the introduction of
measures, radical or otherwise, to raise hundreds of thousands of men for military
service.164 Despite his shock at Kitchener’s assessment, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith
had been deeply concerned about imperial matters and the maintenance and efficiency of
the armed forces.165 Even if one could maintain that the public’s “absent-mindedness”
about the empire had caused them to ignore the alarmists, then it was certainly
remarkable that so many heeded Kitchener’s call to arms in August 1914. Calling for
volunteers, Kitchener hoped that 200,000 volunteers could be raised by the end of
August; in fact, nearly 300,000 had responded. In the week between 30 August and 5
September, nearly 175,000 signed up.166 In the month of September more the 460,000
more recruits had been raised, before sharply dropping off to the low- to mid-100,000s
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over the next nine months.167 To be sure, as Niall Ferguson has pointed out, the rush to
the colors was not fully representative of the nation as a whole, as some classes and
regions of the country joined more readily than others.168 Nevertheless, taking the sheer
number of recruits as a whole, the response definitely warrants a much closer look at the
public discussions concerning the empire and imperial defense in the years and months
preceding the First World War.
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Figure 4-1: Penny Illustrated Paper, 2 February 1889, 73.
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CHAPTER 5
NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL CONNECTIONS WITH
THE BRITISH MILITARY AND EMPIRE

Up until now, most of the present work has been concerned with the press and
parliamentary discourse concerning imperial and military politics. In assessing that
discourse, the continuity of political opinions from one side of the Anglo-Scottish border
to the other suggests that the variances in perspectives regarding the politics of imperial
intervention and war had more to do with the political and ideological alignment of the
press and general public than with specific geographical or cultural considerations. As
the Glasgow Weekly Mail insisted after the declaration of war against the Boers in the
October 1899:
We have now to stand shoulder to shoulder, one solid nation, vindicating the
imperial title to supremacy in South Africa.1
Such rhetoric surrounding the imperial engagements in the Cape to Cairo corridor from
the 1870s to the 1890s demonstrate that both English and Scottish commentators were
concerned about maintaining national and imperial prestige, as well as with the
ramifications of engaging in armed conflict. Even as divisions emerged, they largely fell
along party lines and were relatively unaffected by geographical considerations. It is
arguable, therefore, that variances in the reactions should effectively be considered as
part of a broader “British” dialogue.
On the other hand, the public discourse regarding military reform from the 1870s
onward suggests that there were indeed some nuances in the way people in the different
kingdoms approached the issue, and that the public’s engagement was not entirely
uniform. To be sure, there was a great deal of common ground as the respective
1
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communities debated the necessity for reform, the type of reform, and the costs
associated with reforming the military. However, distinctions between the English and
Scottish papers—and presumably their readers—became much more apparent as the
ramifications of military reform impinged on areas deemed culturally significant. The
prime example of this noted in chapter four was the significant concern raised regarding
the merger of battalions and the re-kilting of Highlander regiments as a part of Childers’s
reform initiatives. While questions about consolidation were raised by constituencies on
both sides of the border, the cultural and historical implications were more loudly
vocalized by the Scottish public. In contrast, the concerns and protests which emerged
from England over the matter generally came from those within the military
establishment.
The works of John MacKenzie and other contributors to his “Studies in
Imperialism” series have done much to demonstrate that Victorian culture was replete
with messages pertaining to the empire and to the military as a manifestation of national
power and prestige. In surveying that scholarship MacKenzie concluded:
By the 1890s, it is clear, British society was saturated with nationalist and
militarist ideas. The queen and the army were moved to the centre of the imperial
stage, a cult of heroes and a heroic national history was celebrated in popular
literature and had infiltrated school textbooks, and the music-halls exploited the
patriotic sentiment in songs and tableaux.2
2
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As the above quotation implies, however, these works have tended to present British
culture as monolithic rather than seeing it as a product of distinct regions that may well
have viewed the empire through different lenses. The result has been that, although the
British public as a whole engaged with the same subject matter, the manner in which
different audiences consumed, interpreted and considered those imperial messages to
have meaning has been overlooked. To be sure, that trend has begun to shift as recent
scholarship has become focused on exploring and deconstructing the concept of identity
in the British Isles.3 In turn, those studies have led to inquiries about how the British
public connected to the empire at the provincial level.4
For instance, Heather Streets has recently addressed the nineteenth-century
concept that certain races were “biologically or culturally predisposed to the arts of
war.”5 Specifically, she focused on questions of why Highlander, Sikh, and Gurka
regiments attained a reputation for being among the empire’s fiercest warriors, and how
that collective perception translated into a general ideology in Britain. Examining
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Roberts’s use of the popular press to advance the army’s initiatives, Streets has concluded
that the military and the concept of martial races formed an integral part of late-Victorian
culture.6 Building off of this insight, it stands to reason that differences would exist in
the manner in which civilian communities related to the military. As such, in addition to
surveying the broad spectrum of popular culture and the integration of martially
suggestive imperial motifs, this chapter will pay particular attention to the following
questions: How did the popularization and consumption of the imperial and military
motifs manifest themselves on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border to the other?
Were there in fact, significant cultural distinctions at play regarding the integration of the
military into the public sphere, as the discourse on military policy suggests?
NATIONAL POPULARIZATION OF THE MILITARY

Beyond the political discourses of the daily and weekly newspapers, as Jeffrey
Richards has persuasively contended, British imperial juvenile literature legitimized,
glamorized, and romanticized the wider societal interest in empire. Designed to entertain
and instruct its readers, juvenile fiction arguably had a deeper impact upon the reading
public than any other direct forms of communication, such as speeches, sermons, or
school lessons.7 As both Richards and Kathryn Castle have pointed out, the genre of
adventure stories was particularly concerned with exemplifying evangelical and racial
messages, and over the course of the nineteenth century, those messages became
increasingly militaristic.8
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Beyond juvenile literature, works aimed at an adult or general audience—
including those of poets, novelists, and journalists—were influential in highlighting the
military’s exploits on behalf of the empire, even in instances of death and defeat.
Tennyson’s epic poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” along with some of his lesser
known works, including “The Charge of the Heavy Brigade” and “Epitaph on General
Gordon,” stand out for their telling of British military actions in the Crimean War and
Sudan operations.
When can their glory fade?
O the wild charge they made!
All the world wonder’d.
Honor the charge they made!
Honor the Light Brigade,
Noble six hundred!9
Glory to each and to all, and the charge that they made!
Glory to all the three hundred, and to all the Brigade!10
Warrior of God, man’s friend, and tyrant’s foe
Now somewhere dead far in the waste of Sudan,
Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know
This earth has never borne a nobler man.11
Likewise, Thomas Campbell, Lord Macaulay, and Feclia Heman all wrote stirringly of
past and present wars, while Rudyard Kipling’s barrack-room ballads such as “Hymn
Before Action” and “Ford O’ Kabul River” did much to promote sympathy for the
common soldier and the military profession in their efforts to defend Britain and the
empire.12 In particular, such poetry found its way into literature that purposefully
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targeted young boys, such as Frederick Langbridge’s Ballads of the Brave (1890),
William Henley’s Lyra Heroica: a book of verse for Boys (1891), Arthur Stanley’s
Patriotic Songs: a book of English Verse (1901), William Knight’s Pro Patria Regina
(1901), William Caton’s Songs of England (1902), and James Fawside’s The Flag of
England, Ballads of the Brave and Poems of Patriotism (1914). While their titles
conveyed their purpose succinctly, Henley stated explicitly that his ambition was “to set
forth, as only art can,
the beauty and joy of living, the beauty and blessedness of death, the glory of
battle and adventure, the nobility of devotion—to a cause, an ideal, a passion
even—the dignity of resistance, the sacred quality of patriotism.13
And William Knight characterized his “small contribution to a patriotic purpose” as one
that revealed “what is ‘true, and beautiful, and good’” about the Anglo-Saxon race.14
The notions of duty, honor, sacrifice, and national pride that these refined writings
articulated were supplemented by a plethora of music-hall songs such as “By Jingo,” and
numerous paintings, such as Richard Caton Woodville’s “The Charge of the Light
Brigade,” Lady Butler’s “Scotland Forever,” and Robert Gibb’s “Thin Red Line.”15 The
combined effect of these expressions was the creation of what some referred to as a
“fount of patriotism” and others as “mob passion” that permeated popular discourse and
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transcended class divisions. These forms of media effectively celebrated British
imperialism and justified the United Kingdom’s colonial wars, all the while conveying
the notion that it was not the British way to seek out war purposefully but to fight when
the empire was challenged.16 As Krzysztof Cieszkowski has contended, Lady Butler’s
piece “Floreat Etona!” visually exemplified Henry Newbolt’s call for Britons to “Play
Up! play up! and play the game!”17 However, Carolyn Wynne has cautioned that
Butler’s works—which the public received enthusiastically as celebrations of the empire,
the army, and the common soldier—did not directly advance the “crude jingoism” of the
day. In fact, by her frequent focus on the suffering and tragic results of war, Butler’s
works were “not always in harmony with the imperial Zeitgeist of the late nineteenth
century.”18 An example of such a work would be “The Remnants of the Army,
Jellalabad, January 13th, 1842” (1879), which depicted the disastrous retreat taken by
General Elphinstone during the First Afghan War.19 The disconnect between Butler’s
more complex engagement with military realities and public sentiment can perhaps be
crudely measured. As her biographers have noted, after making her initial splash with
her breakout masterpiece “Roll Call” (1874), Butler’s reputation declined in the 1880s, as
the more complex imperial themes of her works apparently affected public perceptions of
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her.20 Her story is an important reminder that scholars must be cautious about how we
utilize art and literature as source material when drawing conclusions about issues as
complex as imperial sentiment.

Figure 5-1: Engraving of Lady Butler’s “Floreat Etona!”21
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Figure 5-2: Engraving of Lady Butler’s
“The Remnant of an Army”22

Imperial messaging of a martial nature was thus aimed at all ages and delivered in
multiple media, including music halls, paintings, newspapers, and elite and popular
literature. Likewise, picture books brought such themes home to British youths even
before they entered primary schools. For instance, Frank Green’s Pictures for Little
Englanders: a Companion to ABC’s for Baby Patriots, included rhymes such as:
The Union Jack
Wave John Bull Junior,
Wave our British Flag!
The Terror of the Foreigner,
Despite his noisy brag.

The Girl He Left Behind Him
Little Boy Blue, go blow your horn,
To cheer up this Maiden all forlorn;
For her soldier laddie will soon return,
But first his foes have a lesson to learn.

The Army
When I was young and a grenadier,
The sound of the drum was ever dear,
But the only tunes that I could play
Were “Forward! Boys,” and “Lead the Way!”

The Navy
Here are some British ironclads—
You must not mind a bit,
That taxes should grow heavier
If but our Navy’s fit.23
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A is for the Army
That dies for the Queen;
It’s the very best Army
That was seen.

B stands for Battles
By which England’s name
Has for ever been covered
With glory and fame.

D is the Daring
We show on the field
Which makes every enemy
Vanish or yield.

N is the Navy
We keep at Spithead;
It’s a sight that makes foreigners
Wish they were dead.

Figure 5-3: ABC’s for Baby Patriots24
Once in school, youths were exposed to texts, such as Cyril Ransome’s Elementary
History for Schools and Charlotte Yonge’s Westminster Reading Books. As Chancellor
has shown, such works preached the idea that all citizens of the British Empire had a
spiritual obligation and duty to defend its principles:
Whoever does his or her duty to God, man and to the country is helping to keep
our beloved old England in honour and safety.25
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Taking the issue of patriotism one step further, C. R. L. Fletcher and Rudyard Kipling
published a history textbook in 1911 aimed at young Britons that waded into the issue of
universal military service, which we have already seen had not won general approval
from their parents. According to Fletcher and Kipling, one’s duty to God and country
required all citizens to undergo military training and service in the nation’s armed forces:
But I don’t think that there can be any doubt that the only safe thing for all of us
who love our country is to learn soldiering at once and be prepared to fight at any
moment.26
Most texts refrained from going as far as this, but they still spoke of duty and service to
the nation in general terms, and as Chancellor has documented, history textbooks were
highly jingoistic and ultra-patriotic in their language and subject matter.27
That such messaging was indeed consumed by Britain’s youth is indicated by the
recollections of Donald Hodge, a World War I veteran who grew up in the years after the
Boer War:
War had been a part of our background, in every sense of the word really. When
we learned history, it was a succession of kings, queens, and battles. When we
learned geography, the maps we saw were covered by crossed swords, which
indicated a battle. … The Battle of Hastings, Napoleonic Wars, up to the Boer
War. ... And when it came to learning poetry, school was all by rote. We had to
learn a psalm every week and periodically a piece of poetry. And the poetry was
actually scattered with battles ... We started with 'How Horatio Captained the
Bridge.' We went on to the 'Battle of Hastings,' and then to the Napoleonic Wars,
and then the Crimean War, and then at that time the Boer War.”28
As indicated by Hodge’s testimonial, elementary and secondary primers and history
textbooks indeed proved quite effective in spreading martial sentiments to British youth.
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By the turn of the century, history readers, textbooks, and juvenile literature consistently
glamorized the exploits of military figures, such as Admiral Horatio Nelson and the Duke
of Wellington, while elevating generals such as Henry Havelock and Charles Gordon to
martyr status. The consequent message was that such individuals were to be revered and
emulated.29 In addition, Wolseley came to be regarded by the country as “Our Only
General,” and the phrase “All Sir Garnet” became equated with success.30
British society’s draw toward military pomp is also evidenced by promotional
materials for a variety of commodities. Such themes frequently adorned advertisements
for items such as Pattison’s Scotch Whisky. That Pattisons’ whisky advertisements
invariably depicted a kilted-Highlander regiment is a graphic illustration of Streets’s
contention that the British public considered the military through a racial lens. 31 Aside
from advertisements for commodities, military imagery was also the subject of articles in
popular magazines if not the primary focus of the magazines themselves. One example
of such a publication was the monthly magazine The British Realm, whose cover
consistently put provocative military images on full display. The cover for the January
1899 edition was representative of these images; it depicted a myriad of soldiers and
sailors wearing uniforms from across the empire, effectively and vividly placing the
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concept of a “British Realm” in a martial and imperial context.32 The magazine also
addressed a variety of other popular cultural topics during its run from 1897 through
1904. While the attention to military matters in the immediate context of the empire
might be fully expected, the public’s fascination with military pageantry was further
suggested by the British Realm’s nonchalant inclusion of a photograph of nine-year-old
Hugh Trevor Dawson striking a martial pose in its piece on the activities and membership
of the Prince’s Skating Club.33

Figure 5-4: Pattisons’ Whisky Advertisement34
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will remain there.”
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Figure 5-5: British Realm, 3
(January, 1898), cover.

Figure 5-6: “Master Hugh Trevor
Dawson as the ‘Handy Man.’”
British Realm 5 (February, 1902), 48.

The proliferation of such martial attitudes and sentiments in British society led the
social historian J. A. Mangan to conclude that, by the turn of the twentieth century, war
was widely viewed as a “sacred path to moral purity, ascendancy and domination.”35
Indeed, according to such materials, war was seen as a natural part of human interaction,
not as something to be shunned, but rather as something to be accepted as a legitimate
part of international politics. Despite those in society who frowned upon the cultural
manifestations of militarism—including the pro-Boer factions discussed in Chapter
Three—Howard has maintained that many in Victorian and Edwardian Britain had, by
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the outbreak of the Great War, become largely desensitized to the horrific side of war and
instead had embraced warfare as a determinant of the fittest nation and its right to rule. 36
Truly, so long as military institutions or outbursts of bellicism did not infringe upon the
cherished notions of personal liberty and the British sense of fair play, military motifs
had become incorporated into British culture.
Provincial Relations with the Military and the Empire,
and the Return of the Iconic Highlander

While there was much continuity in the way that the Empire and the British
military were popularized and consumed, there were also some distinct regional
manifestations of martial sentiment. On the broadest level this was revealed in the
language used by the press and public to discuss the nation in imperial contexts. As
innumerable instances in the past four chapters have shown, this involved the frequent
conflation of “England” and “English” with “Britain” and “British” in English
newspapers. As Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose have contended, this conflation was one
that was deliberately advanced as early as the late 1840s with Thomas Macaulay’s
immensely popular History of England, a work that emphasized the rise and dominance
of a distinct and heralded English nation. Marked by a constitutionally limited
government, free press, free speech, and the Protestant religion, Macaulay’s imagined
English people and nation arose as homogenous entities. Through its dominance of
Ireland and a Union with Scotland, new groups were grafted onto England and became
assimilated as English, with the periphery then being the contemporarily established
Empire in the New World, the Caribbean, and India.37 With that understanding in hand,

36
37

Howard, The Causes of War, 271-272.
Catherine Hall, “At Home with History: Macaulay and the History of England,” in At Home with the

292
subsequent investments in the Cape, the Transvaal, Egypt and the Sudan were to be seen
and widely described and understood as English enterprises. While this was to be
expected from English newspapers, such conflations were also made by non-English
writers as well, such as Sir William F. Butler, the Irish-born army officer who wrote
extensively on his own military experiences in South Africa, Egypt, and Canada on
behalf of “queen and country.” Butler consistently conflated “England” with “Britain,”
and more often than not, showed a preference for the former over the latter.38 For
instance, in addressing his role in the Second Ashanti War (1873-1874), Butler stated:
A general and some thirty or forty officers of various abilities had landed on the
most pestilential shore in the world for the avowed object of driving back a horde
of forty thousand splendidly disciplined African savages, who had invaded British
territory. All the hopes founded upon the idea that the native races who lived
under our protection in the forest lying between the sea and the River Prah—
Fanits, Assims, Abras, and others—would rally under English leadership to do
battle against their hereditary enemies, the Ashantis, had proved entirely
fallacious.39
Writing about what the government’s reaction should be to the threat posed by the Mahdi
to the stability of the Sudan in 1883, he contended:
The English government were now alarmed. One of two things must happen—
either the Sudan must be fought for with English troops and paid for with English
gold, or it must be abandoned.40
Later, in writing his history of Wolseley’s Nile expedition in late-1884, he referred to the
mission as a “purely English matter,” despite the fact that Wolseley’s force included a
number of prominent non-English battalions, specifically the1st Royal Highlanders, the
“Black Watch,” and the Gordon Highlanders. Also present were battalions from the
Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose (Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 32-34, 40-41.
38
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Royal Irish and West Kent Regiment.41 At the same time, Butler also showed a
pronounced preference for “England” over “Britain.” In recalling the enormous weight
and responsibility on his shoulders, Butler wrote:
My wrong, if it was to be my wrong, meant the death of hundreds of men, the loss
of millions of money, the utter failure in the eyes of the world of the most
remarkable effort made by England in our generation.42
In fact, in his account, The Campaign of the Cataracts, Butler referred to “England”
twenty-eight times, but used “Britain” only twice.43 In Butler’s other works, such as his
biography of Gordon, “Britain” appeared just as infrequently and almost never apart from
the joined term “Great Britain.”44
In stark contrast, as Esther Breitenbach explained in her recent work on Scottish
missionaries, Scots consistently used the designate of “British” or “Britain” in
conjunction with the activity of Christians and imperial administration.45 For example,
she notes that the Free Church of Scotland Quarterly characterized Havelock’s efforts to
suppress the Indian Mutiny as being “the noblest deed that ever God put into the power of
a British soldier to do.”46 At the same time, the “English” descriptor in Scottish
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discourses was distinctly different and only used when specifically referencing the
language, though it might also be used in connection with the broader culture of the
United Kingdom. Breitenbach concluded that references to “English” society and culture
included Scots and, where differences did exist, they highlighted those distinctions.47
Indeed as Christopher Harvie has contended, the use of “Britain” and “British,” while
politically correct was “too cumbersome a formulation for diplomats, merchants, and
publicists to deal with.” As a result, the use of “English” and “England,” which
referenced the language and the predominant state became a “default position” that
“Scots had to live with.”48 Moreover, he contends that the labels of “Britain” and
“British” carried significant provincial connotations that were utilized by local chapters
of country-wide organizations and clubs to designate their affiliation. 49
Consequently, although “England” and “English” may have been the predominant
label for the nation and its people, when it came to imperial affairs, the empire was very
much a British enterprise. As Paul Ward has argued, such language allowed Scots to
emphasize their contribution to the nation and empire, of which many were fiercely proud
and defensive.50 Thus, Breitenbach detected relatively little tension over the use of labels
such as English, British, or Scottish while Scots served abroad, but she noted that
sensitivity did manifest over their use within the United Kingdome itself. 51 As we will
see shortly, many Scots expressed that sensitivity in the pages of the Scots provincial
presses. There, when labels pertained to Scotland’s place in the empire, Scottish papers
preferred to use the word “British” rather than “English.”
47
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Moreover, when looking at coverage of the military and its relationship to the
general public, one can detect several patterns in the press. Perhaps not surprisingly,
aside from giving attention to active military campaigns, my survey of the leading presses
digitized by the British Library Newspapers, found that Conservative, Unionist, and
independent papers in England were much more likely to offer coverage of the
promotions, deployments, shooting competitions, and other happenings of district or local
units and the Volunteers than were Liberal papers. When they did, however, it was
generally information gleaned from the London Gazette, the official government organ,
and not resulting from locally generated reportage. To that end, when they did cover the
peacetime actions of the military, papers such as the Evesham Journal, Gloucester
Standard, and Dereham and Fakenham Times, often focused on matters of national
attention such as the grand scale maneuvers conducted on the Salisbury Plain in
September of 1898 and 1899.52 When they mentioned noteworthy general officers or
regiments, such as the reception of new regimental colors by the Scots Guards, the
coverage of the English provincial papers generally reflected the national interest.53 Even
so, some English papers, such as the Cheshire Observer, the Derby Mercury, the
Hampshire Telegraph, and the Isle of Wight Observer, did consistently cover
developments in the local Volunteer units, which frequently involved reports on shooting
matches. While such reports were certainly geared to informing the neighborhood about
an event of local interest, the reports themselves were not necessarily written to engender
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public affection toward the military. More often than not they were merely statements of
fact.54
Such barebones coverage does not in itself mean that the English public was
uninterested in military activities; indeed, scattered comments in local stories indicate
that men and women were interested in military spectacles if nothing else. The Pall Mall
Gazette’s report on the recruiting march of the 2nd Battalion Devonshires in August 1895
mentioned that such developments were “being watched with great interest in the
country.”55 The brief notice on the Devonshires’ activity was subsequently carried
verbatim by provincial papers such as the Yorkshire-based Huddersfield Chronicle,
which served a readership well outside the unit’s recruitment area.56 Particular attention
was paid to the Volunteers, because of the defensive character of the organization.
Cunningham and, more recently, Walton have shown that men and women from all parts
of the country and from all political backgrounds came out to watch Volunteers drill and
train, and at times bestowed gifts upon the units.57 The personal and beneficial attention
paid to military units by individuals notwithstanding, as Ian Beckett’s recent work on the
Volunteers has concluded, public interest in the Force largely depended on international
events. As a result, in times of peace, the public was frequently indifferent to the
Volunteer Force and derided those who were a part of it.58 At the same time, the tone and
general substance of the press coverage suggests that the English public engaged
54
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individual military units more as part of the national institution and less so for their
distinctive provincial and/or local identity.
In contrast, Scottish papers of both Conservative and Liberal persuasions
frequently covered such military activities, seemingly fostering warm connections
between the military and the civilian communities. That attention may indicate that the
bonds between the military and the community were particularly strong and particularly
important in Scotland. For instance, when the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Seaforth
Highlanders, known as the “the Ross-shire Rifles,” marched into Dingall (Ross-shire) in
August 1899 as a part of their annual recruiting tour, the Northern Weekly devoted nearly
three full columns to the festivities surrounding the battalion’s arrival. The battalion
marched into town with their brass band playing “Rothesay Bay,” and the paper reported
that they were welcomed by civilians who sang songs of “older days” that lauded the
grandness of the regiment. Moreover, according to the report, many people were
disappointed that they had missed the regiment when it took an unexpected route to the
camping grounds on the far side of town. In addition to covering the details of the event,
the Northern Weekly reminded its readers of the lengthy and proud heritage of the
regiment that traced back to 1777, listing the times and places since 1835 where they had
been engaged.59 Similarly, the Liberal Fife Free Press announced the activities which
were to accompany the Fife Artillery Regiment’s annual two-week training session, while
the Unionist Edinburgh Evening Dispatch printed a full itinerary of the 1st Battalion of
the Gordon Highlanders when it left on a wide-ranging publicity tour.60 In the case of the
former, the Fife Free Press berated the “unpatriotic” actions of certain members of the
59
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Kirkcaldy Town Council, who had refrained from coming out in support of the regiment
as it passed through. The paper insisted that without the auxiliary forces, the country
would be forced to bear the “yoke of conscription” and “bear the enforced militarism that
was now part of the national life of the Continental states,” implying that to slight the
Volunteers was a tremendous disservice to the country’s ideals, including the ideal of
volunteerism itself which they ought to defend.61
It is possible that such receptions and such coverage were mere testaments that
Cardwell’s localization and linked-battalion reforms of 1853 had been more successful in
tying the civilian population to the militia and regular army communities in Scotland than
in England. Indeed, the provincial press in Scotland was not oblivious to the connection
between fostering that relationship and yielding new recruits. Still, according to the
Weekly Free Press of Aberdeen, translating that rapport to recruitment remained dubious
at best nearly fifty years after those reforms were enacted:
Everywhere the gallant regiment has been received with enthusiasm, and
hospitably entertained. It now remains to be seen whether the real purpose of the
march, the acquisition of recruits, will be attained. There can be no doubt that an
intelligent, well-behaved young fellow, on entering the army, may rely on
securing speedy promotion, and may confidently hope to raise himself … to a
very fair position. Unfortunately … there still lingers throughout Scotland the
feeling that a man who becomes a soldier is drifting downwards, and the great
improvement that has taken place during the past twenty years in the treatment of
the rank and file is not fully realised. By-and-by prejudices will be dissipated …
if only some assurance of steady employment could be held out to soldiers of
good character on their discharge. Certainly it is that Highland lads who think of
enlisting could not possibly do better than join the Seaforths—a regiment that has
long been as highly distinguished for excellent conduct at home as for valour on
the field.62
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What is equally likely is that while personal aversions to taking the king’s shilling
remained, the bonds linking the civilian and military communities in Scotland exceeded
those in the sister country to the south.63
A measure of this connection was the voluminous coverage of peacetime military
happenings that transcended occasions where local life literally intersected with the
military. Papers such as the Unionist Aberdeen Weekly Journal, Aberdeen’s Liberal
Weekly Free Press, and the Liberal People’s Journal, which circulated in various editions
all around Scotland, all had serial columns dedicated to Scottish regiments for the
purpose of keeping “the Scottish soldiers in touch with the people of Scotland, and to
keep up that interest and connection which will tend largely in favour of recruiting.”64 In
the case of the Aberdeen Weekly Journal’s coverage of the Highland Brigade, that
coverage was not limited to the Gordon Highlanders, who were principally stationed in
Aberdeen, but also included the Cameronians, Seaforths, Black Watch and other Scottish
regiments who were barracked across Scotland. And while these columns most certainly
touted military exploits, they were also concerned with “sports and recreations, their
barrack-room relaxations, and their shooting and marching exercises,” promotions, and
other regimental items of interests.65
Serials, such as James McKnight’s “Highland Battles and Highland Arms” in the
Weekly Inverness, brought to the forefront incidents of Scotland’s more distant but still
63
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treasured military past.66 Other serials brought attention to less well-known persons who
may not have had ties to the local community. These included individuals like Lt. A. M.
Price of the 2nd Lancers, who grew up in Aberdeen and received a Distinguished Service
Order in 1898 for gallantry at Omdurman, or Mike, “an Irish private in Squadron M,”
who recounted his exploits at the Battle of Omdurman.67 The People’s Journal likewise
formed a serial around soldiers like Captain Henry MacDonald and Lt. Colonel Abraham
Boulger, who had successfully risen through the ranks and were awarded with
commissions.68 Such accounts not only served to personalize the military achievements
of Scots and Scottish regiments, but since Boulger was Irish and had served in English
units, it is arguable that such accounts helped to personalize the entire institution of the
British army.69
More significantly, after reading through some thirty Scottish newspapers,
another genre that emphasized military themes became evident—the serial novel.
Appearing in papers such as the People’s Journal, the backdrop for these romantic
history and adventure tales was often events such as the campaigns in the Sudan, the
Crimean War, or Waterloo, and their titles smacked of adventurism: “Fields of Fire,”
“The Captain’s Bride,” “Into the Jaws of Death,” and “Field and Fight.” 70 However,
much older themes, such as the Jacobite Uprising were also used for stories such as
“Battle of Sheriffmuir,” “Kilmarnock’s Hussars, and “The White Rose – A Romance of
‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’.”71 These themes were particularly prevalent in the Celtic
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Monthly, a magazine which ran from 1892-1917 and was devoted to the “History, Folklore, Archaeology, Poetry, Biography, Antiquities, Art, etc. of the Highlands.”72
These works were hardly unique creations of the late-nineteenth century. On the
contrary, they were reminiscent of one of Scotland’s greatest men of letters, Sir Walter
Scott, who had similarly romanticized Scotland’s martial past in works like Waverly, The
Black Dwarf, and Rob Roy in an effort to engender appreciation for the Highlands among
his fellow Lowlanders. As noted by Linda Colley and Hugh Trevor-Roper, Scott’s
efforts fell short in the near term. Lowlanders of the early nineteenth century generally
sought recognition as gentlemen by adopting the ways, fashions, and customs of London
society, and they were taken aback by the “tartanized” Highland clans who welcomed the
visit of George IV to Edinburgh in 1822.73 Indeed, as Graeme Morton has argued, in
stark contrast to the rest of Europe, nineteenth-century Scotland suffered a noticeable
lack of nationalism.74 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the frequent
appearance of Highland themes, not only in Highland publications, where one might
expect to find it, but in Lowland ones as well, pointed to a realignment in the selfidentification of the Lowlanders that coincided with the emergence of Scottish nationalist
July 1899.
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organizations, such as the Scottish Home Rule Association (1886).75 Whereas
Highlanders had once been shunned by Lowlanders for their martial ways, by the 1890s
many Lowlanders gladly attached themselves to that identity and proudly claimed it for
their own.76 In fostering this identity, the People’s Journal was arguably one of the more
influential newspapers, as regional editions were published throughout the country from
Aberdeen, Cupar, Dundee, Edinburgh, Forfar, Glasgow, Inverness, Perth, and Stirling,
and its pages consistently celebrated and melded Scotland’s martial past and present
contributions to the British imperial experience.
Even while a romanticized heritage of the Highlands had begun to permeate the
self-consciousness of Lowlanders via provincial publications at the turn of the century,
the presses unique to the Highlands lauded Scottish regiments more avidly. This
distinction should not be surprising. Ever since the union of 1707, the Highlands had
been more closely identified with exuding a military culture than the Lowlands, an
association that contributed to the concept of martial races.77 In the aftermath of the
Union, Lowlanders largely relied on the model of England in their attempts to modernize
the country, and their dedication to the Covenanting movement displaced soldiering as a
central pillar of Lowlander identity. The demise of any Lowlander militarism can also be
accounted for by the Royal Navy’s drain on Lowland manpower and the fact that
Highland regiments were much more homogenously filled with Scots, than were non-
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Highland Scottish regiments.78 Indeed, in a March 1898 article, the Weekly Inverness
lamented the extra-Scots makeup of many “Scottish” regiments.79
On this point, many Scots were fiercely proud of their martial contributions to the
empire and were concerned that those actions should not be undermined by those who
insisted that Britain was in reality Greater England. Highland presses—more so than
their Lowland counterparts—reacted stridently to English attempts to subvert, appropriate
or otherwise minimize Scotland’s contributions to the empire and its place as a coequal
partner of Great Britain. Much to the consternation of thousands of Scots, including
Scottish Secretary Alexander Bruce, 6th Lord Balfour of Burleigh, Lord Salisbury was
frequently and deliberately interchanged the term “England” for the broader term
“Britain.” His blatantly prejudicial response to the 1897 Scottish Petition on this issue
was particularly astounding:80
The advantage of the use of the words ‘England, English, and Englishmen’ is that
it has not any strict geographical interpretation, but is generally used for any
inhabitants. Its use is traditional and based on a long course of history. It has
followed the development of our literature … [and] it carries a clear idea to
anybody’s mind, and it rests upon no interpretation of a statute, but upon a long
established custom, it raises no jealous question of honour or pre-eminence
among the various populations of the two islands. While agreeing that the formal
phrase ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’ should be employed in all
documents of strictly formal character,

I do not think any advantage would be gained by attempting to modify the laxer
practice which is instinctively followed by writers and speakers upon public
questions.81
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For patriotic Scots like Bruce, such slights and deliberate expressions of English
hegemony could not be ignored. On 17 February 1898, the Weekly Inverness raised
objections to “English” being used interchangeably with “British,” which prompted the
question of whether Scotland was losing its identity. Coincidentally, but fittingly in the
present discussion, the paper protested accounts where massacres of the 78th and 93rd
Highlanders in the Sepoy Rebellion and at Lucknow had been referred to as “English”
massacres.82
Likewise, in the Edinburgh edition of the People’s Journal from 23 July to 1
October 1899, a series of letters appeared that debated the “Britain over England” issue.
Driven by the ardent nationalism of John S. Rae and Malcolm MacGregor Campbell,
much of the discussion emphasized Scotland’s contributions to and sacrifices on behalf of
Britain, which were minimized by treating the nation as Greater England.83 Reflecting
upon the celebrations surrounding the American day of independence, Campbell
lamented the absence of such a day in Scotland. With a subtle reference to Scotland’s
victory at Bannockburn, he called for Scots to demand the right to observe a national
holiday on its “day of deliverance from the English yoke.”84 While the points of Rae and
MacGregor were welcomed and appreciated by many, others—such as “Rob Roy,” a Scot
from Perth, and A. E. Parker, an Englishman from Aberdeen—insisted that such “bluster”
served very little purpose whatsoever. The issue of a distinct Scottish identity was best
set aside for the sake of national fraternity and unity. Indeed, “Rob Roy,” an ardent
82
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supporter of Scottish Home Rule, argued that that cause would be better served by
dismissing the subject instead of fanning the flames of animosity toward the “hated
English.”85
That Malcolm MacGregor Campbell was a secretary for the Scottish Home Rule
Association may suggest that this discussion and the broader effusion of military themed
articles were fundamentally linked to the efforts of the Home Rule movement which
arose between 1880 and 1914. To this end, the press coverage of the Scottish regiments
and their soldiers transcended the mere purpose of covering current events and providing
public interest stories, as such topics also engendered a greater appreciation for
Scotland’s participation in the empire and the British nation. The product was the
marketing of a self-conscious Scottish identity deeply grounded in Scotland’s military
past and present, to a degree that in England was either minimized or completely nonexistent.
Thus, in delving into the links between the public and the military, the provincial
dynamics of British cultural militarism, and its manifestation in the provincial press, we
find that those sentiments and connections may well have been much more deeply rooted
in Scotland than in England. As we have seen, both English and Scottish presses
certainly reported on military happenings. However, the attention devoted to recruitment
marches and social occasions in Scotland was both quantitatively greater and
qualitatively warmer, suggesting a different bond between the civilian and military
sectors than existed in England. Moreover, to the extent that martial attitudes and
sympathies emerged particularly strongly in Scotland, they were notably molded and
characterized by a strongly romanticized strain of Highlanderism, ironically using the
85
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trope of a “martial race” in service to the Crown to undercut the very connection that
such a race was meant to preserve.86 Thus, while the connection between the British
public and the military received heightened attention in the cultural expressions of the
later nineteenth century, those links were expressed distinctively in Scotland in order to
serve, simultaneously and paradoxically, both regional and national purposes.
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CONCLUSION

In surveying the public discourse concerning imperial events in the Cape to Cairo
corridor and imperial military reform, we have seen that the issues of empire and national
defense were interwoven and certainly not confined to the polished offices of Whitehall,
the smoking rooms of the elite’s social clubs, or even the parlors of the middle class.
They loomed large in the eyes of the public, evidenced by discussions in the provincial
press and the manner in which Britain’s imperial army became fused into the fabric of
Victorian society. While Porter acknowledges that such messages became more
prevalent after 1870, his central question remains whether those messages were enough
to pull an “absent-minded” public out of its slumber and infuse it with a “general imperial
consciousness.”1
The present survey of national and provincial papers—a resource that Porter did
not consult in his work—demonstrates that newspapers and popular journals, and by
extension the reading public, were consistently attentive to imperial matters.
Specifically, in matters concerning the Cape to Cairo corridor, there was robust
commentary about Britain’s actions in South Africa, Egypt, and the Sudan across the
political spectrum. Furthermore, tangible evidence of the public’s engagement in
imperial questions included the significant results of the 1880 parliamentary elections, an
election rooted in Gladstone’s anti-imperial Midlothian platform, as well as the numerous
public demonstrations that were held in response to imperial events such as the siege of
Gordon in Khartoum, the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, and most notably the
relief of Mafeking.
1
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Throughout these events, Conservative, Liberal, and Radical voices spoke of the
need to defend the nation’s prestige and not to lose face in the eyes of its Continental
rivals. British prestige involved a myriad of principles associated with classical
liberalism, security, and economic and diplomatic supremacy. For the imperialists, the
perpetuation of these elements often necessitated a vigorous foreign and imperial policy.
It was on these grounds that Carnarvon and Shepstone coordinated the annexation of the
Transvaal in 1877, a move generally supported by the press and politicians across the
political spectrum. In the 1880s, the need to uphold British prestige was at the heart of
intervention in the Sudan, the public’s perception surrounding Gordon’s mission to
Khartoum and the public’s demands for his relief. In the 1890s, British prestige was
again invoked by Milner and his allies to support the Uitlanders in the Transvaal and to
legitimize the Second Anglo-Boer War. Equally concerned about the nation’s standing,
Liberal leaders and their press allies frequently opposed imperial interventionism on the
grounds that it was detrimental to British prestige, as it proved to be an unnecessary
distraction to the government, diverted resources, and pulled Britain away from its
principled abhorrence of war, conflict, conquest, and subjugation.
Looking at the spectrum of efforts at reforming the military and the engagement
of the public, we find a great deal of continuity in the public’s engagement in such
matters as far back as the mid-1850s. To be sure, as international circumstances and the
geopolitical landscape evolved, the potential consequences of military inefficiency and
ill-preparedness became all the more serious. The British government was forced to shift
its attention from having to contend mostly with pre-industrial armies on the imperial
periphery to the highly industrialized powers of continental Europe. The result was that
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the consequences of military inefficiency and ill-preparedness became all the more
apparent and led some to advocate more radical solutions, such as conscription. To that
end, Porter saw the propagandizing of Britain’s imperial perils by the imperialists in the
early 1900s as an effort to awaken the British public out of a slumber. He concluded that
the sheer weight of their effort was indicative of the new imperial threat and the
unsatisfactory state of the public’s attention to it. As to the question of whether the
public was convinced by it, Porter offered two possible and admittedly contradictory
deductions. While he allowed that it was possible that the public did become convinced
of the threat given the pervasiveness of the imperial message, he contends that it was far
more likely that the public largely remained unconvinced of the threat because imperialist
propaganda continued unabated for a lengthy period of time and because it did not
apparently effectively penetrate the working class.2
However, if we examine the 1890s from the perspective that the public had for
decades been keenly engaged in questions concerning military efficiency and military
preparedness, along with their imperial implications and connotations, the imperialist
propaganda of the 1890s which was geared toward heightening the awareness of national
defense takes on quite a different meaning. In the first place, it is hardly surprising that
as the perils to the British Empire increased, the calls for a national response did as well.
In addition, so far as the imperialist propaganda was directed towards encouraging
attention to national defense in the late 1890s, this messaging was very much in keeping
with the previous efforts to encourage patriotism and increase voluntary enlistment in the
services. The “paramilitary” organizations of the 1890s and early 1900s were certainly
outgrowths of these efforts. By the mid-1890s, some imperialists believed that more
2
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drastic solutions might be necessary: compulsory military service and conscription. For
that solution to be implemented, however, Britons would have to reassess their personal
and national identity, and redefine themselves and their nation socially, politically, and
above all militarily. For a nation and people whose military traditions had been so deeply
rooted for centuries, this was a momentous challenge. That the imperialists and
militarists did not fully succeed to their satisfaction in bringing the country to that level
of awareness prior to the First World War should thus be hardly surprising. The failure
of groups such as the National Service League to harness the public to their cause was not
necessarily an indication that the country remained oblivious to imperial needs. In the
light of the robust attention paid to imperial affairs at least since the annexation of the
Transvaal, the public’s reluctance to respond to the NSL suggests just the opposite: the
nation remained attached to its longstanding commitment to voluntarism as a
fundamental British institution. Even amid the stark reality of an imperiled empire
during the First World War, Britons were reluctant to part ways with such national
principles. At the same time, the volunteerism of the British public in the first weeks of
the war argues that they were already aware of the imperial implications of that conflict
and were well-prepared to answer Kitchener’s call to arms. Indeed to a certain extent, the
public was more cognizant of those needs than some of the nation’s leaders.3
In examining the public discourse on a provincial level, we find that by the end of
the nineteenth century the martial aspects of the empire were being propagated by
nationalist-minded Scots who sought to emphasize the Britishness of the British Empire
by highlighting Scotland’s unique contribution to it. Despite frequent conflation of

3
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“England” and “English” with “Britain” and “British” by the national and English
provincial presses in addressing imperial politics, these Scots could thus assert that the
empire was not English, but was most certainly a British construction and enterprise. At
the same time, the discussions concerning military reform for the benefit of the nation
and the empire became incorporated into broader narratives concerning Scotland’s
martial and Highlander identity—elements that were deeply felt by the general Scottish
public.
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